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crowned heads that the age of absolute monarchies was past. This revolution was the first accomplished by the military in behalf of liberty. Our ancestors had seen an English army cut down the Long Parliament; we have seen French grenadiers first destroy, and then a second time chase, an assembly of legislators; but the Spanish soldiers did not elevate an Oliver Cromwell, or a Buonaparte, on their shields; it was the laws of their country that they displayed on their triumphant flags. It has been generally acknowleged in Europe, that all nations require such institutions as may in some measure temper royal authority; but a potent Monarch has said, and many have repeated it after him, that these institutions ought to emanate from the throne itself. The principle may be very fine, but may I be permitted to ask in return, what is to be done, when nothing does emanate from the throne? If a King doom to death, if he plunge into dungeons, if he exile, men who have braved every danger to replace him on his throne, and to secure its independence and liberties to their country, then is a nation to endure and suffer in silence; or to see without murmuring its hopes extinguished, its laws violated, and all the sources of its prosperity choked up? O you whose heart the most powerful crown in the world has not yet been able to corrupt, deign to say, if the heroic Spaniard ought to hide his head in the folds of the mantle yet wet with the blood that he has shed for his King, and submissively stoop to receive blows from the very hand to which he has so lately restored the sceptre? There are those in Europe who would dare to answer yes; but they are those who consider the people as no more than sheep given up to the discretion of their driver. Alexander however is not of this description. The Spanish revolution was a pillar of light for all the armies of absolute monarchies, and its rapidity made a powerful impression upon the people, and particularly upon that portion of society which is the most interested in the preservation of order, and make the most sacrifices towards maintaining it. It taught these persons that it was possible to pass speedily and happily from a state of oppression and misery to one of liberty and felicity. Piedmont felt the stimulus of this revolu tion, but in a less degree than Naples did; because the imagination of the Piedmontese is more calm, and because they flattered themselves that the government of the king would profit by the terrible

lessons which astounded all.

At length I come to an epoch which will be long remembered by Italy, I mean the NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION. This is not the place to investigate its causes or to retrace its history; I shall only observe, in order to show its legitimacy, that the Government of Naples was perfectly arbitrary; and if I should be told, that it was wisely administered, I shall deny the fact. We must not form

our judgment of the prosperity of a state, from a few beneficial establishments in the metropolis. It is to the provinces, to places further removed from the centre of government, that I would appeal as to the execution of the laws. I have no fear of being belied by these witnesses, the fittest persons to consult, unless indeed we would judge of the merits of a government by a few roads and public edifices, or by the luxury of the higher classes, whose unhappiness is never very great, even under arbitrary sway, unless they suffer from the distresses of their fellow-citizens, or stoop to disgraceful expedients to lighten the burden of slavery.

Moreover, if the government of Ferdinand I. refrained from tyrannic violence, the King found himself fully requited in the nature of the Neapolitan revolution. Those enthusiastic spirits showed that they had even forgotten the noble blood shed in Naples in 1799, as a happy omen on the return of this same Prince, which was hailed with benedictions in 1820, because he appeared to lend himself willingly to the wishes of the nation. One would have said that the Neapolitan people were greeting, in the person of their King, the lawgiver and the founder of their liberties. Mistaken people! Too dear has it cost you to put away distrust and invidious resolutions!-To be just and moderate in a time of revolution is doubtless commendable; but in the paths of justice and moderation we must preserve a firm step. Moderation is not weakness, nor pusillanimous complaisance. There was indeed too much ne glect and credulity in the resolutions of the Neapolitan Parliament, when it did not resist the departure of Ferdinand for Laybach: nor was this merely an excess of confidence. To be plain, the Parliament did not feel what the national dignity required, when it allowed the King to present himself at the Congress in the attitude of a suppliant. Nor did he then think to appear there in the character of a perjurer.

I have yet a graver fault to find with the Neapolitans; which is, that they did not perceive their situation, but foolishly imagined they should disarm their implacable enemy by a defensive attitude. It was evident to all that the Sovereigns assembled at Laybach would not let slip the opportunity of beating down at Naples the principle of military revolutions, which they must still spare in the Spanish Peninsula. It was also pretty clear that the Emperor of Austria would never permit that five millions of Italians should be governed by a free constitution. This would in a few years bring on a revolution in Italy, which must soon have wrested Lombardy from his dominion. It became necessary, therefore, at whatever cost, to crush Naples, and even run the risk of an Italian revolution, which at this time would be both premature and feeble. Could he be sure too, on any other occasion, of the support of the

Emperor Alexander? It was consequently in this very revolution that Naples should have sought its salvation: it was only by rousing the whole Peninsula, that Southern Italy could ensure the establishment of its own liberties. The remembrance of the unfortunate enterprise of Joachim Murat, should not have prevented another attempt; times were altered. Although Italy did not attend to the call of a foreigner, remarkable for the imbecility of his political character, it might have risen at the summons of the Neapolitan people become free, and inviting their brethren to liberty.

There is still another fault alleged by some against the Neapolitans. I refer to their choice of the Spanish constitution. It is not our business here to discuss its advantages or defects, still less to blame the Spaniards who proclaimed it in 1820: they were bound to rally round it, as a precious model consecrated by the approval of a national assembly, whose noble courage did not suffer them to despair of their country in the hour of calamity. But the Neapolitans possessed also a model, which perhaps they were wrong in neglecting, I mean the Sicilian constitution. This constitution, but little known in Europe, is no other than the written English constitution, but the English constitution without that inequality in the right of election, and without those remains of feudality, which impair its symmetry. It was more popular than the French charter; either because the exclusive proposal or introduction of laws did not form part of the Royal prerogative, or on account of its elective regulations, and the broad basis on which the municipalities were organised. It would have been easy to divest it of certain defects of form and detail, not well adapted to its general tenor. By adopting it, Naples would in the first place have had the advantage of avoiding its sanguinary contests with Sicily, which shocked Europe, and afflicted Italy. Naples might besides have reasonably reckoned on the support of England and France by ranging herself under the same constitutional system. This last advantage appears so important, more especially in the situation of the Neapolitans, that it is surprising they should have renounced it so lightly. This is difficult to account for, unless we ascribe it to a kind of terror in the aristocracy—a terror which spread itself through Italy by means of the writings and discourses of the liberal party of France. But was not this a false alarm ? The French had, and they have still to dread, a menacing aristocracy, which was invested with great power under the ancient monarchy, which but ill dissembles its lofty pretensions, which has heavy misfortunes to recount, and odious reprisals (réactions) to charge themselves with; an aristocracy, in short, which in its turn assumes the shape of a party, and is formidable from the

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distinguished talents of many of the individuals composing it. Nothing of this kind existed in Italy, where the nobility possesses no influence, but such as arises from the favors it obtains from arbitrary power, or from the attachment of a portion of its body to liberal ideas and to the interests of the people. The nobles of the first-mentioned class would have fallen with the absolute monarchy, which constitutes their only force; and it is not from the latter description that Italians had any thing to fear.

If the Liberals of Piedmont did not all view with pleasure the constitutional system adopted by the Neapolitans, the greater part of them were persuaded that their revolution would become one of those great occasions offered by Providence to oppressed nations, of re-appearing with honor on the arena of politics. Others thought that Italy was not yet prepared for a war of independence. Information, said they, has as yet only reached to certain classes of society; the young, however devoted to their country, can as yet but offer the aid of their physical strength; hereafter, when filling the principal employments in the community, and possessed of property, they will find themselves naturally and effectively at the head of a revolution. That might be all very true; but the first step was taken. The Neapolitans had claimed their rights-they were our brothers; we could not abandon them, without at once failing in our duty and injuring the national honor. There began, however, to detach itself from the great majority of Piedmontese of whom I have spoken above, and who glowed with desire for a war of Italian independence, a set of people who, placing no reliance in the Neapolitans, and judging of the future from the past, were persuaded that their armies would not be able to oppose the slightest resistance. We were more confident; indeed it was not in our nature to foresee the events that have happened.

The differences of opinion among the Piedmontese Liberals on the constitution best suited to their country, did not prevent a sincere union in the endeavours they used to enlighten the King's Government with respect to its situation. An address of the Piedmontese people to the King, and a short pamphlet intitled 'Duties of the Piedmontese,' were rapidly circulated at Turin; I regret that I cannot give them publicity. It would be seen with what affection they speak of the King and his family; with what truth the internal disorders of the country are therein pourtrayed, and with what indignation the idea of seeing the house of Savoy promote the designs of Austria on Italy is treated. These pamphlets were printed in Naples and in Spain, and showed at once the moderation and energy that were employed amongst us in the expression of public opinion. It was observable that the wish for a free constitution was strongly marked, but that its principles

duced on him by the bold step of the chief president. Every man of sense in Piedmont, from that moment, made up his mind, that the great work in which the whole nation took so deep an interest, would either not be accomplished for a long time, or would be effected in an imperfect manner by an awkward alliance between the old and the new system: such an alliance would have occasioned great expense to the state without any advantage, and would have been but another step towards confusion.

Thus did Piedmont, subjected to an arbitrary government, lose all hope of averting painful consequences by the counterpoise of a legislature solemnly promulgated, and a magistracy of elevated character and strong in the reverence of the people. At the same time an approaching crisis in our finances seemed at hand: a crisis truly alarming for an absolute monarchy, since one or other of these results must happen: Either the government is strong-and it will grind its subjects by enormous contributions that trench on even capital, and otherwise prove destructive of property; or it is weak, and the state falls into dissolution ; when the people, naturally driven to an open expression of their fears, eventually become an instrument of anarchy in the hands of the factious.

The more the situation of the country was considered by the enlightened Piedmontese, the more they were convinced of the necessity of a responsible ministry, and of a parliament that should place the government on a regular system, prevent a deficit in the finances, frame wholesome laws, and guaranty their execution. This truth, moreover, was generally admitted, so as to become the popular feeling. A minority, consisting of a portion of the nobility and of ex-magistrates, still resisted it. This minority was weak in numbers, yet more so in talent! The prejudices of the King, and still more of the Queen, constituted its chief strength: but unfortunately it was supported by some public men attached to that fatally timid and superficial policy which will be noticed hereafter. They, however, were themselves convinced that under the present system no good could be effected. What a way of showing love for their country!

If ever the measure of introducing a representative government into a country can be deemed legitimate and necessary, it was without doubt in Piedmont, and at the period of which I speak. It was legitimate because Piedmont was ruled by an absolute government under which subjects were abandoned to the arbitrary will of a master, which constitutes in the eyes of all politicians an illegal government. It was necessary because the government, arbitrary by privilege, was likewise so in act, from the instability of the laws, and the abusive facility with which they could be broken;

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