6 . no hesitation in concluding a treaty with Russia for the purpose of crushing the rebellion, and made no secret of the policy he was pursuing. He told Sir Andrew Buchanan, that Prussia would never endure an independent Poland on her frontiers; that, if the Poles seemed likely to succeed, Prussia would occupy their country in force. Europe would never allow that,' said Sir Andrew. What is Europe?' replied Bismarck. 'Certain great nations,' said the ambassador. 'Are they all agreed upon the subject?' asked Bismarck. Sir Andrew gave no answer, but suggested that France would not suffer a new oppression of Poland. For us,' said Bismarck, the suppression of the insurrection is a matter of life and death.' Napoleon III. went so far as to propose to England and Austria a common attack upon Prussia. This was rejected by England, and the intervention of the Great Powers against Russia in favour of Poland substituted. This, however, did not find favour in France. Bismarck's policy was violently attacked at home. After a three days' debate the Lower House resolved by a large majority that the interests of Prussia demanded a strict neutrality in the Polish struggle. The Opposition, Sybel tells us, had little idea that the Convention with Russia was the foundation-stone of Prussia's future greatness. In the meantime the Cabinets of Paris and London were working in favour of the Poles, and were doing their utmost to obtain the co-operation of Austria. The actual terms offered are not known, probably the possession of Silesia and Roumania in return for the cession of Venice. After some hesitation Austria consented to desert her position of neutrality. There were reports of a descent in Courland or of an attack upon Trieste. The Emperor of Russia with dignified firmness denied the right of foreign Powers to interfere with his domestic affairs. Indeed the intervention did more harm than good. All Russia rose to reduce the rebels to obedience. Russia had soon half-a-million soldiers at her disposal, and sent a message to Berlin suggesting a common declaration of war against France and Austria. The proposal was a tempting one, as Austria was entirely unarmed. But Bismarck was afraid that the whole strength of France might be directed against Prussia, and that the peace which concluded the war might be more favourable to Russia than to her ally. The proposition was therefore declined. A last attempt to place Austria at the head of Germany was made by the invitation of all German Princes to Frankfort to discuss the formation of a new Federal Constitution. This design was communicated by the Emperor Francis Joseph to King William, at Gastein, on August 2, 1863, and fell upon him like a thunderbolt. There was little chance from the first of the invitation being accepted. The King of Prussia could easily excuse himself on the score of health. Every effort was made to induce him to attend. The venerable King John of Saxony, the most pious and the most learned of monarchs, was sent to Baden to shake his resolution; every art of female persuasion was employed to cajole him. His good-nature would have led him to acquiesce, but Bismarck declared that he would indeed go to Frankfort, if his sovereign commanded him, but that he would in that case never return as minister to Berlin. The King said 'Thirty princes invite me and send me a king as courier, how can I refuse?' At last, after much delay, a letter was sent declining the invitation. No sooner had the door closed behind the King of Saxony than Bismarck threw down a table with glasses on it, and smashed them to pieces. I must break something,' he cried. Now I breathe again.' The desired opportunity of a war with Austria that should secure the supremacy of Prussia was offered to Bismarck by the Schleswig-Holstein question, which at this period entered upon an acute phase. It would be impossible within the limits of this article to give any satisfactory account of a dispute, which had its roots in the fifteenth century, which dealt with the most complicated points of the law of infeudation and of the private succession of sovereigns, which was involved in national hatreds and national ambitions, and which had been obscured by storms of passion the more severe because they raged in a small compass. Lord Palmerston once said that the Schleswig-Holstein question was so difficult that only three men had ever understood it. The first was Prince Albert, and he was dead; the second was a Danish statesman, and he had gone mad; the third was Palmerston himself, and he had forgotten it. Suffice it to say that while the inheritance to the Danish monarchy was continued in the female line, that of the three Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg was confined to the male line; that Schleswig was to a great extent Danish, that Holstein was undeniably German, and indeed an integral portion of the German Empire. At the same time the separation of the two Duchies, giving one to Denmark and the other to Germany, was impossible, because they had always been united, and were determined to remain so. The Conference held in London in 1852 had confirmed the succession to the Danish monarchy as well as the Duchies to Prince Christian of Sonderburg-Glücksburg, but the line of Augustenburg had never properly surrendered surrendered their rights to the southern province, and the Protocol of London had never been acknowledged by the German Confederation. In default of larger interests, the patriotic feelings of Danes and Germans had been roused to fever-heat about the provinces of these tiny territories, the almost forgotten cradle of the English race. The Eider-Danes demanded the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark, and did not care much what became of Holstein. The Germans were indignant that a fragment of the Empire should be torn from them, and that a German population should be taught the Danish language, and fleeced by Danish tax-gatherers. The population of the Duchies clamoured for their ancient union, elevated the popular song 'Schleswig-Holstein sea-surrounded,' to the dignity of a national hymn, and tossed up their caps for their hereditary land-prince Frederick of Augustenburg. Bismarck expressed the opinion in December 1862 that the question could not be settled in a manner favourable to Prussia without war, and that it would be easy to find a favourable opportunity for beginning it. It was unfortunate that Prussia had signed the London Protocol, but Austria was in the same position. The Eider-Danes' had persuaded King Frederick VII. to issue an edict on March 30, 1863, which incorporated Schleswig with Denmark, and gave very scanty recognition to the rights of Holstein. This was regarded by the Diet as a breach of faith, and in consequence a Federal execution was ordered, or, in other words, an occupation of Holstein by the troops of Hanover and Saxony. The English Government had a natural affection for the conditions of the London Protocol. Denmark, as the smaller State, was popular in this country, a feeling which was strengthened by the marriage of the Prince of Wales with a Danish princess. In the midst of these perplexities King Frederick died on November 15. Only ten days before, the Emperor Napoleon, on opening the Chambers, had declared 'the Treaties of 1815 have ceased to exist; what can be more sensible than to summon the European Powers to a Congress, which will decide as a high tribunal over all questions in dispute?' On the same day invitations were sent to all sovereigns to attend a Congress in Paris. A new Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig had been offered to Frederick on his death-bed. 'I will not sign it,' he said; 'Christian may do so if he likes.' This was the first question the new sovereign had to decide. At the same time the Duke of Augustenburg assumed the government of Schleswig and Holstein under the title of Frederick VIII., in spite of the London Protocol. Three Three days after his accession King Christian found a surging crowd under the windows of his palace. His Prime Minister said to him, 'Sire, if you do not sign the new Constitution I cannot answer for your life or for that of your family.' Yielding to the advice of his mother-in-law, Princess Charlotte, he took the fatal step. All Germany was in flames. The Schleswigers shouted free from Denmark.' Cabinets, Chambers, Peoples, repeated the cry. Bismarck was rejoiced that Denmark had been the first to break the treaty. But he determined to act with caution. 'We found,' he said, 'in 1849 that it is bad to stand one against four; it is better to be two against three.' He was determined to act, if possible, in concert with Austria. On November 24 he came to an agreement with Count Karolyi, that the two Powers should support the action of the Confederation, and that the execution should be carried out as soon as possible. They thus adhered to their obligations as signatories of the London Protocol. The world was astonished to see the two rivals walking hand-in-hand, and supporting the integrity of the Danish monarchy, while the smaller German States were clamouring for the erection of the Duchies into a separate principality. The English Government strained every nerve to preserve peace. The French Emperor, on the other hand, saw in the dispute excellent material for his favourite project of a Congress. In the meantime he suggested a possible annexation of the Duchies by Prussia, and dropped hints of an alliance with Prussia against Austria. These overtures were coolly received by Bismarck. His policy, so far as it was then known, was not approved of by the Prussian Parliament, which voted by a large majority, that the honour and interest of Germany demanded that Frederick of Augustenburg should be recognized as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. The threatened execution lost its natural course. By this time the English Government had definitely declined the invitation of Napoleon III. to a Congress, and the relations between the two Powers became strained. Prussia suggested a Congress of ministers instead of a meeting of sovereigns, as a practical compromise. Lord Wodehouse was sent on a special mission to Berlin in favour of peace, but he produced no effect on Bismarck. The minister declared his regret if war should break out, but laid the blame on Denmark, which had been the first to violate the arrangements of 1852. At the close of the year the Federal troops, under General Hake, entered Holstein, the Austrian reserve posting itself at Hamburg, and the Prussian at Lübeck. No act of war was committed, as the Danes retired at their approach. The Holsteiners Holsteiners considered this advance as a step in favour of their Duke, but this was far from the mind of Bismarck. His views are expressed in an important minute to the King: 'There are three courses,' he says, 'before us. The first would be to repudiate the Treaty of London, and to march into Schleswig. This would be open war. The fate of the Duchies would be uncertain, and we should break with the Great Powers, especially with England. The second course is to repudiate the Treaty of London without engaging in war. The Confederation might then decide the question of the disputed succession, and settle the Prince in Holstein. But Schleswig would then remain unprotected. We could not intervene, as we should have destroyed the treaty which gave us the right to do so, and the Confederation would have no business to interfere with a non-German State. We should indeed rescue Holstein from Denmark, which may be effected without war, but we should sacrifice Schleswig. The third course is for Prussia and Austria to say nothing about the Treaty of London, but to base their action on the duty of Denmark to fulfil the obligations of 1852. We might present an ultimatum, or march into Schleswig without an ultimatum. That would mean war with Denmark, which we must carry out as quickly and energetically as possible. The Powers would have no right to interfere. None of them would fight, except possibly Sweden. Our position in a Congress would not be less favourable because the object of contention was already in our possession.' In pursuance of this last view an invitation was sent to Austria, which resulted in the signature of a treaty on January 16, 1864. Denmark was required to withdraw the Constitution of November under the penalty of the occupation of Schleswig by the two Powers. If war should break out, and the treaty of 1852 be annulled, the future of the Duchies was to be determined by the common consent of Austria and Prussia. The advance into Holstein begun almost immediately under the command of General Wrangel, then eighty years old. When Hake indignantly refused the offer of placing himself under Wrangel's command, Bismarck quietly replied, we should have been so glad to have given the brave troops of the Confederation a share in the patriotic and glorious work.' It is difficult to see how Austria fell so easily into the trap thus skilfully prepared for her. Europe imagined that she contemplated the establishment of an independent Duchy; it is quite certain that Bismarck contemplated nothing short of a union of both Schleswig and Holstein with the crown of Prussia, probably at the expense of a war with Austria. In the meantime Lord John Russell was indefatigable with his despatches. He summoned the Powers to a Conference, he warned Prussia and Austria by identical notes not to occupy Schleswig, |
