mastership in 1836, occupied the several foundation fellowships. Among these John Woolley was not long in attaining an honourable place. He was soon called to a tutorship in University College, and became noted as one of the most diligent and thorough of readers, giving and taking as his motto the grand old Greek proverb, Τὸ μὲν πάρεργον ἔργον ὣς ποιούμεθα Even my amusement I make serious work," as he says it " may be freely rendered."

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It was while enjoying the status of a scholar of University College, and performing the duties of a tutor therein, that John Woolley determined to assume the toils of authorship, and to write his name among modern logicians, by the production of a treatise on that science, which, while it would be strictly elementary," would enter "sufficiently into the principles of the science to awaken the learner's curiosity, and prepare him for a more enlarged and intellectual prosecution of the subject. Being of opinion" that for a very young mind the elegant introduction of Archbishop Whately is hardly technical enough," he has chosen to follow the arrangement and doctrine of Aldrich, accepting some improvements established by later logicians," and making some "deviations from his teaching." This modest account of his work and its aim might mislead the reader into supposing that the treatise was really little worth. On the contrary, it is one in which a great deal of acuteness, good sense, learning, thought, and originality are to be found. It is not only scholarly and scholastic; it is shrewd and well-planned. This will be readily seen from the following extracts from the introduction, in which his general views on logic are contained :

or reason.

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"Exclusively of his passions and will there are in the mind of man two principal instruments for the apprehension of truth-sense (aïobnois) and intellect (vovg): the former of these he shares with the brutes, the latter with purely spiritual beings; but occupying, as he does in his present condition, an interinediate position between these different orders, he is distinguished from them not more by the fact of possessing something which each respectively has not, than by the manner in which he possesses that which he and they partake in common. The design of man's creation, and the intention of this life as a scene of discipline and education, has called forth in him a third faculty, which is properly termed that of reflection, Objects, whether intellectual or sensible, are never in the first instance presented to the human mind in their true nature as wholes: they are, as it were, divided into parts, conveyed to him by distinct and successive impressions through the intellect or the different senses, and his discipline consists in the perception of the connection of these several impressions, and the combination of them into one idea according to their real relations: it is this act of combination to which the name of reason is properly applied, and it is to be carefully distinguished from the perception of the separate ideas which it unites.... The proper office of science is the examination of principles, in their twofold character as elements and general facts or laws. . . To this twofold use of science human fallibility, in all practical subjects, requires the addition of a third. This was the office

of those which, in the language of the Greek philosophy, were distinguished as the formal and organic or instrumental from the former, which were called the real sciences; and in the system of Aristotle each practical or theoretical treatise is attended by its own formal auxiliary. These consist of systems of rules, deduced

...

from the principles of the science, and serving as instruments by the application of which we may test the correctness or incorrectness of any operation we wish to examine. The elements of the reasoning faculty and their functions are amongst the subjects of psychology, or mental anatomy; the principles or laws according to which their operations are performed are included in the speculations of metaphysic; the instrumental science or art which enables us to ascertain the conformity of any act of reason to the laws of metaphysic is logic. Every system of rules, as we have said, derives its origin from human fallibility, and its principal value from the discovery and correction of error; it is, therefore, necessary for the logician to observe at the outset of his investigation to what mistakes the human reason is exposed, and for this purpose to analyze it into its component parts. The faculty of reason comprehends three distinct but progressive operations, which are called simple apprehension. judgment, and discourse. error of apprehension is termed indistinctness or confusion; of judgment, falsity; and of discourse, false collection; and that these are errors in the process of thought itself, and not in the object of it. Logic, as furnishing rules for the correction of these three errors, is divided into three parts,-distinct, but like the operations which it examines, not independent of each other. Matters of fact. the elements of thought, the logician assumes on the authority of others; he is simply concerned with the process of thought itself."

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From this epitome of the general principles of logic held by John Woolley the reader can readily see the place he occupies among the expositors of the science of thinking. He holds with the scholastics that "logic is the formal science of the laws of thought;" but he contends, in company with the modern school, that logic must harmonize with the spirit of the age by showing itself to be useful, and not merely a dry chip of ancient speculation. The main teaching of the formal portions of the science which he supplies are acute in thought and well-expressed, but are such as are to be found in most treatises compounded of Aristotle, Aldrich, and common sense. is not necessary, therefore, that we should load our pages with extracts from the ordinary expository portions.

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The following tables, which occur in Part I., may be usefully laid before our readers for study and thinking out:

By far the most noteworthy portions of this work-which Sir William Hamilton characterized as one "of no ordinary merit" are contained in the appendices, wherein, leaving the Aldrichian tract, he enters boldly into territories unmarked in his map of logic. These are entitled respectively:-1. "On the connection of language and ideas." This discusses the nature and origin of language, and epitomizes the arguments pro and con of the question "Is language of human or divine origin;" he concludes that,

"In the mind of Nature, ideas and words are connected by a real resemblance, of which some traces yet remain, although the corruption of man has to a great degree destroyed or weakened its completeness. In a perfect language words would be ovoiwuura, or exact copies of ideas; but we allow that in language, as we actually find it they are scarcely more than symbols, in the ordinary meaning of the term." 2. " On nominalism and realism;" that great controversy of the Middle ages. "A general account of its more important features is given in a lucid and succinct manner, and the general inclination of the author is towards realism. 3. "On Aristotle's views of induction." The value of this particular section requires more note than either of the others; and we shall proceed to supply some grounds for its proper appreciation,

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The theory of induction proposed by Lord Bacon in the " Novum Organon" (Book ii., Aphorism x. et seqq.), had originated a literature of discovery and invention, and given rise to a logical controversy regarding the merits of reasoning by induction and by deduction. At length logic came to be regarded as a synonym for syllogistic reasoning, and induction was spoken of as a new logic quite antagonistic to the old. Whately observes, that this mode of talking" of the superiority of the inductive to the syllogistic method of seeking truth, as if the two stood opposed to each other; and of the advantage of substituting the Organon' of Bacon for that of Aristotle,' "indicates a total misconception of both." "This inaccuracy," he says, seems to have arisen from a vagueness in the use of the word Induction, which is sometimes employed to designate the process of investigation and of collecting "facts, sometimes the deducing of an inference from these facts. The former of these processes (viz. that of observation and experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from that which takes place in the syllogism; but then it is not a process of argumentation: the latter again is an argumentative process, but then it is, like all other arguments, capable of being syllogistically expressed" ("Logic,' book iv., chap. r.). R. D. Hampden, another Oriel thinker," in his paper on "Aristotle's philosophy," in the "Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. viii., following Whately's lead, "defends the induction of Aristotle against its disparagement by Lord Bacon.' Hinds, Whately's vice-principal at St. Alban's Hall, supported the same view. Sir William Hamilton, in his famous article, attacked the Whatelyan exposition of Aristotle's induction with great force and general acceptance. Hamilton laid it down as a rule, that "to understand Aristotle in any of his works, he must be understood in all; and to be understood in all, he must be long and patiently studied by a mind disciplined to speculation, and familiar with the literature of philosophy." Woolley had read this article, and was led by it to study the whole subject in the original treatises of Aristotle. He did this with such effect as to produce quite a revision of opinion on this topic-with such effect as to influence Sir William Hamilton's mind and induce him to admit, that a change at least in his method of exposition would be advisable. So * remarkable was the effect on Sir William Hamilton's mind produced by this brief chapter that, having indicated this appendix by express mention as the cause of his conversion, he says, emphatically, by italization,-"What follows, on the logical doctrine of induction, is, as it has generally been admitted to be, I am convinced, true. I would, however, now evolve it in somewhat different language ("Discussions," p. 158). And, again, "I would now express this somewhat differently, though not varying in the doctrine itself." In this reconsideration of Aristotelic induction, Woolley preceded [Archbishop] Thomson, T. S. Hill, H. L. Mansel, &c., who follow and approve of the system of the Stagyrite; as well as J. S. Mill, who disapproves of and repudiates the ancient

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theory of induction, and who may justly be regarded as the Aristotle of experimental and observational induction; for it was early in 1840, when he had but recently completed the twentyfourth year of his age, that Woolley's work was published. The foregoing account of the status quæstionis may place the following excerpts on Aristotelic induction before the reader's mind in such a way as to impart a due sense of their importance in the history of modern thought in regard to logical science. After discussing" inductive syllogisms," and giving the valid forms of them, he supplies this dictum as that which holds in regard to them, viz., Whatever may be predicated affirmatively or negatively of all the members which together constitute a class, may be predicated in like manner of the whole class so constituted." The following are the rules to which they are subject:-1. "The major premiss must be universal. 2. The conclusion must be universal. 3. The minor premiss must be an inductive proposition, i.e., an affirmative proposition, with both its terms distributed. Then follows the Appendix, in which he quotes and expounds the Aristotelic definition of "induction" as "the form of reasoning by which we prove the major of the middle term (ie., those terms which are the major and middle in the deductive syllogism), by means of the minor (i.e., the individuals which in deduction would be the minor term). After explaining the source of the common misunderstanding of scholastic induction, he proceeds thus to expound his views of the logical induction of the ancients :

A logical conclusion cannot assert more than is virtually contained in its premisses; that therefore which is predicated in the conclusion of a whole class, must have been assumed in the premisses of every member of which that class is composed as a matter of fact, however, it is clear that it is scarcely ever possible to ascertain every member, and in most cases the number of cases which fall under our observation bears no proportion whatever to the whole. In these instances, therefore, it follows, either that induction is founded on a fallacy, and so all reasoning is overthrown, or that there exists some primary law of thought by which we are justified in assuming a whole class, from a limited number on individuals. That the latter alternative is the true one is attested by the tendency to form inductions universally observed in mankind, a tendency not derived from experience, but innate in us from childhood, and which experience does not increase, but rather checks and renders cautious. Any principle which allows us to assume 7 a whole class from any number short of the whole, must be founded on an antecedent presumption that they are all governed by a common, immutable principle. It is therefore clear that for a perfect induction, all that is required is the knowledge of a single fact that if this one be well ascertained, we are allowed, or rather compelled. by a law of our nature, to assume the agreement of all other members of the same class, and that this law is derived from our antecedent belief in the immutability of all nature's operations. This statement, at first sight, appears a paradox; for it is universally allowed that no induction can be trusted which is not based upon an accurate and extended examination of facts; but the difficulty will immediately vanish when we proceed to investigate the proE cess by which the mind is enabled to ascertain the fact from which her induction mis derived. To ascertain a single fact is far from being that easy task