the eyes, head and body away from the disgusting object; turning

away attention from disgusting thoughts. The emotion of disgust

inhibits curiosity about its object, and curiosity tends to exclude

disgust. Disgust tends to exclude all disinterested emotion on behalf

of its object, pp. 374-378.

3. Of the Instinctive Tendencies of Tactile Disgust.

Shrinking from the object when near or approaching; shuddering and

shaking of the body when the object is upon the surface of it;

rushing wildly about; cleansing the part of the body when the

object sticks to it, by licking or rubbing it, pp. 378-383.

4. Of the Laws of the Development of Disgust.

When the emotion of disgust develops it must have some object, however
vague, to refer its thought to and distract it from its own sensation,
so that these may fall into the background of consciousness and
colour the emotional attitude, pp. 384-486.

5. Of Primitive Tactile Disgust.

There is a primitive disgust caused by sensations of touch and tem-
perature localised in other parts of the body than the organs of
taste and smell. The instinctive activities connected with this
disgust at first accomplished too rapidly for the emotion of disgust
to be felt. Before the emotion can be felt, there must therefore be
some condition present that delays the instinctive response, pp.
386-389.

6. Of the Nature and Function of the Emotion of Disgust.

The emotion of disgust accompanied by a partial revival of the instincts

of ejection,-as evidenced by its expression: its central tendency to

turn away from and avoid the disgusting object. It organises in a

single system a number of instincts of diverse origin, and controls

their manifestations, pp. 389–394.

CHAPTER XV.

REPUGNANCE.

1. Of Repugnance as a Primary Emotion.

Repugnance a primary emotion opposite to joy, distinct from disgust,

pp. 395-398.

2. The Meaning of the Terms 'Displeasure, Distaste,'' Repugnance,

'Aversion, Antipathy.

'Displeasure' popularly used to signify an emotion of repugnance imply-

ing a certain degree of anger, but distinct from disgust, pp. 398-

400.-The term 'aversion' emphasises the conative side of an experi-

ence opposite to desire. The term 'distaste,' a weaker form of disgust.

'Antipathy' expresses better than 'distaste' the distinctness of this

emotion; but also used to signify opposite emotions to the sympa-

thetic, pp. 400-401.

3. The Mood of Repugnance.

Shown by aversion to things in general; By pursuit of solitude; by fault-

finding; by anger; by sorrow. It often appears as if the mood were

one of irascibility or anger. Tends to develop either misanthropy or

pessimism; and to destroy all capacity for love, pp. 401-408.

4. Of the Relation Between Repugnance and Disgust.

Repugnance possesses the same central tendency as the emotion of

disgust, namely to exclude the perception or thought of its object.

Proposal to employ the term 'repugnance' in a more general sense

so as to include disgust, pp. 408-410.

5. Ennui.

A kind of repugnance, induced by a feeling of mental fatigue at having

to attend to, or be occupied with, uninteresting objects, pp. 410-412.

6. Discontent.

In

A late variety of repugnance aroused exclusively by ideas; implies the
conception of a better state than our own, and, except in discontent
with ourselves, includes a feeling of inequality or injustice.
distinction from ennui, which inclines to sadness, discontent always
connected with anger; hence the difference of its expression, pp.
412-416.

CHAPTER XVI.

SURPRISE.

1. Adam Smith's Theory of the Causes of Surprise and Wonder.

That the new is not the only cause of wonder, nor is surprise always

caused by the unexpected,-as Adam Smith thought. Surprise

stronger in proportion as present experience disagrees with other or

past experience, pp. 417-421.

2. Adam Smith's Theory of the Nature of Surprise.

Smith's theory that surprise was only the first shock accompanying any

other emotion suddenly aroused; that it increases the intensity of the

emotion blended with it. How far his opinion is correct that it is

more akin to joy than sorrow, pp. 421-423.

3. Of the Chief Varieties of Surprise and what they have in Common.

Two chief varieties of surprise, sensational and cognitive surprise; in the

latter we must cognise the object as a condition of feeling surprise,

in the former, not. Sensational surprise put an end to by cognition of

the object; so also the cognitive surprise, if cognition satisfies the

curiosity it evokes. Surprise is an emotion of shock and confusion

of mind that occupies the interval between the sudden event and the

cognition that explains it, pp. 423-427.

4. Of the Tendencies of Surprise.

The essential attitude of surprise one of exclamation, excluding curiosity.

It has no impulse, and therefore cannot be an emotional system,

pp. 428-430.-Its tendencies, non-conative. It indirectly excites the

mind to attend to the object, but only as surprise declines. Surprise

tends to free the mind from what before occupied it; also tends to

diminish the efficacy of the emotion with which it blends; also

tends to arrest the impulses of the emotion excited with it, sometimes

excluding the emotion itself from being felt, pp. 430–434.

5. Of the Question Whether Surprise is a Primary Emotion.

Bain's theory that surprise is a "neutral" excitement and, therefore, a

distinct emotion. If its feeling is not "indifferent," surprise may

still sometimes be a distinct emotion, pp. 434-437.

CHAPTER XVII.

CURIOSITY.

1. The Impulse of Curiosity.

Curiosity an impulse and instinct but not an emotion. The eagerness of

curiosity like the eagerness of any other impulse. Many of our

primary emotions include the impulse of curiosity, and subordinate it

to their ends, pp. 438-442.

2. The Nature of Wonder.

Wonder includes an arrested impulse of curiosity; also cognitive surprise

or astonishment; also joy; though this may be counteracted in wonder

at evil things, pp. 442–448.

3. Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Knowledge.

Curiosity, in wonder, tends to pursue knowledge as an end; in other

emotions, as means to their ends, pp. 449-450.

4. Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Mystery.

Curiosity, in this variety of wonder, tends to maintain ignorance, because

held in check by delight in, and astonishment at, the marvellous.

Here joy stronger than curiosity, pp. 450-454.

BOOK III.

THE SYSTEM OF DESIRE.

CHAPTER I.

THE SYSTEM OF DESIRE.

1. Of the differences of Impulse, Appetite and Emotion.

Three orders of systems: (1) the simplest; the systems of impulses, each

including some instinctive or other tendency; (2) the systems of the

appetites and emotions, including some of the former tendencies;

(3) the most complex: the systems of the sentiments, including

some of both the preceding, pp. 457-460.

2. The Emotional System of Desire.

Desire sometimes dependent for the foresight of its end on obstruction to

its impulse; sometimes the thought of an end occurs first and

arouses desire for it, pp. 460-461.-Once desire has arisen, dependent

on obstruction for eliciting the potentialities of its system: (1) in

respect of the search for and choice of means; (2) for transforming

the "uneasiness" of its impulse into definite prospective emotions,

corresponding to the checks and releases to which it is subject.

These emotions are 'hope,' 'confidence,' 'disappointment,' 'despon-
dency,' 'anxiety,' 'despair.' They belong only to desire; its system
essentially contains their dispositions, pp. 461-463.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAWS OF THE EMOTIONAL SYSTEM OF DESIRE.

The prospective emotions of Desire depend on the thought of its end, and

on some modification of this thought which acts as the stimulus of

one or other of them; and on some obstruction of its end, and on

some supposed change of situation affecting the prospective fulfil-

ment of this end, pp. 464-465.—We cannot define the thoughts on

which the prospective emotions of hope, anxiety and despondency

depend, because states of bodily health or ill health, and innate

tempers, predispose us to one or the other. But we cannot feel

despair or confidence, unless we have the thought and belief that the

end is either certain or unattainable. In disappointment, expectation

is suddenly frustrated, pp. 465-467. Have the prospective emotions,

like others, their own impulses and ends? pp. 467-468.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS OF DESIRE.

We cannot observe the process by which the prospective emotions have
been developed. Hope not joy, and without its essential tendency;

yet with a conservative tendency of its own. It does not seem to

be developed from joy, rather to be a definite form of one of the

changes to which impulses are subject, pp. 468-471.-Anxiety a

development of our later fears. As we are apt to fear lest the end

desired may not be accomplished,-when the desire is sufficiently

important, so from this fear interacting with hope, anxiety may be

developed. Despondency, disappointment, and despair probably

differentiations of sorrow, pp. 472–476.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE (1).

1. Of the Laws of Hope and Despondency.

Hope strengthens desire, but, making the future appear better than the

present, is often deceptive; still indispensable. Despondency

weakens desire; but has this counterbalancing advantage that, by

impelling us to desist from the line of action which has led to failure,

it leaves us free to attempt some other, to which when hope revives

we turn. Hope restores the courage of which despondency deprived

us, pp. 477-481.

2. Of the Tendencies of Anxiety.

Anxiety, of great service to desire by preventing our yielding to extrava-

gant hopes; by making us cautious and watchful in pursuit of its end;

by stimulating desire to further exertions, pp. 481-482.

3. The Tendencies of Confidence.

When the end is certain we no longer need caution and watchfulness, and

confidence tends to relax them. Self-confidence a valuable support

to desire, so long as it inspires us with courage to attempt difficult

ends, and is balanced by doubt and anxiety, pp. 482-487.

4. The Tendencies of Disappointment.

Disappointment, of service to desire by correcting deceitful hopes and

rash confidence; but when excessive and not balanced by opposite

emotions, it discourages desire, and excludes hope, pp. 487-490.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE (II).

Despair.

Is despair of any service to desire? It evokes courage, energy and
resolution even in cowards, and these necessary in desperate
situations, pp. 491-495.-The suicidal impulse, which it evokes in
certain cases, shown to be instrumental to its end,—as union in death,
or escape from suffering, pp. 496-497.-The study of our less import-
ant desires shows that they are not strengthened by despair, but
extinguished by it, pp. 497-500.-A contrary law, that despair tends