distinguishes the one system from the other. It is their modes

of behaviour that distinguish them. The aggressive behaviour of

anger sufficiently distinguishes it from fear. Its utility consists in

the sudden increase of energy it imparts, and in the number of forms

of aggressive action which it puts at the service of the emotions

and sentiments, pp. 250-251.

3. The Relation of the System of Anger to the Emotion.

In the development of anger, as in the case of fear, the emotion comes

to assume a position of supreme importance in relation to the

instinctive and acquired tendencies of its system, pp. 251-252.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE LAWS OF THE INTERACTION OF FEAR AND ANGER.

1. Of the Complicated Relation of the Systems of Fear and Anger.

That the systems of anger and fear do not wholly tend to exclude one

another, but that their respective emotions do, pp. 253–256.

2. Of the Relation of Jealousy to Fear and Anger.

The behaviour of jealousy shows it to be a derivative of fear and anger,

which implies the action of self-love and a lowering of its self-

valuation; hence concealed out of shame. The emotion of jealousy,

though unique, has a variable composition, inclining sometimes more

to anger, sometimes more to fear; and its end requires the support

of the tendencies of both emotions. In jealousy the systems, and

even the emotions, of fear and anger appear to be harmonised,

pp. 256–262.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT THAT HAVE THEIR

SOURCE IN ANGER AND FEAR.

1. How far the Quality of Courage Belongs to Anger.

Anger innately possesses the quality of courage, defined as a readiness to

risk the life of the organism to which it belongs for the attainment of

ends, pp. 263–265.

2. To what Kinds of Fear the Quality of Cowardice Belongs.

The egoistic varieties of fear innately possess the quality of cowardice,

as tending to avoid risking the life of the organism to which they

belong, p. 265.

3. Of Disinterested Fear as an Innate Source of both Courage and

Caution.

Fear on behalf of others implies love; is an innate source of courage and

caution, pp. 265-268.

4. Of the Derivation of Cruelty from Certain Kinds of Anger.
Cruelty, a quality of that variety of anger which aims at inflicting pain as
its end. The revengeful type of anger tends to become deliberately
cruel under the restraints of fear. Cruelty may also become the
object of a sentiment, affording enjoyment in the exercise of it, with-
out admixture of either anger or fear, pp. 268-270.

CHAPTER VII.

JOY (1).

1. Of the Distinction Between Joy and Pleasure.

Pleasure is an abstraction; joy is one of the concrete facts from which

we abstract it. Bodily pleasure and pain when they reach a certain

intensity tend to attract attention to themselves; but pleasant and

painful emotions tend to attract attention not to themselves but to

their objects, pp. 272-274.-Bodily pain and pleasure, when below a

certain intensity, tend to arouse and become part of some emotional

mood. Mental pleasure and pain always constituents of some

emotional attitude, pp. 275-276.

2. The Common Varieties of Joy.

That, failing to distinguish these by their differences of tendency, we have

to fall back on the differences of their objects, pp. 276-278.-That

joy is not in all cases a wholly pleasant emotion, and sometimes

involves more pain than pleasure, pp. 278-279.

3. The System and Laws of Joy.

The system of an emotion is that higher kind of system that we may call

an organisation, because its constituents promote a common end. Is

joy a system in this sense? Joy attracts attention and thought to its

object, and tends to maintain this object and our relation to it, and

is therefore such a system, pp. 279-281.-But where joy is un-

disturbed this impulse is scarcely felt; and in proportion as this

impulse is felt, enjoyment is diminished, pp. 282-285.

CHAPTER VIII.

JOY (11).

4. The Play-Impulse and the Behaviour of Play.

Play distinguished from work or serious activity; if it exercises the same

instincts, what makes it play? The same instincts here organised

in the system of joy, instead of in the systems of anger, fear and

appetite, and subordinated to its end. Hence two new features:

(1) the same instinctive behaviour apt to repeat itself in play because

it is here an object of joy; and (2) in social plays, the destructive

instincts are partially inhibited, so that their activities may be

consistent with enjoyment, and not arouse fear or anger, pp. 288-299.

-The system of joy, as manifested by play, contains more instincts

than any other primary system; but they are all borrowed except

the one that originally belongs to it, which gives to it its character-

istic behaviour and essential end, pp. 299-300.

CHAPTER IX.

SORROW.

1. Of the Common Varieties of Sorrow and Melancholy.

Two out of the four common types are mixed,' and none of them are
based on inherent differences of tendency, pp. 301-305.-In melan-
choly and 'melancholia,' sorrow or sadness is frequently connected
with fear law of their connection, pp. 305-309.-If we disconnect
sorrow from other emotions that complicate its behaviour, its
varieties seem reduced to two,-the depressed and the excited, pp.
309-310.

2. Of the Causation of Sorrow.

Sorrow, except where caused by a state of the body, arises from the
frustration of some impulse or desire, pp. 310-314.

3. Of the Nature of the System of Sorrow.

Sorrow, as an emotion of weakness caused by frustration of impulse has,

as its innately determined end, to obtain from others the help of which

it stands in need: the instinctive behaviour of its system is the cry

for help. The appeal for relief, distraction and sympathy, a develop-

ment of this primitive cry. The system of sorrow, therefore, includes

an instinct, pp. 314-317.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE LAWS OF THE TENDENCIES OF SORROW IN THE SENTIMENTS.

1. Of Two Different Tendencies of Emotion.

Tendencies of emotion are either conative or non-conative, pp. 319-

320.

2. The Law of Attraction.

The sorrow of love by voluntary recollection of the object, by augmen-
tation of its own suffering, by resistance to consolation, by its ideal of
constancy, manifests its attraction to its object, pp. 320-323.

3. The Law of Restoration.

The sorrow of love strives to restore that state of the beloved object,

or that relation to it, the loss of which causes the sorrow, pp. 323--

326.

4. Of the Source of the Tendencies of Attraction and Restoration in

Sorrow.

The tendency of attraction in sorrow is derived from joy, according to the

law that innate and acquired tendencies of one system may be also

organised in some other system to which they are serviceable, pp.

326-328.-The tendency of restoration does not belong to the system

of joy, but is innately connected with interruption or frustration of

its impulse. The tendency of restoration belongs to the system of

sorrow, but is sometimes felt without eliciting the emotion. When

the tendencies of attraction and restoration in sorrow are

themselves frustrated, then sorrow-other things equal-is at its

maximum intensity. The behaviour of these tendencies seems to be

in part instinctive, pp. 328-333.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE LAWS OF THE INCREASE AND DIMINUTION OF SORROW.

Sorrow increased by the precedency of joy, or by our remembrance of

it, or by our witnessing the signs of it around us, or even by our

thought of it, pp. 334-336.-Sorrow diminished by the precedency

of sorrow, by remembrance of it, by the perception of the signs of it

around us, or by the thought of it around us, pp. 336-339.-Sorrow

increased when it is sudden and unexpected; but, when it is either

foreseen or the mind prepared for it, not felt with the same intensity

pp. 339-341-Sorrow diminished by the knowledge that another

sorrows with us, but increased by the knowledge that another rejoices

at our suffering. Sorrow tends to become more painful by being

kept secret; but to be eased by being disclosed, pp. 341-342.-The

intensity of sorrow diminished by self-control, and increased by loss

of control; increased also by the knowledge that misfortune is

caused by our own folly; or by anything that once belonged to us: or

by one whom we love, pp. 343-346.

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE LAWS OF THE NON-CONATIVE TENDENCIES OF SORROW

1. Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Arouse Anger.

We cannot define the conditions under which sorrow when opposed tends
to arouse anger; we know only that the opposing force must not be
too strong and that there must be sufficient energy to resist it, pp.
347-349.

2. Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Break the Spirit.

When the opposition to the impulse of sorrow is too great to arouse anger,

the impulse of sorrow being frustrated, sorrow is increased; and in

proportion as this frustration occurs again and again, it tends to

destroy all hope, courage and energy of resistance, pp. 350-352.

3. Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Destroy the Value Set upon the Objects

of other Sentiments and to Increase the Value set on its own.

The sorrow of love, in proportion to its persistence, diminishes or destroys

the value placed on the objects of other sentiments of love, because it

diminishes or destroys our capacity to receive joy from them, pp. 352-

355. So far as sorrow diminishes the value placed on other objects,

it increases that placed on its own. Joy an original source of judgments

of value, pp. 355-360.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE TENDENCY OF SORROW TO STRENGTHEN AND PERFECT THE

CHARACTER OR TO WEAKEN AND DEGRADE IT.

1. Of the Opposite Opinions Concerning the Value of Sorrow.

Some great writers hold that sorrow is useless and has a bad influence on

character; others, that it has a great use and value, pp. 361-364.

2. Attempt to Estimate the Value of Sorrow by Estimating the Value of

its Functions in Different Systems.

The function of primitive sorrow, to obtain help. In the sentiment of

love, sorrow has a variety of functions: to build up a stable connec-

tion with the object, so that the love for it may be strong; when the

object is destroyed to preserve the love for it; to preserve union with

the object or so much of it as remains ; to restore the former union or

former state of the object. Where sorrow appears to be useless, its

end unattainable, it still tends to develop the union of thought with

the object, and to elicit beliefs or hopes of a fuller union hereafter.

Where its object is degraded, it tends also by its persistency to find

some way of restoring it; where directed to the evil in our own

nature, to restore it by repentance. The function of sorrow in self-

love, to preserve the love of those things that for self-love alone have

value, and to recover those, the possession of which has been lost,

pp. 364-369.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISGUST.

1. Of Primitive Disgust and its Distinction from the Emotion

Developed from it.

That primitive disgust is not an emotion, but an instinct with its connected

impulse nevertheless both this and the later emotion are the same

force in different stages of development, pp. 370-374.

2. Of the Innate and Acquired Tendencies of Disgust.

Different reflex acts, according to the part of the body affected,-vomiting,
coughing up, blowing out the infected air, thrusting out with the
lips, pushing away with the hands in the later varieties, turning