CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

I.

A COMPLETE Science of mind would include a science of character. The

best approach to such a science through the study of the primary

emotions and their connected instincts. This study to be directed

to an analysis of tendencies. How far we can study the emotions

in isolation, pp. 1-2.-The bearing of the James-Lange theory on

this problem, pp. 3-5.-Mr. McDougall's theory, as bringing into

prominence the active side of emotion, p. 6.

II.

Such knowledge of character as we possess unsystematic and inexact,

p. 6.-Neglect of the true nature of the wisdom of life in fables,

proverbs and maxims, p. 7.-The advantage of a science of character

in education, p. 8.—and in interpreting the ruling ideas of the past

and present, p. 9.

BOOK I.

THE CONCEPTION OF CHARACTER.

CHAPTER I.

MILL'S CONCEPTION OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER.

His conception of Ethology, as founded on the Laws of Psychology,
p. 13-as connecting generalisations about character with these
laws, p. 13.-His conception of Empirical Laws, as subject to
exception, p. 14.-of Causal Laws or Laws of Mind; of Laws of
Ethology, as axiomata media, and of the method of this science as
deductive, p. 14.-His conception of its practicability, dependent on
the existence of a sufficient number of empirical laws and of laws of

mind; the former have not been collected, p. 15.-His "Laws of

Mind' are no other than the laws of association, the laws of

retentiveness and of "mental chemistry," p. 16.-These laws

unsuitable for interpreting facts of character, pp. 17-19.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF ORGANISATION AS IT IS DISCLOSED IN THE MIND.

Two kinds of forces in character, the one working to higher forms of

organisation, the other, to lower: both pursue ends and organise the

means to them, thereby producing systems, pp. 20, 21.-The Law of

Organisation as the fundamental law of character, exemplified by all

the forces and systems of character, pp. 21, 22, 23.-These organic

laws alone capable of interpreting popular generalisations about

character, p. 23.

CHAPTER III.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE EMOTIONS.

1. Of the Constitution of Character.

The organic laws of character, those of our instincts, emotions and

sentiments: character as constituted by these forces, pp. 24, 25.-

What we attend to in the stream of perception and thought largely

determined by these forces; their tendencies often counteracted by

the mechanical laws of association, pp. 25, 26.—In contrast to this

conception, popular conceptions of character reduce it to a number

of detached qualities, p. 26.

2. Of the Nature of an Emotional System, and of the Different

Primary Emotions.

The systems of character being forces, the first to be considered those of

the primary emotions: part of these systems organised in the body,

part in the mind, pp. 27, 28.-Fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy and

sorrow, include instincts or innate tendencies in their systems: the

appetites classed with these primary systems, pp. 28-31.-Also the

impulses for repose and exercise; for self-display and self-abasement;

all of them include instinctive tendencies, and pursue innately

determined ends, pp. 28–34.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (I).

1. Of the Innate Bond Connecting the Primary Emotions.

Consideration of the greater systems of the Sentiments that organise

many of the lesser systems of the emotions, p. 35.-The base of the

greater systems, an innate organisation of the dispositions of fear,

anger, joy and sorrow, pp. 36-38.

2. Of the Sentiment of Parental Love.

This sentiment also called the "parental instinct": not one instinct;

includes a variety of instincts of different kinds, nutritive, defensive,

offensive, sportive; also a variety of emotions, as fear, anger, joy,

sorrow, and others. The sight of offspring tends innately to arouse this

sentiment its disinterested character, pp. 38-43.

3. Of the Source of Disinterested Action.

The source of disinterested action traced by biologists to certain in-

stincts; by psychologists to either sympathetic or tender emotions:

neither of these essentially disinterested, pp. 43-45.-Independently

of these emotions, love naturally disinterested. The emotions of

fear, anger, joy and sorrow, organised in maternal love, are

disinterested, because innately connected with a disinterested,

instinctive behaviour, pp. 45-47.-The disinterestedness of pity, not

dependent on its quality of tenderness, p. 48.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (II).

1. Of the Theory that Love and Hate are Emotions.

The representations of Love in dramatic poetry evidence that love

includes a number of emotions, pp. 51-54.-Spencer's theory of love

as a compound emotion cannot interpret the diversity of its behaviour,

PP. 55-56.

2. Of the Sentiments that are most Commonly Found among Men.

Self-love, sexual love, family affection, friendship; the sentiment for

games; impersonal sentiments; the sentiments of respect and hate

PP. 56-58.

3. Analysis of Hatred.

The emotional system of hatred contrasted with that of love, pp. 58-61.—

The chief problem of the sentiments to understand the laws of their

growth, constitution and decline, pp. 61-62.-The "laws of mind" to

be sought for among the systems of character, p. 62.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WILL AND INTELLIGENCE AS CONSTITUENTS OF CHARACTER.

We must personify the systems of the emotions and sentiments in order

to isolate them and to simplify our problem, pp. 64-65.-The will

and intelligence evoked in subordination to some impulse, emotion

or sentiment. The question of 'real' or indeterminate choice and

'pure reason' beyond a science of character, pp. 65-67.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER ( .

1. Of" The Laws of Mind."

Mill assumed that "the laws of mind," as laws of tendency, are not merely
'approximate generalisations,” p. 68. Of the reciprocal relation of

the laws of organisation and the laws of association, p. 70.-The laws

of mind as laws of organisation. We cannot attach a higher validity

to the form given to them than to the form given to "empirical laws."

They are empirical laws. Their function as laws of tendency to

interpret empirical generalisations about character, pp. 70–72.

2. Of the "Empirical Laws," and the Difficulty of Discovering Them.

No one has made a collection of these laws: the great thoughts of
literature seldom expressed in the form of laws of character, pp.
72-74.

3. Of the Nature of the Wisdom of Life Contained in Fables, Proverbs

and Maxims.

Fables imply laws of character but do not express them; proverbs

contain advice, exhortation, reproof, consolation, maxims, advice

or reflections, pp. 75-80.-Mill formed a mistaken opinion of the

nature of the material to be obtained from literature for the inductive

base of the science, pp. 80-81.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER (II).

1. Of Certain Qualifications which the Method of a Science of Character

should possess.

A chief deficiency of Mill's method due to his not regarding a conception

of character as an indispensable part of it, p. 82.-The conception

of his successors, due to the influence of analytical psychology,

suggested unfruitful problems, p. 83.-Our conception synthetic, and

in harmony with the point of view of literature; can utilise its

material; which suggests natural, instead of artificial problems.

Our conception to be used as a hypothesis; becoming, as it unfolds,

a number of hypotheses, and including all the provisional laws we

adopt; becoming ever more complex, and therefore more adaptable

to the variety and complexity of the facts of character; suggesting

fresh problems, and leading to the discovery of new laws, because

furnishing the clues to such discovery, pp. 83-87.-Besides being

employed as a method of discovery, to be used as a method of

gradual proof by directing attention to the facts which conflict

with its hypothetical laws, pp. 87-88.-Examples to show how the

laws may be progressively raised to the standard of scientific laws,

pp. 88-92.-The importance of continuity of development. The

urgent need at present of a sufficient number of hypothetical

laws, which it is the aim of the present work to furnish, pp. 92–93.

CHAPTER IX.

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER.

1. The Qualities of Conduct.

The method of observation, as directed to the knowledge of character,

gives no knowledge of what the forces of character are; seems to give

this, because we attribute to character the qualities observed in

conduct, pp. 94-97.—Analysis of the method of characterisation of

Theophrastus, La Bruyère and others: a quality of conduct, an

emotional disposition, or a sentiment (or several of them together)

employed to compose a character, pp. 97-100.

2. The Conception of Conduct.

Conduct as the expression or behaviour of some system of character is

a part of this system; the will of this system implicated in it: the

qualities of conduct in this sense also qualities of character; we can

voluntarily aim at acquiring such qualities, pp. 100-103.-Other

qualities, proper to character itself, as qualifying its emotions and

sentiments; thence taken to qualify the conduct of these systems.

Hence two kinds of qualities, (1) those first observed in conduct and

attributed afterwards to character; (2) those first belonging to

character and attributed afterwards to conduct. Our conception

of character, taken at first to include the systems of the emotions and

sentiments, now to be advanced a further stage to include both kinds

of qualities, pp. 103–104.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE QUALI-

TIES OF CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

This problem suggested by the last addition to our conception of char-

acter: What qualities of character any given emotion or sentiment

tends to foster. Assumption that every sentiment tends to acquire

the qualities it needs, as it tends to organise the emotions it needs,

pp. 105-109.-Of the injustice of our affections, pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE RELATIVE ETHICS OF THE SENTIMENTS.

1. Of the Virtues of Sentiments.

In the first stage of Love its qualities and virtues develop spontaneously;

in the second stage, only through effort and reflection, as we become

conscious of possessing these qualities in insufficient degree. Hence

the Ideals of a sentiment, pp. 111-112.

2. Of the Ideals of Sentiments.

All the qualities of a sentiment may suggest such ideals, and tend to

develop certain emotions appropriate to them, as aspiration, admira-

tion, remorse and shame, pp. 112-113.