3. Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Knowledge

There are two principal varieties of wonder; and these appear to have opposite tendencies and effects. We shall take first that which has been held to be the source of philosophy and the sciences. It is the force and principle of the mind which leads us to pursue truth for itself as an end. It is therefore distinguishable from ordinary curiosity, which works in the interests of so many emotions and sentiments. But in wonder curiosity is freed from alien control, and pursues knowledge as an end. Hence it becomes the base of the love of truth.

From very early times this type of wonder has been discerned by the greatest intellects as the source of their disinterested pursuit of truth. Thus Plato says in the Thaetetus: "Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder."1 Aristotle expresses more fully the same opinion: "For from wonder," he says, "men, both now and at the first, began to philosophise, having felt astonishment originally at the things which were more obvious . . .; then by degrees . . . about more important subjects." 2 For "Wonder and learning too are generally pleasant; wonder because it necessarily involves the desire of learning. . . "He that labours under perplexity and wonder," he says, "thinks that he is involved in ignorance. Therefore also the philosopher-that is the lover of wisdomis somehow a lover of fables, for the fable is made up of the things that are marvellous. Wherefore, if, for the avoidance of ignorance, men from time to time have been induced to form systems of philosophy, it is manifest that they went in pursuit of scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not on account of any utility that it might possess."4 Bacon also says: "For all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there groweth

1 Thaetetus, 155, D (Jowett).

2 The Metaphysics,' B. i. ch. ii.

3 'The Rhetoric,' B. i. ch. ii. (Welldon's trans.). 'The Metaphysics,' B. i. ch. ii.

G G

that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum."1 And many others have recognised the same influence of wonder. According to Adam Smith, who analysed the emotion in conjunction with Surprise and Admiration, Wonder, with the imagination supporting it, is ever trying to "fill up the gap in our knowledge which has evoked our astonishment, or to find the "connecting chain" of events that will remove the apparent irregularity. Hence he concludes, like his predecessors, that Wonder, "and not any expectation of advantage from the discoveries, is the first principle which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy"; and that "they pursue this study for its own sake, as an original pleasure or good in itself.” 4

We must now attempt to express this law of the tendency of wonder; and since these great writers did not distinguish between the wonder which had the influence they ascribed to it and any other variety which had not, we must at first state the law absolutely. (104) Wonder is a complex emotion due to the conjunction of joy, astonishment, and curiosity, which pursues as its end the knowledge of that which causes it.

It is remarkable how often wonder is spoken of as pleasant; since it may, as we have seen, combine with painful emotions which counteract its pleasantness. Thus Wordsworth referring to the same variety which we have been considering, says: "With Indian awe and wonder, ignorance pleased With its own struggles, did I meditate On the relation those abstractions bear To Nature's Laws." 5

This pleasure, and even enjoyment, is again frequently referred to by those who are preoccupied by the second variety of wonder which we have next to consider.

4. Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Mystery There are people who enjoy mystery, and are eager to find it, and who, far from desiring to satisfy the baffled curiosity

1 'Of the Advancement of Learning,' 'The First Book.'

2 Op. cit., sect. ii.

4 Ibid.

3 Op. cit., sect. iii.

5 The Prelude,' B. vi. l. 121.

of wonder, try to maintain it as it is. They have grown to love wonder. Nor is this at all a late and unusual development. It is conspicuous in children. In an admirable passage Shaftesbury has described it. "For what stronger pleasure is there with mankind, or what do they earlier learn or longer retain, than the love of hearing and relating things strange and incredible? How wonderful a thing is the love of wondering, and of raising wonder! 'Tis the delight of children to hear tales they shiver at, and the vice of old age to abound in stories of times past. We come into the world wondering at everything; and when our wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at."1 in "Henry VIII" Shakespeare indicates the same tendency of wonder to maintain itself, and to seek for fresh objects to replace those which are exhausted:

And

Hume in his celebrated chapter on "Miracles" refers also to the pleasantness of wonder, and notices the same tendency. He speaks of "the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous." "This," he even says, “is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events." 3 "With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relation of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners." For "the gazing populace receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition and promotes wonder." 5

Thus we notice, in marked contrast to the preceding variety, that in all these cases the impulse of wonder appears to be arrested, does not press forward to its goal of knowledge, but remains complacently in its state of ignorance. And many others have observed the same fact. But Hume

1 'The Moralists, a Rhapsody,' pt. ii. sect. v. p. 325.

2 'Henry VIII,' A. v. Sc. iv.

3 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,' sect. x. part ii. 4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

also distinguishes another tendency. "The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived."1

The complex law which is implied in the preceding observations appears to be contradictory of our provisional form of the law of the first variety of wonder, that wonder promotes investigation, to remove ignorance and to attain to knowledge. In this second variety, it does not promote investigation, but remains satisfied in its state of ignorance.

It would seem that there must be something variable in the constitution of an emotion that can produce effects so opposite and striking. Wonder, in fact, is not a simple emotion; and its composition is variable. We have referred to the joy or admiration which normally enters into it, to its astonishment, and its obstructed curiosity. A curiosity which is satisfied at once has no sufficient interval to arouse wonder. But while our impulses often feel pleasant, no one would say that they are generally pleasant when they are obstructed. On the contrary, it is under these conditions that they tend to become unpleasant. Here, then, we have, as a remarkable exception, an emotion the impulse of which must be obstructed in order that the emotion may be felt, which yet, according to general testimony, is felt to be pleasant. This pleasantness is due to the joy or admiration contained in it.

In the familiar examples of wonder, we find first an admiration for the excellence of something, whether in respect of its beauty, or its power, or its organisation, which contains astonishment at such excellence. The cause of the pleasure in the wonder is this admiration; which, being a kind of joy, has the tendency of all joy to maintain the object as it is, and to maintain also the present relation of the self to it so long as the joy is felt. So long as this tendency is fulfilled, the pleasantness of the emotion is not interfered with, and it runs out to its natural term. But with the joy there is also a baffled curiosity, and this obstruction tends to be felt as unpleasant in proportion to the strength 1 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,' sect. x. part ii. 2 See ante, B. ii. ch. vii, 3.

of the impulse. There are, then, two antagonistic principles in wonder the one tends to maintain the present state, and with it the wonder; the other tends to supersede the present state by a fuller knowledge of the object; and this works, therefore, to destroy the wonder. In the wonder at the base of philosophy and the sciences, curiosity, after a little, obtains supremacy over the attitude of joy and astonishment; in the wonder at the base of the love of the marvellous and of mystery, the joy and astonishment remain supreme; and the mystery of the thing and the undercurrent of curiosity seem to increase both the delight and the wonder. For the baffled curiosity, which in itself tends to diminish the enjoyment, carries a compensation: it exalts the object and increases the admiration for it, as something far above our comprehension, and, therefore, increases the joy.

We have found, then, an explanation of the opposite effects of these two kinds of wonder, and we have now to attempt to formulate the law of their action: (105) In proportion as the joy in wonder is stronger than curiosity, the impulse of curiosity already obstructed by the situation, is altogether held in check by joy; its question is reiterated, but is not allowed to seek for an answer. In proportion as the impulse of curiosity in wonder is stronger than the tendency of joy (being, indeed, irrepressible in the greatest minds), the first delight of wonder gives place to active investigation of the object.

From this law it seems to follow that only those possess a great gift of wonder who never satisfy its curiosity; but the reverse of this seems to be the truth. For curiosity, which is always at first obstructed in wonder, is either easily satisfied or it is not. If it is, wonder is soon at an end, and its object may hardly seem to have been worthy of the emotion. But how many other occasions of wonder are presented in its stead, inspired by admiration for the great, the beautiful, and the mysterious? And thus wonder is the Phoenix which, through its own destruction, comes to life again. There is, however, a second reason why this active and investigating wonder develops rather than exhausts the capacity of feeling the emotion, and is not supplanted in those ardent minds that pass their lives in investigation. From common things,