anger, at another time one of depression or sorrow; but the hidden cause of both is the disposition to be displeased with nearly everything around us. The common remark made about anyone in this state is that "it is impossible to please him," or that "he finds fault with everything." Such people have "jaundiced eyes to which all order withers, all things here are out of joint." Sometimes these defects appear to be part of the permanent character, and not due to misfortune or ill-health. "There are men of gloomy character," says Gratian, "who regard everything as faulty, not from any evil motive but because it is their nature to." 2 When repugnancy is neither a mood nor a permanent temper, but an emotion with a definite object, the same effects may still be observed, though limited to a single case. There are people who have bound themselves, or been bound together, for life, though one of them is so subtly repugnant to the other that he cannot please her, except by keeping out of sight; and though his services be never so good, and such that were they done by another no fault would be detected in them, yet being done by him they appear defective. And here too there will arise sometimes an apparent irascibility at the presence of this person, and at other times sorrow or melancholy,--because the connexion between them cannot be severed,-masking this fundamental fact of repugnance. Molière in "Le Misanthrope" has made a profound study of this temper. Alceste appears to us as almost incapable of joy. Neither the presence of his friend nor of the woman he loves delights him. Something counteracts the disposition to this emotion, displeases him and makes him discern their faults. With mankind in general it is worse. Yet it appears to him that his repugnancy is based on their vices and not on the vice of his own mood. For he prides himself on his sincerity and honesty, and can find no one else like him : "Mes yeux sont trop blessés, et la cour et la ville Ne m'offre rien qu'objets à m'échauffer la bile; J'entre en une humeur noire, en un chagrin profond, Quand je vois vivre entre ceux les hommes comme ils font, 1 Tennyson, 'Locksley Hall.' 2 'The Art of Worldly Wisdom,' cix. trans. J. Jacobs. "Je ne trouve partout que lâche flatterie, Je n'y puis plus tenir, j'enrage; et mon dessein Est de rompre en visière à tout le genre humain." 1 Thus both his sorrow and anger arise from the same cause, and from it, too, the hatred which he thinks he feels for men in general : "Non, elle est générale, et je hais tous les hommes : 12 Scott in "The Pirate" has also described the character of a misanthrope. Owing to disappointments in his youth all human beings have become repugnant to Basil Mertoun, including his own son. He selects as his place of abode one of the Shetland islands, and an abandoned house in the most solitary part of it, where, as he says, "there would be neither human luxury nor human society near the place of my retreat." The sight of cheerfulness was specially repugnant to him. "From loud mirth he instantly fled; and even the moderated cheerfulness of a friendly party had the invariable effect of throwing him into deeper dejection than even his usual demeanour indicated." 4 "Surely, sir," says his son to him, “such distaste for life is not the necessary consequence of advanced age?" "To all who have sense to estimate that which it is really worth," 5 is the answer. Thus, like Alceste he ascribes his solitary habits and moroseness to the defects of mankind, not to the defect of his own mood or temper. Like Alceste, too, his habitual mood alternates between sorrow and anger, masking the fixed temper of repugnancy which underlies both, He had "his dark hour," and at its approach he “retreated to an inner apartment," into which even his son was not permitted to enter. "Here he would abide in seclusion for days, and even weeks, only coming out at uncertain times, to take such food as they had taken care to leave within his reach." His son learnt " to note 1 'Le Misanthrope,' A. i. Sc. i. L. 88 2 Op. cit., A. i. Sc. i. L. 118. 5 Vol. i. ch. vii. the particular signs which preceded these fits of gloomy despondency, and to direct such precautions as might insure his unfortunate parent from ill-timed interruption (which had always the effect of driving him to fury)." His anger was aroused even by the voices of his servants, reminding him of the society from which he sought to escape, and he dismissed one in the following speech: "Not for being a liar, a thief, and an ungrateful quean, for these are qualities as proper to you as your name of woman, but for daring in my house to scold above your breath." 2 Thus the temper of repugnancy appears to have this singular character that it cannot be confined to the emotion with which it is directly concerned, but brings in its train alternately an irascible and a melancholy mood. For according to a law which is now familiar to us, repugnance arouses anger when it is opposed in one degree, and sorrow in the higher degree of frustration; and the mood of repugnance, being so diffused and general, is always liable to be either thwarted or frustrated; but what feels like frustration when we are weak, is only obstruction when we are strong and will not be beaten. Thus we may enunciate this law: (92) The mood of repugnance tends to give rise to and to be accompanied by either a mood of anger or of sorrow, according to the degree of opposition to which it is subjected and the degree of energy available for resistance. There are two principal varieties of this mood and temper. When its tendency to detect the faults of its objects, to exaggerate them, even to invent them, in order to justify itself, and, again, to obliterate the good qualities, so that there may be nothing to produce pleasure or joy,-when this tendency finds its satisfaction in the criticism of human nature, it produces misanthropy; when in the criticism of human life and the world, it produces pessimism. The one provides as wide a field in which the mood may expend itself as does the other. There are times in which our general displeasure with things fastens on the fundamental evils of human life rather than on the vices of human nature, and when, like Alceste, we do 1 Vol. i. ch. ii. 2 Ibid. not discern the part which our ill-humour has played. And it is then as natural to condemn human life, because it subjects us to pain, disease, old-age, and death, and to separation from those we love best, and to form arguments and even philosophical systems to justify our pessimism, as it is to point to the vices of mankind to justify our misanthropy. And when this mood is a permanent temper, we cannot estimate how much the changed valuations of things are due to it, and how much to bad qualities of the objects. But when it is temporary and is succeeded by a mood of cheerfulness, we are often astonished to find how the same intellect then furnishes very different arguments and conclusions. Pessimism, even more than misanthropy, is characterised by melancholy. For if to make men virtuous is difficult, to alter the destiny of human life is impossible. And here melancholy often may be judged to be the fundamental mood, instead of an effect of the general displeasure or repugnance concealed behind it. The temper of repugnance has then effects on character of the utmost importance, and we must now attempt to formulate the law of its influence: (93) So far as the mood of repugnance becomes a fixed temper, it tends to develop either misanthropy or pessimism. There is another tendency of repugnance without which this effect would not arise. As its central tendency is opposite to that of joy, so it is antagonistic to love. To avoid a person and to think badly of him is contrary to the action of love, which is to unite oneself to him and to think well of him. As a mood the same tendency is generalised. But the mood passes and the effect which it begins to have may pass with it: the temper weakens or destroys all old sentiments of love, and counteracts the formation of new ones. Thus Alceste refuses to acknowledge Philinte any longer as his friend, or Célemène as his mistress; Mortoun has no affection for his son. If the love for anyone escapes destruction, it must be strong enough to resist this disintegrating influence. It appears then to be a law that (94) So far as the mood of repugnance persists, it tends to destroy old sentiments of love and to prevent the formation of new ones. ones. In addition to its tendency to counteract love, does this mood also tend to produce hate? To avoid a thing is not necessarily to hate it. The end of hate, derived from anger, is to destroy or to cause suffering to its object. But we have noticed that the mood of repugnance meets with such recurring opposition that anger is frequently aroused. Tied to the thing that is repugnant to us, we may come to hate it. Thus we may hate the places, people, or occupations from which we cannot free ourselves. But the mood of repugnance is so general that we cannot free ourselves from its innumerable objects; and so long as it subsists, it tends to constitute fresh Thus there is ever fresh occasion for anger, which, like the repugnance, is checked, and cannot fulfil its end. For what can a man do against the world or mankind? Still, so far as the temper of repugnance remains constant, the ends of anger are only occasionally suggested, or are subordinated to its own end of aversion; and the sentiment developed, however much at times it seems to resemble hatred, is still directed to a distinctive end. This misanthropy or pessimism has not the malevolent character of genuine hate, directed against persons, classes, and institutions. Thus we find Marmontel1 taking up the problem of Alceste again, withdrawing him from the court and the city, and by a return to nature and primitive manners, effecting a cure of his misanthropy. For moods are sometimes the effects of circumstances, sometimes of organic conditions. 4. Of the Relation between Repugnancy and Disgust While repugnance has a great importance as a mood, and still more when it is a fixed temper, its central tendency, as we have previously noticed, possesses no distinctiveness. It is the same as that of one of the varieties of disgust. The difference between them is one of origin and emotional feeling: as forces of character they are substantially the same. From our point of view we ought therefore to class them together; and there is a wider sense in which we may use the term ' repugnance' than that which we have hitherto adopted. There is a sense in which the emotion of disgust is itself a 1 Contes Moraux, Vol. ii, 'Le Misanthrope Corrigé.' |