This entire concrete fact, which we shall call the emotion, susceptible of varying degrees of intensity and strength, is a system; because it is penetrated throughout by an impulse that organises it, which accepts certain thoughts and rejects others, and directs them to its pre-determined end. Thus anger excludes 'reasonable' thoughts and 'kindly' thoughts about its object, and possesses its feeling in support of its impulse, which is innately organised to work toward a certain result or end, the injury or destruction of its object. This result which at first probably is not foreseen, human beings come to foresee after they have had sufficient experience of the emotion.

The emotions then are forces: they work in certain ways, and in certain directions. They are within us to perform certain functions; though they often exceed their functions, and are very imperfect instruments. They need, and in man they acquire, higher systems to control them; but they are essentially organised forces, and as such we shall define them. And if in the course of our inquiry we come upon any so-called 'emotion' which is not such a force, which has neither impulse nor end-as we shall do in at least one case-we shall not enter upon any subtle inquiry as to how this contradiction to our theory may be met; we shall for our purpose refuse to accept it as emotion, because it lacks the fundamental character of that class of facts to which we here restrict the term. So much it has seemed necessary to say, in order to obviate, as far as possible, disputes and misunderstandings as to the meaning of the term.

We have now to add something further as to the nature of the emotions, and to distinguish between them and the entire systems to which they belong-between, for instance, anger or fear as we feel it, and the entire system of anger or of fear. And this distinction is forced on us, not because anger or fear, as we feel it, is not a system, but because it is not the entire system of the emotion. The emotion is only a part of that system. It is, in fact, that part which is present in consciousness; but there is another part which is not in consciousness: namely, the executive part which

carries out the impulse of anger or fear, and the receptive part which evokes that impulse. It is clear that the system of the fear or anger that we feel would fail if it did not extend into the body, and there excite certain nervous and muscular processes not only having a connection with one another, but forming one system with the emotion of the mind, because directed to the same end. Yet this is not all. If the emotion has no external effects, its system remains abortive and incomplete. But the angry man becomes erect; he clenches his fists, he sets his teeth, he shouts or fights. The frightened man turns pale and trembles, and hides or runs away. This part of the system of fear or anger which we call its expression and behaviour is that which is accessible to external observation; the first part, the emotion that we feel, is accessible to internal observation; and the intermediate part has to be approached by indirect methods, and the nature of its living action inferred from them.

Thus the three distinguishable parts of the system of the emotion, the emotion itself, the processes connected with it in the organism, and its outward expression and modes of behaviour, all belong together, and form one system.

Now, where we are dealing with a primary emotion there is often, if not always, an instinct connected with it, and the next problem which we have to consider is the meaning to be given to the term 'instinct,' and the relation which such instinct bears to that complex system of the emotion to which we have referred.

The term 'instinctive' is applied by biologists to certain complex actions or behaviours characteristic of a group of animals, the capacity to perform which is inherited;1 as the way in which some animal attacks and kills its prey, the mode of locomotion characteristic of it, as the swimming of ducks, the flight of birds. Such modes of behaviour are

1 "In recent scientific literature," says Prof. Lloyd Morgan, "the term is more frequently used in its adjectival than in its substantival form ; and the term 'instinctive' is generally applied to certain hereditary modes of behaviour Investigation thus becomes more objective, and this is a distinct advantage from the biological point of view."-Art, 'Instinct. Encyclo. Britannica,' Eleventh Edition.

observed to arise before the young animal can have learnt to perform them through experience. But we find that the specific behaviour which in this sense of the term we entitle instinctive' is liable to be modified in the course of an animal's life through its experience. 'Instinctive' behaviour is then of two kinds, that which is purely instinctive and that in which some traits of the behaviour have been acquired by practice.

There is another common use of the term "instinctive" in which it is applied to the emotion itself when excited by a stimulus which innately tends to arouse it. Thus Darwin says: "Fear of any particular enemy is certainly an instinctive quality, as may be seen in nesting birds, though it is strengthened by experience." Hudson who contests this conclusion of Darwin, and considers that "fear of particular enemies is in nearly all cases "2 acquired, also uses the term "instinctive" in this additional sense. In his chapter on "Strange Instincts of Cattle," he refers among other cases to "the excitement caused by the smell of blood, noticeable in horses and cattle, among our domestic animals, and varying greatly in degree, from an emotion so slight as to be scarcely perceptible to the greatest extremes of rage and terror."3 All our primary emotions may in this sense be instinctively felt, because among their stimuli there are some that are innately connected with their excitement.1

These two uses of the term 'instinctive' are quite consistent with one another. The same conception penetrates both that that which is instinctive is not acquired through experience, but is due to inherited endowment.

1 'Origin of Species,' ch. viii. 'Instinct.'

2 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. v.

3 Op. cit. ch. xxii.

* Since this work was prepared for the press, Prof. Stout has given in the 3rd Edition of his manual an excellent account of Instinct. He justifies the application of the term 'instinctive' to emotion in certain cases: "where we find an animal showing emotional excitement in the presence of a certain special object and fixing attention on this, though it has not been actually harmed or benefited by it in the past and is not being actually harmed or benefited by it in the present, such interest and attention may be properly called instinctive." Manual of Psy.' B. iii. ch. i, 6.

Turning next to the meaning to be given to the term 'instinct' we must in correspondence with the meaning assigned to the adjectival form, define it to be an inherited disposition both to be excited by certain stimuli and to respond with a specific kind of behaviour or expression to such stimuli.

There is another meaning of 'instinct' and 'instinctive' that we ought to notice. Just as fear and other emotions, and even imitation and sympathy, are spoken of as instinctive when it is meant that the emotion, or the impulse to imitate, has been due in the particular case to a stimulus which is innately connected with the excitement of that emotion or impulse; so also when the end aimed at, and not merely the behaviour by which it is accomplished, has not been acquired through experience but is due to hereditary endowment, the pursuit of such an end may be called instinctive, and the disposition to pursue it may be called an instinct. It is in this sense that we speak of the 'Instinct of Self-preservation and the Instinct of the Preservation of the Race.' But from this point of view all the primary emotions are instincts in so far as they direct action to ends that are not acquired through experience, and at first without knowledge of what these ends are.

If we were to take this third meaning of instinct independently of the others, we should have to say, that even where the means to an end are acquired through experience, yet so far as the ends are not so acquired, our actions are in this respect instinctive, and that from which they proceed is an instinct. Thus, if we were to analyse the most complex and recently developed behaviour of civilised man, as manifested in the building of battleships or aeroplanes, we should have to conclude that it is still instinctive so far as directed to the end of self-preservation or to the preservation of the race.

We have tried to show in Book 1,1 that the Instinct of Selfpreservation is in reality the name of a number of different instincts which would not be so named, unless in addition to their predetermined end they also gave rise to definite and hereditary forms of behaviour. We have also seen2 that the 2 Ibid.

1 Ch. iv. 2, 3.

parental instinct is such a group of distinct instincts. It may seem to introduce confusion into our conception of instinctive behaviour to name it instinctive when its end alone is innately determined, and it is more in agreement with ordinary usage to allow it to be such only when, in addition to the end, the behaviour itself is in great part not acquired, and when it has that typical form that makes it characteristic of the species, or of the sex of the animal, or of some narrower group.

We can combine together these three uses of the term 'instinct,' and say that every instinct is such because it is (1) capable of being instinctively aroused, (2) of evoking an instinctive mode of behaviour, and (3) of being instinctively directed to the end of self-preservation or to the preservation of the race.

There are some instincts that seem to be nearly perfect at birth, and to evoke actions which are complete in themselves, and others that produce only fragments of more complex actions, apart from which they are useless. Among the former are the wonderful instincts of moths and other insects which are only brought into activity once in a lifetime, and which oblige the insect to wander about until it has found a suitable place in which to deposit its eggs, and where the larvæ when they are developed will find the food suited to them. The young of many mammals are able not only to suck when the nipple is in their mouth, but at birth, or soon after, to walk and find their way to the teats of the mother-animal. But the child has to be assisted by its mother, because it can only suck when the nipple is in its mouth, and only this part of the complex action is instinctive. The instincts of human beings in general produce only such fragmentary actions and, where they are not assisted, require other actions to be learnt and combined with them. The instincts of " sitting, standing, creeping, running, walking, jumping, climbing, throwing," 1 are only fitted to become parts of more complex and acquired dispositions through which alone are they of any advantage to us, and fitted for the service of our emotions and sentiments. They therefore cannot be regarded as connected with any particular emotion, nor as

1 Preyer, 'The Mind of the Child,' pt. i. ch. i.