to weaken desire; but some desires so strong that they triumph over this influence, thence becoming stronger than they were before, pp. 500-502.-The advantage which these opposite effects of despair have for the sentiment to which the desire belongs, pp. 502-504. That the specific emotions of desire have certain intimate relations among themselves, so that a change which one undergoes involves change 1. Of Joy as interrupting Desire or Ensuing on its Fulfilment. The joy of anticipation, which often follows confidence in an end, interrupts desire for it; so also the joy of retrospect; the joy of attainment arises when desire is at an end, pp. 509–512. 2. Of the Joys of Activity and their Relation to Desire. The joys of anticipation, retrospect and attainment, joys of rest in com- parison with the joys of activity exhibited in playing at games. That this joy, which appears both to imply and to be compatible with Desires are never independent systems. They spring originally from our emotions and impulses, and have a second and prolific source in our sentiments. They subserve the end of one or other of these forces, and never acquire an end of their own. They cannot therefore serve as the base of a scientific study of character, pp. 518–521. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER INTRODUCTION I WHOEVER will consider the treatises on the science of Mind that have appeared up to recent times, will be able to judge how much or how little they have accomplished toward the foundation of a science of Character. The processes of perception and thought, of feeling and will, have been detached from the forces of character at their base. We have what purports to be a science of these processes; while that which alone directs and organises them is left out of account as if it had no importance. Yet we find in the text-books a small and subordinate place allotted to the emotions which, rightly conceived, are among these forces; but too often, as William James complained in his time, they are treated in such a way as to deprive them of the living interest which they have in the drama and the novel. If we are to have a complete science of the mind, this will include a science of character as the most important part of it; and if we are to make any approach to such a science, it would seem that we must begin by a study of the fundamental emotions and of the instincts connected with them. But we have to conceive of the problem as essentially dynamical. The emotions are forces, and we have to study them as such. Our analysis must not be preoccupied by their constituent feelings and sensations,—and it is here that they B are little capable of scientific treatment, because these constituents are so elusive and variable,-but must be directed to show what are their main tendencies, what biological value they have at first, and what value for the higher ends of character afterwards. Once we grasp this problem clearly, the other problems of their varying sensations, the degree of bodily disturbance accompanying them, their description and classification, will fall into a proper and subordinate place. As the study of the emotions should be directed in the first place to the discovery and analysis of their tendencies, so this seems to be the only way of advance to the more complicated problems of character; for we cannot attain to any clear conception of how the whole works before we understand how the parts work. The common problems of character— the problems of the growth and decline of nations; the ennobling and degradation of individuals; the changes through which character passes from childhood to youth, from youth to manhood and old-age,-these are so complicated that they confuse the mind, and we abandon all attempts to solve them, except such as are popular and unscientific. We have then first to investigate the forces at the base of character, and the part they play in the general economy of the mind. The solution of this problem presupposes that we can profitably study the emotions dynamically, and that for this purpose we can sufficiently isolate them from one another and from the character as a whole. It is well for us to understand some of the difficulties of this first and indispensable task. In a strict sense we can never isolate the emotions. Each is bound up with others. Each subsists and works in a mental environment in which it is liable to be interfered with by the rest. Nor do these forces keep themselves, like human beings in the social environment, always distinct. On the contrary, they frequently become blended together, and often what we feel is a confused emotion which we cannot identify. In consequence of this confusion and interference, we are liable to attribute to one emotion tendencies that belong to another; yet we can and do, in many cases, reach probable conclusions. The literary observer has to meet a corresponding difficulty. The conduct which he is observing may be variously interpreted; but if he is able to observe the living man he may reach a definite conclusion. He believes that each emotion has its characteristic expression and gestures. He passes from the expression to the emotion often with the utmost confidence. What he sees he calls anger or fear or joy or sorrow. And, besides, a man's speech betrays his thoughts, and these his motives. And finally, when he surveys the man's action as a whole, and the ends to which it appears to be directed, he can often judge what are his dominant sentiments. And thus from a man's expression and gestures, from his speech and conduct, we may be able to refer results to motives, the ends accomplished to their determining emotions and sentiments. 1 What bearing on this conception of the problem has the famous James-Lange theory? The authors of it rejected the common belief that the emotions have definite and persistent characters. The truth is, says Lange, that they present "an infinity of imperceptible transitions," 1 and James says, that "they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things." For if it is true that the peculiar character of their feeling is conditioned by vaso-motor and other bodily changes, and that these being variable (since "one and the same cause may act differently on the vaso-motor nerves of different individuals ""), the feeling of the emotion is itself variable in different persons and in the same person at different times; yet this conclusion only verifies the fact, clear to introspection, that the same emotion may at different times include different bodily sensations. But setting aside those cases already referred to, in which one emotion so blends with others as to produce an emotional state that we cannot name or identify, still, fear, anger and other emotions, though their bodily sensations undergo some change, preserve their identity. We are not at present concerned with the feeling 1 'Les Emotions,' 'Conclusions.' 2 Prin. of Psy.,' vol. ii. ch. xxv. |