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He also says that "by a longer fire it could be made more completely a ruin and a mass of broken masonry, but could scarcely be made more powerless for the defence of the harbor."

My breaching batteries were located at distances ranging between 8,320 and 4,240 yards from the works, and now remain as efficient as ever. I deem it unnecessary, at present, to continue the fire upon the ruins of Fort Sumter.

I have also, under a heavy fire from James Island, established batteries on my left, within effective range of the heart of Charleston city, and have opened with them, after giving Gen. Beauregard due notice of my intention to do so.

My notification to Gen. Beauregard, his reply thereto, with the threat of retaliation, and my rejoinder, have been transmitted to the army headquarters. . The projectiles from my batteries entered the city, and Gen. Beauregard himself designates them as the

"most destructive missiles ever used in war."

The report of my chief of artillery, and an accurate sketch of the ruins of Fort Sumter, taken at 12 M. yesterday, six hours before we ceased firing, are herewith

transmitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General Commanding. OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., August 23d, 1863. Brig. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore, Commanding Department of the South, Morris Island, S. C.: GENERAL: I have the honor to report the effect that our breaching batteries have had upon Fort Sumter, and the condition of that work to-night, at the close of the seven days' bombardment.

The gorge wall of the fort is almost a complete mass of ruins. For the distance of several casemates about midway of this face the ramparts are removed nearly, and in places quite to the arches, and but for the sand bags, with which the casemates were filled, and which have served to sustain the broken arches and masses of masonry, it would have long since been entirely cut away, and with it the arches to the floor of the second tier of casemates. The debris on this point now forms a ramp reaching as high as the floor of the casemates.

The parapet wall of the two northeasterly faces is completely carried away, a small portion only being left in the angle made with the gorge wall, and the ramparts of these faces are also a total ruin. Quite one half of our projectiles seem to have struck the parade and parapet of these two faces, and judging from the effect they have had upon the gorge wall within our observation, the destruction of masonry on these two sides must be very great, and I am of opinion that nearly every arch in these fronts must be broken in. But one gun remains in position on these two fronts. This is in the angle of the gorge, and I think unserviceable.

The ruin extends around, taking in the northeasterly face as far as can be seen. A portion of this face adjoining the angle it makes with the southeasterly face is concealed, but from the great number of missiles which have struck in this angle during the last two days, it cannot be otherwise than greatly damaged, and I do not think any guns can be left on this face in

a serviceable condition.

The ramparts on this angle, as well as in the southeasterly face, must be ploughed up and greatly shat tered; the parapet on this latter face being torn off in many places, as we can see, and I hardly think the platforms of the three remaining guns on this face could have escaped.

With the assistance of a powerful glass, I cannot determine that more than one of these guns can be used. The carriages of the others are evidently more or less shattered, and such is the ruin of the parapet and parade in the immediate vicinity of this gun that it probably could not be served for any length of time.

In fine, the destruction of the fort is so far complete that it is to-day of no avail in the defence of the harbor of Charleston; by a longer fire it can be made more completely a ruin and a mass of broken masonry, but could scarcely be more powerless for the defence of the harbor.

I therefore respectfully submit my opinion that a continuance of our fire is no longer necessary, as giv ing us no ends adequate for the consumption of our resources.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN W. TURNER,
Colonel and Chief of Artillery.

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To this note Gen. Beauregard replied as fol- nay, even the city of Charleston in the same delows:

HEADQUARTERS Department of SOUTH CAROLINA,
GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, CHARLESTON, S. C.,
August 22d, 1863.

SIE: Last night, at fifteen minutes before eleven o'clock, during my absence on a reconnoissance of my fortifications, a communication was received at these headquarters, dated "Headquarters Department of the South, Morris Island, S.C., August 21st, 1863," demanding "the immediate evacuation of Morris Ísland and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces," on the alleged grounds "that the present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty;" and that if this demand were "not complied with or no reply thereto received within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your (my) subordinate commander at Fort Wagner for transmission," a fire would be opened "on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city." This communication to my address was without signature, and was of course returned.

About half past one o'clock one of your batteries did actually open fire, and threw a number of heavy shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.

About nine o'clock this morning the communication alluded to above was returned to these headquarters, bearing your recognized official signature, and it can now be noticed as your deliberate official act.

Among nations, not barbarous, the usages of war prescribe that when a city is about to be attacked timely notice shall be given by the attacking commander, in order that non-combatants may have an opportunity for withdrawing beyond its limits. Generally the time allowed is from one to three days; that is, time for the withdrawal in good faith of at least the women and children. You, sir, give only four hours, knowing that your notice, under existing circumstances, could not reach me in less than two hours, and that not less than the same time would be required for an answer to be conveyed from this city to Battery Wagner. With this knowledge, you threaten to open fire on the city, not to oblige its surrender, but to force me to evacuate these works, which you, assisted by a great naval force, have been attacking in vain for more than forty days.

Batteries Wagner and Gregg and Fort Sumter are nearly doe north from your batteries on Morris Island, and in distance therefrom varying from half a mile to two and a quarter miles. The city, on the other band, is to the northwest, and quite five miles distant from the battery opened against it this morning. It would appear, sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel measure of turning your guns against the old men, the women, and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city, an act of inexcusable barbarity from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the complete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems to you "a matter of certainty."

Your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured; while the facts that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your demand, which made it almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open fire and throw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares, and filled with sleep ing women and children, will give you a "bad emiLeace" in history, even in the history of this war.

I am only surprised, sir, at the limits you have set to your demands. If, in order to attain the abandonmeat of Morris Island and Fort Sumter, you feel authorized to fire on this city, why did you not also inclade the works on Sullivan's and James's Island

mand?

Since you have felt warranted in inaugurating this method of reducing batteries in your immediate front, which were found otherwise impregnable, and a mode of warfare which I confidently declare to be atrocious and unworthy of any soldier, I now solemnly warn you that if you fire again on the city from your Morris Island batteries without giving a somewhat more reasonable time to remove non-combatants, I shall feel impelled to employ such stringent means of retaliation as may be available during the continuance of this attack.

Finally, I reply, that neither the works on Morris Island nor Fort Sumter will be evacuated on the demand you have been pleased to make. Already, however, am taking measures to remove all non-combatants, who are now fully aware of and alive to what. they may expect at your hands.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gen. Com'g. To this letter Gen. Gillmore made the following response :

DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., August 22d, 9 P. M. G. T. Beauregard, Commanding Confederate State Forces, Charleston, S. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, complaining that one of my batteries has opened upon the city of Charleston, and thrown a number of heavy rifle shells into that city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.

My letter to you demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris Island, and threatening, in default thereof, to open fire upon Charleston, was delivered near Fort Wagner at 11.15 o'clock P. M. on the 21st instant, and should have arrived at your headquarters in time to have permitted your answer to reach me within the limit assigned, namely, four hours.

The fact that you were absent from your headquarters at the time of its arrival may be regarded as an unfortunate circumstance for the city of Charleston, but it is one for which I clearly am not responsible. This letter bore date at my headquarters, and was officially delivered by an officer of my staff. The inadvertent omission of my signature doubtless affords ground for special pleading, but it is not the argument of a commander solicitous only for the safety of sleeping women and children and unarmed men.

Your threats of retaliation for acts of mine, which you do not allege to be in violation of civilized warfare, except as regards the length of time allowed as notice of my intentions, are passed by without comment. I will, however, call your attention to the well established principle, that the commander of a place attacked, but not invested, having its avenues of escape open and practicable, has no right to expect any notice of an intended bombardment other than that which is given by the threatening attitude of his adversary. Even had this letter not been written, the city of Charleston has had, according to your own computation, forty days' notice of her danger. During that time my attack upon her defences has steadily progressed. The ultimate object of that attack has at no time been doubtful.

If, under the circumstances, the life of a single noncombatant is exposed to peril by the bombardment of the city, the responsibility rests with those who have first failed to apprize the non-combatants, or secure the safety of the city, after having held control of all its approaches for a period of nearly two years and a half, in the presence of a threatening force, and who afterward refused to accept the terms upon which the bombardment might have been postponed. From various sources, official and otherwise, I am led to believe that most of the women and children of Charleston were long since removed from the city. But, upon your assurance that the city is still full of them, I shall sus

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Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General Commanding. The effect of the shells first fired at Charleston is thus described by a citizen: "Between one and two o'clock, Saturday morning, the enemy commenced firing on the city, arousing the people from their slumbers. Twelve 8-inch shells fell into the city, thirteen in all having been fired. Fortunately no person was injured. Several shells flew in the direction of St. Michael's steeple, and fell either in the vacant lots in the burnt district on King street, or more generally struck in Queen and Rutledge, where an 8-inch shell tore up the plank-road, and dug a large hole in the ground. Another shot entered the warehouse of G. W. Williams and Co., at the corner of Hayne and Church streets, entered the roof, and exploded in the upper story, making a large opening in the brick wall of the Medical Purveyor's storehouse next door, and scattering things in great confusion. Some loose straw or packing was set on fire by the explosion, which caused the alarm bell to ring, and brought out the firemen. It was extinguished with little effort before it had made any progress. Four shells fell in this locality. One large piece was picked up and exhibited at the guard-house, where it was the subject of much curiosity. There was a good deal of excitement and some surprise expressed at the enemy being able to reach the city from his present position. The battery is located in the marsh between Morris and Black Islands, distant fully five miles from Charleston."

On Wednesday, August 26th, Gen. Gillmore, having completed a fourth parallel and sap, which extended very close to Fort Wagner, determined to possess a ridge of sand which interposed, and was necessary to the success of his operations. It was constantly occupied by a strong body of the enemy's pickets, and at night by a force protected by rifle pits. A bombardment of the position was made just before dark, after which it was carried by the 24th Massachusetts. One company of North Carolina troops was captured. On the 7th of September, Morris Island was evacuated by the enemy, which is thus reported by Gen. Gill

more:

DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, September 7th, 1863. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief: GENERAL: I have the honor to report that Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg are ours. Last night our sappers mined the counter-scarp of Fort Wagner on its sea point, unmasking all its guns, and an order was issued to carry the place by assault at 9 o'clock this

morning, that being the hour of low tide.

About 10 o'clock last night the enemy commenced evacuating the island, and all but seventy-five of them made their escape from Cummings's Point in small

boats.

Captured despatches show that Fort Wagner was commanded by Col. Keitt, of South Carolina, and gar

risoned by 1,400 effective men, and Battery Gregg by between 100 and 200 men.

Fort Wagner is a work of the most formidable kind. Its bomb-proof shelter, capable of containing 1,9 men, remains intact after the most territic bombardment to which any work was ever subjected.

We have captured nineteen pieces of artillery and a large supply of excellent ammunition.

The city and harbor of Charleston are now completely covered by my guns.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General Commanding.

On the night of the 7th, an assault was made by an expedition on Fort Sumter. The flotilla consisted of between twenty-five and thirty boats, manned by over one hundred sailors, under Lieutenant Commandant Williams, and a hundred marines, under Capt. McCawley. The entire force was commanded by Commander Stephens, of the Patapsco. The bosts were towed within a short distance of the fort, when they advanced. Three boats, under Commander Williams, Lieut. Remey, and Ensign Porter, landed, and the parties attempted to rua up the ruins to the parapet, when they were fired upon by musketry, and hand grenades were thrown down upon them. The slope was so sharp that they were unable to reach the parapet. The signal was given from the fort, and in an instant all of the batteries of the enemy opened on the fort and shelled it terribly. Three boats were smashed, and all who landed were either killed or captured. Lieut. Bradford, of the marines, was mortally wounded and captured. Among others captured were Commander W.]liams, Lieut. Remey, Lieut. Preston, Lieut. Bower, Lieut. Bunce, Dr. Wheeler, and Ensiza Porter. Forty or fifty sailors and marines were killed and wounded. The entire list of casualties was about eighty. The remainder of the command retired safe.

The captured forts on Morris Island were enlarged and new batteries erected by Gen. Gillmore, which effectually commanded Fort Sm ter, and could aid any naval attack on Charieston. But little further progress, however, was made in the siege during the remainder of the year. The forts of the enemy were occasionally bombarded severely, and the shelling of Charleston at intervals, during day and night, was continued. The portion of the city within the reach of the shells was greatly injured, and entirely abandoned by its inhabitants. An attempt was made by the enemy to blow t up the frigate Ironsides, with a torpedo, on the night of October 5th. It failed of success, and did ro serious damage to the vessels.

Af

Some further operations took place in the Department of the Gulf during the year. ter the capture of Vicksburg, Gen. Banks was reenforced by Gen. Grant, and an expediti a was fitted out under Gen. Franklin to occupy the mouth of the Sabine river, in Texas. consisted of a force of four thousand men, and the naval steamers Clifton, Sachem, Arizona and Granite City. The squadron was under the command of Lieut. Crocker. The defences at

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the pass were supposed to consist of two 32pounders, en barbette, and a battery of field pieces, and two boats used on the bay, which had been converted into rams. The plan was that the squadron should make the attack alone, assisted by about one hundred and eighty sharpshooters divided among the four vessels, and, having driven the enemy from his defences and destroyed or driven off the rams, the transports were then to advance and land their troops.

Sabine Pass is the name of the outlet from Sabine Lake into the Gulf of Mexico. Sabine Lake is an expansion of the Sabine river about five miles from its entrance into the Gulf of Mexico, at the southwest extremity of Louisiana. Its length is 18 miles and its breadth 9 miles. Sabine river rises in Hunt county, Texas, and flows in a direction east of southeast until it strikes the eastern boundary of the State. From this point it pursues a southerly course, forming the boundary between Texas and Louisiana. It is very shallow at its mouth. The whole length of the river is estimated at 500 miles.

Early on the morning of Sept. 8th, the Clifton stood in the bay and opened on the fort, to which no reply was made. At 9 A. M. the Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City, followed by the transports, stood over the bar, and, with much difficulty, owing to the low water, reached an anchorage about two miles from the fort at 11 A. M. About the middle of the afternoon the Sachem, followed by the Arizona, advanced up the eastern channel to draw the fire of the forts while the Clifton advanced up the western channel. The Granite City remained to cover the landing of a division of troops under Gen. Weitzel. No reply was made to the fire of the gunboats until they were abreast of the forts, when eight guns opened fire upon them. Three of these were rifled. Almost at the same moment the Clifton and Sachem were struck in their boilers and both vessels enveloped in steam. The Arizona, not having room to pass the Sachem, then backed down the channel until she grounded by the stern, when the ebbtide caught her bows and swung her across the channel. White flags were raised on the Clifton and Sachem; and within twenty minutes they were taken in tow by the enemy. The naval force of the expedition being thus disabled, the transports moved out of the bay. The Arizona was got afloat during the night and followed. The expedition then returned to Brashear City. The officers and crews of the Clifton and Sachem and about ninety sharpshooters who were on board were captured, and the loss in killed and wounded was about thirty. After remaining at Brashear City some time, the military force moved to Franklin and Vermillionville.

On the 27th of October an expedition under Gen. Banks put to sea from New Orleans. It consisted of about twenty vessels accompanied by the gunboats Owasco, Virginia, and Monon

gahela, and was destined to the mouth of the Rio Grande river, which is the boundary line between Texas and Mexico. During the first three days out the weather was pleasant. On the fourth a "norther" prevailed, and one light draft steamer and two schooners were lost, but no lives. On the 31st the expedition anchored off the mouth of the river and on the next day a force was landed on Brazos Island. By the 4th the troops were all landed, and on the next day, Gen. Banks, preceded by a small body of infantry and artillery, entered Brownsville on the Rio Grande river. A small body of the enemy under Gen. Bee attempted to destroy the public property, and retired on the approach of the Federal force. Subsequently Corpus Christi and the coast of Texas to within one hundred miles of Galveston were occupied. Gen. Banks successfully prosecuted the campaign thus begun in Texas, the extent and results of which more properly belong to the records of 1864.

In Missouri and the Department of the Frontier, those portions of the Confederate army of the Trans-Mississippi Department, which was under command of Gens. Hindman, Sterling Price, and Marmaduke, maintained a restless activity.

Early in January, 1863, a force of five or six thousand men, under Gen. Marmaduke's command, comprising a portion of the troops which had been so signally defeated at Crawford's Prairie (see ANNUAL CYCLOPÆDIA, 1862, p. 60) a month before, proceeded down the Arkansas river to Spadry's Bluff, near Clarksville, Ark., and thence marched rapidly north toward Springfield, Mo., with the intention of seizing and destroying the large amount of Federal commissary and quartermaster stores accumu lated there for the supply of the Army of the Frontier. The design of Gen. Marmaduke in proceeding so far eastward before making a movement northward into Missouri was to avoid all chance of collision or interference with his plans by Gens. Blunt and Herron. He hoped to reach Springfield and accomplish his purpose before they could obtain intelligence of his approach, and this once accomplished, those Federal generals and their army, deprived of all supplies, would, almost of necessity, be compelled either to surrender to Gen. Hindman or fly from North-western Arkansas. The scheme was well planned and circumstances indicated that it would be successful. Springfield had some defensive works, but they were not completed, and the Federal troops which were necessary to its adequate defence, were scattered widely over the entire region of Southwestern Missouri, two or three companies in a place. When, on the afternoon of the 7th of January, it was ascertained that the Confederate force had burned Lawrence Mills, and were then marching on Ozark, and would certainly appear before Springfield the next day, Brig.Gens. Brown and Holland, who were in command there, the one of the Missouri State

militia and the other of the enrolled Missouri militia, exerted themselves to the utmost to call together a force adequate to the defence of the town, but their most strenuous efforts only sufficed to bring together about 1,100 men, of whom 400 were either convalescents in the hospitals or those who had just been discharged from those institutions, and the remainder were in about equal numbers Missouri State militia and enrolled Missouri militia, almost wholly raw troops. The commissary and quartermaster's stores were sent north toward Bolivar, only enough being reserved to maintain the siege, which were placed in one of the forts. The Confederate force (or rather about one-half of it, not far from three thousand men) appeared before the city about one P. M. on the 8th, and commenced firing with solid shot at once, without giving any notice for the removal of non-combatants. The fighting which followed was irregular, and occasionally the Confederates gained some advantages; but the courage of the new Federal troops seemed to increase under fire, and late in the afternoon they commenced driving the enemy from one position after another, till at night the battle ended, having continued five hours, when the Confederates retreated, carrying with them a part of their wounded. The Federal loss was 14 killed, 145 wounded and 5 missing. The Confederates lost 41 killed, and over 160 wounded, of whom 80 were left in the town as prisoners. The next day the garrison of the town were ready to renew the battle, but found that the Confederates had escaped, and they were too feeble to make a vigorous pursuit.

Before proceeding from Ozark to Springfield, Gen. Marmaduke had detached Gen. Porter with nearly 3,000 men to follow the road south of the Ozark mountains to Hartsville, and having made what captures he could there, to rejoin the main force again at or near Marshfield, having in view, probably, the extension of his expedition either to Lebanon or Bolivar. On the 9th, Gen. Porter occupied Hartsville, but evacuated it that night, and moved toward Marshfield. Gen. Fitz Henry Warren, in command of that Federal military district, sent from Houston on the 9th of January Col. Merrill, with 850 men, to Springfield to reenforce the Federal garrison there. They reached Hartsville on Saturday, the 10th, and learned that Gen. Porter had been there the day previous. Leaving Hartsville at 3 P. M. they marched to Wood's Forks, on the road toward Springfield, by nightfall, and encamped in line of battle. The next morning (Jan. 11th), at daybreak, they encountered Gen. Marmaduke's forces marching from Springfield, and though the Federal position was an unfavorable one, Col. Merrill fought till 9 o'clock A. M., when the Confederates withdrew in a southerly direction. Sending out a pursuing force of cavalry, and himself returning toward Hartsville, Col. Merrill soon found that the Confederates were also

marching toward Hartsville, and, as it afterward appeared, had formed a junction with Gen. Porter's command. Col. Merrill immedi ately ordered a forced march, and arrived in Hartsville in time to take a strong position, and awaited their attack. Firing commenced on both sides at a little after 11 A. M., and the battle raged till half-past 4 P. M., the Confederates charging repeatedly upon the Federal position, but being met at short musket range by so terrible a fire that they were compelled to fall back each time. At length, finding themselves unable to make any impression on the Federal garrison, the Confederates retreated, going at first toward Houston, but early the next morning they turned their faces southward, and moved rapidly toward the Arkansas line, near the north fork of White river. Their losses had been very heavy; Brig.-Gen. Emmet McDonald, and acting Brig.-Gen. Porter, two colonels, a major, a captain, and two lieuten ants being among the killed, and several other officers severely wounded. Their entire loss was over 300 killed and wounded, and 29 pris oners. The Federal loss was 7 killed, 64 wounded, and 7 missing.

A portion of Gen. Marmaduke's force made their way to Van Buren Creek, and 300 of them were taken prisoners, on the Julia Rosa, on the 28th of January. The greater part, however, descended the White river, and, with Marmaduke himself, camped at Batesville, Ark, from which town they were driven, after s sharp fight, by the Federal Col. Waring, on the 4th of February, a considerable number of the Confederates being killed and wounded, and a colonel and a number of privates being captured.

Gen. Marmaduke now repaired to the headquarters of the Confederate army corps in Ārkansas, at Little Rock, and the next two months were spent by the generals of that corps mainly in enlarging and disciplizing their force. The guerilla bands in Arkansas and Missouri made frequent dashes into the towns, and occasionally stopped steamers on the Missouri river, and plundered, captured and murdered Federal citizens and soldiers, as in the case of the Sam Gaty, on the 28th of March, but these were only the acts of the ir regular and bushwhacking troops in Missouri, and they generally met with swift retribution from the militia scouts and cavalry parties who patrolled all sections of that State. There was no considerable movement of Confederate troops till the latter part of April.

On the 17th of April, the Confederate general, Cabell, left Ozark, Arkansas, with two thousand men, two pieces of artillery, and three days' rations, to attack Fayetteville, Ar kansas, which had been so many times a batte ground, and was then garrisoned by two re ments of Federal troops (the 1st Arkansas in fantry and the 1st Arkansas cavalry), under the command of Col. M. La Rue Harrison. T attack was made on the 18th about sunrise, and

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