A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals: Particularly Those Relating to the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue, Its Nature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter, and Sanctions. The Second Edition, Corrected. By Richard Price, F.R.S.

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T. Cadell (successor to Mr. Millar), 1769 - Christian ethics - 462 pages
 

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Page 446 - Virtue is the foundation of honour and esteem ; and the source of all beauty, order, and happiness in nature. It is what confers value on all the other endowments and qualities of a...
Page 74 - That morality is eternal and immutable. Right and wrong, it appears, denote what actions are. Now whatever any thing is, that it is, not by will, or decree, or power, but by nature and necessity. Whatever a triangle or circle is, that it is unchangeably and eternally. It depends upon no will or power, whether the three angles of a triangle and two right ones shall be equal; whether the periphery of a circle and its diameter shall be incommensurable; or whether matter shall be divisible, moveable,...
Page 163 - To it the last appeal is ever made. Many of its perceptions are capable, by attention, of being rendered more clear ; and many of the truths...
Page 220 - Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also, that no bad consequences would follow ; yet such an action would surely be vicious.
Page 446 - This unites us to the whole rational creation, and fits us for conversing with any order of superior natures, and for a place in any part of God's works. It procures us the approbation and love of all wise and good beings, and renders them our allies and friends. — But what is of unspeakably greater consequence...
Page 51 - Then out of sensible ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that mind was coeval with body, yet till body gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it could at best have been nothing more, than a sort of dead capacity; for innate ideas it could not possibly have any.
Page 97 - in contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have both a perception of the understanding, and a feeling of the heart ; and that the latter, or the effects in us accompanying our moral perceptions, depend on two causes.
Page 66 - Darkness may as soon appear to be light. It would, I doubt, be to little purpose to plead further here, the natural and universal apprehensions of mankind, that our ideas of right and wrong belong to the understanding, and denote real characters of actions; because it will be easy to reply, that they have a like opinion of the sensible qualities of bodies; and that nothing is more common than for men to mistake their own sensations for the properties of the objects producing them, or to apply to...
Page 194 - Nothing can bring us under an obligation to do what appears to our moral judgment wrong. It may be supposed our interest to do this, but it cannot be supposed our duty.
Page 77 - Deity, or positive laws, it is by no means to be inferred from hence, that obligation is the creature of will, or that the nature of what is indifferent is changed: Nothing then becoming obligatory, which was not so from eternity; that is, obeying the divine will, and just authority.

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