against foreign powers), essentially depends on its vain and empty retention of nominal sovereignty over the Christian races of the Danube. The Western Powers have been in alarm lest the Principalities fall into the hands of Russia; only for that reason have they wished Turkey to retain them. But to Turkey they are a drain, a running sore. The tribute which they pay is a trifle; the expense which they involve, and the responsibility, are ruinous. There has been much talk of late about Austria selling Venetia; will the time ever come when the Sultan shall be advised to sell this idle and mischievous sovereignty? Perhaps the possiPerhaps the possibility may soon offer itself, not indeed of sale' in any coarse and dishonourable sense, but of advantageous transfer. Turkey has of late years been forced, primarily in defence of the Principalities, to incur large debts, which ought to have been defrayed by Russia, the real culprit. If the Christian Principalities would take on themselves this debt as the price of their complete emancipation, the Sultan would be a great gainer by it, provided that the provinces thus parted with were fully defended against Russia. We say, the possibility of such a transfer may before long arise, out of which a real permanent settlement of this everthreatening Eastern embroilment would dawn upon us :-we mean in case of Hungary effecting her separation from Austria. Let it not be forgotten that the population of the kingdom of Hungary is equal to that which our United Kingdom' had attained at the Battle of Trafalgar; equal also to that of the Kingdom of Prussia as settled in 1815; while its natural defences are immensely superior to those of the straggling dominions of Prussia: its hardy, warlike population is that with which Austria has fought her countless battles for three centuries; its fertile plain would easily maintain three times its present inhabitants, and under freer commerce, with agriculture already improving, will rapidly develop its powers. In 1849, 1 though Croatia and Servia were hostile, Hungary alone repelled the collective force of Austria, and would probably have made good its resistance against Russia too, but for the treachery of Görgey, and the despondency infused into his officers by the refusal of England and France to mediate or any way acknowledge Hungary. Now, we say, such a Power as this, strengthened by the memory of its heroic deeds in 1849, is a trustworthy nucleus. But not only so; its relation to Croatia, Servia, and Sclavonia, and, indeed, to Transylvania, assimilate it to a body of United States; that is to say, though it has a central Diet (or Congress, as we may call it), yet on principle it allows great internal freedom of self-government in the constituent members. This would easily permit the aggregation of Turkish Servia to it, also of Montenegro, and of the Principalities at the mouth of the Danube, without any sensible internal change to these. It can matter little to Prince Michael or Couza, as far as his internal power and position is concerned, whether the suzerain who is bound to defend him, and to whom he pays a certain allegiance, is the Sultan, or is the King of Hungary; while in the abstract, he is likely to prefer a Christian protector and one more powerful, provided that he has full assurance that the power is friendly and faithful. Austria is so abhorred both in Servia and Wallachia, that such a union is quite impossible as long as the Hapsburg dynasty holds its place in Hungary; but from the day of its ejection the possibility begins to arise. The United States of America, having a Democratic central power -a President elected by universal suffrage could never endure royalty, or its semblance, in the constituent members; and in mere self-defence observes the law that every new State added to the Union shall be strictly Republican, without even hereditary peerage. free Hungary will undoubtedly elect or receive a King; and that King will be in so honourable and But 1861.] How to Constitute a Danubian Power. powerful a position, that no Prince of Servia or Wallachia could think it below his dignity to acknowledge him as his superior; remembering that these provinces have for ages been accustomed to do homage to a superior, and that the Princes have not approached so near to sovereignty as a King of Bavaria or Saxony. Of Bulgaria we here say nothing, except that, like Thessaly, its value to the Sultan is doubtful. The Christian population of each does contribute something to the Sultan's treasury; but their subjection is so invidious, and so opens a door to foreign intrigue and ambition, that perhaps more is lost than gained to the Sultan's military strength by retaining it. Nevertheless, we could not hope that any advice would convince him of this. Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Montenegro are in different case, as these are merely vassal States, from which the Sultan no more gets financial gain than soldiers, certainly no honour, and a very onerous responsibility. If these were joined to Hungary, that monarchy might contain twentythree million people. It would be fully able to guard the Danube permanently from Russia, and would effectually deliver the Sultan from all anxiety concerning that Power on his Western frontier. At the same time its strength would not be such as to be equally dangerous to him itself. Having so small a maritime coast, it could not need a formidable fleet in the Black Sea; and its resources not being hidden in the background, as those of Russia, it could not equally defy the opinion of Europe. We will not say that it would not covet Bulgaria: we think it would; yet any danger thence accruing is slight, compared to the pressure which Turkey has endured from Russia for the last thirty-five years and more. A truly Danubian Power of the first order being once constituteda Power consisting of none but Christian members-where each province has its own historical selfgovernment, and the institutions 567. under which it has grown up, yet is defended by a central Executive which wields the military resources of all, would for ever settle the most urgent of the practical difficulties by which the 'Eastern question' is beset: and this is the critical time at which a wise policy in the English Cabinet might lead in a few years to the result which all English policy must applaud. If the next five years be allowed, to slip past, the thing may be for ever impossible; because it will undoubtedly be most unacceptable to Russia, who at every time will oppose it with all her intrigue, and, after five years more, may be more powerful than she ever has been yet. Only for a little moment she is disabled; and of this moment a wise advantage may be taken. Let us put the other alternative. Suppose that the efforts of the English Government (intrigues, we ought to say, when Lord John Russell tries to starve Kossuth out, and 'forgets' whether or not he ordered spies to dog him)-suppose these efforts to succeed in keeping the Austrian dynasty a little longer on the shoulders of Hungary. There will continue ill-blood and endless quarrel until the foreign troops are removed out of Hungary. But Austria will never remove them; and the mildest form of illwill will be that which was seen in 1848. So soon as Russia has recovered from her present prostration, she will then become absolute mistress of the whole Hungarian question. She will be able to offer to Hungary a Russian Prince for their King, with their ancient laws and independence; and (as every Hungarian we have heard speak attests) this offer will be eagerly grasped at from the hour that Hungary has despaired of otherwise effecting her escape from the strangling grasp of Austria. After such a consummation, Galicia and the Bukovina would instantly be absorbed in Warsaw; nor could it be long ere the allegiance of the Danubian Principalities would be transferred to Russia. If that time arrive, England will then discover that she has fought the Crimean war for nothing. : We need great faith in the noble and humane influences which are to proceed from Russia, not to feel disgust at the idea of her power extending itself over Hungary and the Danube; and proportionate disgust at the obstinacy of English Ministers, who expose Europe to this contingency, by repeating the error of 1849, after the fatal results have been experienced. Yet (humiliating as is such a form of consolation) we console ourselves with the belief, that there is a man in Western Europe who will seize the opportunity of repairing our errors for his own glorification of course we mean the Emperor of the French. He understands, if our aristocracy does not, that the Russian war was the punishment of Western Europe for abandoning Hungary; and, we believe, he will not abandon her a second time, but will rather, if necessary, encounter a war with Germany. Dreadful as such a conflict will be, it will be a welldeserved punishment of Germany, perhaps of England, for fostering such a Power as Austria; and it will be a less calamity to Europe than the aggrandizement of Russia, out of which still greater war would arise. By standing forth against Germany, and against the (probably impotent) displeasure of the English Ministry, as the avowed champion of Hungary and freedom, the Emperor of the French, with Italy as his gallant ally, Garibaldi his guerilla chieftain, and Kossuth in his camp, would be lifted to a height of power and popularity which he must in vain strive to reach but for the infatuation of English politicians, who seem to know no other wisdom than that of holding fast as long as possible to a status quo which is certainly too rotten to abide. What else was the policy of Metternich? 'After me the deluge.' If the French Emperor enters on such a war, the immense influence which he already exercises in Servia and Wallachia will be intensified by the kindling influences of Garibaldi's name; nor will he be afflicted by delicate scruples as to receiving aid from the Danubian provinces and promoting their annexation to Hungary. The result would be brought about far more safely and surely, and with less danger of convulsion to Turkey (which is the matter just now peculiarly under consideration), if England would in due time adopt this annexation as a policy to be aimed at, and steadily press it upon the Sultan. We dare not be sanguine that, under any circumstances, the Turkish finance can recover itself. Perhaps the inveterate results of polygamy decree that whatever is apparently saved shall be forthwith swallowed up by a new sultana. If the Sultan cannot outgrow such follies, it may be that the Ottoman rule must inevitably decay, and Turkish Asia fall into the most terrible dangers of anarchy; but if he can be incited by the hope of a future for his dynasty and race, to employ his resources wisely, things will change for the better in Turkey from the day that the defence of the Danube devolves on the King of Hungary. a state So long as the Western Powers uphold the Treaty of 1856, Russia will not dare to build a great fleet on the Black Sea, and the Sultan I will have little to fear on that element. A very moderate fleet will suffice for him. His main army will then be in Armenia, on the frontier of the purely Turkish population; and if attacked on this side only, he could probably, without allies, defend himself against the utmost efforts of Russia of things which would give good promise of peace. But in peace, the economy of resources resulting from the change would leave finances for carrying on profitable works, such as a railway along the Euphrates valley, to the great benefit of the population, as well as give him disposable troops for maintaining the peace and laws of the empire in Syria and in Kourdistân. Whether any of all these things is possible no man can yet say; but if to maintain yet for a while the existence of the Ottoman Power is a worthy object of 1861.] Hungary the best Barrier against Russia. study for European statesmen, the direction in which they have to strive is to free the Sultan from the need of a double defence which is evidently too much for his strength. Since we cannot defend him in Armenia, we shall have a constant anxiety about the Danube so long as the defence of this frontier also rests on him. Moldavia and Wallachia in old days were under the kings of Hungary: evidently the restoration of this arrangement is to be desired. If Lord John Russell can effect the result while the House of Hapsburg holds rule in Hungary, we will warmly applaud him; but, we confess, the attempt would seem to us to indicate more zeal than knowledge. Not only is the deposition of Austria a first condition without which the union of the Danubian races is morally impossible, but even before or without their union, Hungary alone, if free, would be a far better barrier against Russia than the present Austrian empire, which could not gravely thwart the Czar without instantly being confronted by Hungarian insurrection. But let us put the last contingency, and perhaps the inevitable one. If the overthrow of the Ottoman Power by the wasteful improvidence of the dynasty and the irreconcilable hostility of the Turks and Christians, is an event which elderly men will live to see, still it is of immense moment to Europe that whatever aggrandizement Russia is to get from it should be only on the Armenian frontier and not on the Danube. The Germans well understand the difference. They are far more closely interested in the matter than we; yet with a blindness induced by national vanity, they scold against Hungary for not wishing to be extinguished by 569 Germanism and to lose a constitution eight hundred years old in compliment to a perfidious dynasty. By their national partiality to Austria, they bring their own danger to its maximum. How far the internal policy of Russia and the general spirit of the Imperial rule will be modified by the great events of this year, remains to be seen. We are able to believe that in the future the Russian influence over Persia will be for the benefit of humanity; nor can it be pronounced that the possession of Armenia by Russia ought to be deprecated by a cosmopolitan. But the inhabitants of Central and Western Europe do not need the pressure of Russian influence_to stimulate their improvement. For them a Russian dynasty ruling in Hungary would be a terrible calamity. With the imminent danger of this event within ten years' time, unless Hungary be first delivered from a family which she equally despises and hates, we cannot understand the blindness of our statesmen, who cling to a condition of things which Russia has imposed on Hungary by force of arms, from which Russia alone has gained and Russia alone can gain a state of things which keeps Hungary miserable, Germany divided, Poland tumultuous, and places insuperable difficulties in the way of the first necessary step towards a solution of the Turkish question. If English statesmen persevere in this cause and animate Germany to support Austria, it will become impossible to avert the excessive power of Russia, except by acquiescing in a great aggrandizement of French influence, which will be won, as the influence in Italy has been won, by promoting national freedom. CONCERNING THINGS SLOWLY LEARNT. You what sort of things they are which I understand by Things Slowly Learnt. Some are facts, some are moral truths, some are practical lessons; but the great characteristic of all those which are to be thought of in this essay, is, that we have to learn them and act upon them in the face of a strong bias to think or act in an opposite way. It is not that they are so difficult in themselves; not that they are hard to be understood, or that they are supported by arguments whose force is not apparent to every mind. On the contrary, the things which I have especially in view are very simple, and for the most part quite unquestionable. But the difficulty of learning them lies in this: that, as regards them, regards them, the head seems to say one thing and the heart another. We see plainly enough what we ought to think or to do; but we feel an irresistible inclination to think or to do something else. It is about three or four of these things that we are going, my friend, to have a little quiet talk. We are going to confine our view to a single class, though possibly the most important class, in the innumerable multitude of Things Slowly Learnt. The truth is, a great many things are slowly learnt. I have lately had occasion to observe that the alphabet is one of these. I remember, too, in my own sorrowful experience, how the Multiplication Table was another. A good many years since, an eminent dancingmaster undertook to teach a number of my schoolboy companions a graceful and easy deportment; but comparatively few of us can be said as yet to have thoroughly attained it. I know men who have been practising the art of extempore speaking for many years, but who have reached no perfection in it, and who, if one may judge from their confusion and hesitation when they attempt to speak, are not likely ever to reach even decent mediocrity in that wonderful accomplishment. Analogous state ments might be made with truth, liberal tip, or even a few kind words or And |