But we may carry this view into some particulars which are deserving of notice. The results, for instance, of a popular election, if certain data are ascer tained, are often considered as settled, even before the day of voting has arrived; although the conclu sions thus formed are based in part upon opinions relative to whole classes of men, who differ from each other in their callings, interests, and prejudices.

Again, the speculations in the public or national stocks are very frequently prompted by the opinions, which those who are engaged in such speculations are able to form of the course which states and na tions will take in some future time.

One of the most striking facts, involving the foresight or prescience of the conduct of large masses of men, is the financial estimate which is annually made by governments. It is well known that the amount of property invested in commerce, with the annual returns of revenue to the government, is every year estimated in advance, and with very considerable accuracy, by the treasury departments of all civilized

nations.

Reasoning from what has taken place in times past, we may predict, with a good degree of accuracy, what number of letters will be written and circulated through a nation at any future time. The number of letters is indicated by the amount of postage; and this is a matter which the governments of nations have thought it important to them to ascertain. If a person will take the pains to examine the total receipts of the Postoffice Department of the United States, in the successive years from 1790 to 1830, he will notice, with but few exceptions, and those easily explained, a gradual and very regular increase in the amount; the increase being such as would naturally be expected from the augmentation of the wealth and population of the country.

It would seem, in looking at the statistical tables for this purpose, that in the year 1815 there was an increase decidedly greater than would be naturally expected in ordinary circumstances. But this was

probably owing (and equally satisfactory reasons will be found for other equally marked variations) to the recent return of peace with Great Britain, which at once gave a new and expanded impulse to the business transactions of the country.

We presume it will be found also on inquiry, that the number of letters not taken from the subordinate offices, and returned from time to time to the General Postoffice, or DEAD LETTERS SO called, is nearly the same from year to year, or varying so as to correspond to the variation in the number of letters received. It is stated by Laplace, that the number of dead letters remaining at and returned from other offices to the Postoffice at Paris is, in ordinary times, nearly the same from one year to another. same thing has been stated of the Dead Letter Office, as it is called, in London.-All these things conclusively evince that the actions of men, whether considered individually or in masses, are not left to chance or mere accident.

The

NOTE.-For a more detailed and satisfactory examination of this part of our subject, including not only a specific statement of a number of volitional laws, but also an explanation of the relational harmony and consistency of Law and Freedom, we are compelled by our narrow limits to refer to the volume on the Department of the Will, of which these statements are an abridgment.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

§ 474. Of the freedom of the will, and of the relation of its freedom to its subjection to law.

WE proceed now to another view of this important subject. If it be true that the will, in its action, harmonizes with law, in such a sense at least that its action cannot be regarded as wholly accidental, it is also true that the WILL IS FREE.

Law and Liberty necessarily go together. If it could be shown that the will acts, irrespective of any determinate methods and principles of action; in oth

er words, if laws were not in any sense predicable of the will, (such for instance as the great law of motives,) then it would of course follow, that it is the subject of mere contingency and accident, which entirely and fully comes up to the utmost îdea of fatality. And it would be found to be a fatalism of the worst kind, an unintelligent fatalism.—But having shown that the Will has its laws, we secure in that single fact the possibility of liberty, which we could not have without it. We are, accordingly, in a situation in which the liberty of the Will, that important and noble attribute of a morally accountable nature, is not necessarily excluded, which would certainly be the case if the will were driven about hither and thither, without any possible foresight of what is liable to take place, and without any regularity of action.

§ 475. Circumstances or occasions under which freedom of the will exists.

Although, in entering into the subject of the freedom of the Will, we do not profess, in this abridged view of it, to go into verbal explanations and definitions, something may nevertheless be said in relation to the occasions or circumstances under which it exists. If there is perfect harmony in other parts of the mind, there will be perfect freedom in the Will; if every appetite, and propensity, and passion is precisely what it should be, the voluntary power cannot possibly experience any pressure which will interrupt or diminish that degree of liberty which is essential to, or compatible with its nature.

This topic may perhaps be susceptible of illustration by a reference to the Supreme Being. If freedom can, with propriety and justice, be predicated of any being whatever, it is certainly predicable of the Supreme Being; and predicable not only in general terms, but of the Will in particular. We hazard nothing in saying, that liberty of the Will is possessed by Him in the highest possible degree. And we cannot conceive how it should be otherwise, when we consider that the elements, both moral and intellectual,

by which it is surrounded, are in harmony with each other. And if we turn our attention to any other high and holy beings, such as are nearest in glory to the Supreme Author of all things, it is the same. All the various elements, which go to constitute them intelligent and moral beings, are restricted to their proper place, and operate in their due proportion. Their perceptions, so far as they go, are in perfect accordance with the truth of things. Their emotions are such as God, who takes supreme delight in perfect rectitude, can entirely approve. Every desire which they exercise is in its right place; their love to God is just such as it should be; their love to other holy beings corresponds precisely to the nature of the object towards which it is directed; their aversion to sin and sinful beings is just such, and fully and entirely such, as is appropriate and right; and it is precisely the same in respect to every other emotion and desire. And the consequence is, there is no disturbing force in the neighbourhood of the Will; there is no possible motive to sway it from the line of perfect rectitude; and hence it is true, that their Will, although it always operates in the direction of the highest rectitude and good, is always at liberty; and this liberty exists, too, in the highest possible degree. And hence we assert, in respect to all minds, whether they are higher or lower in the scale of being, that perfect harmony is the appropriate element of perfect freedom; and that every diminution of harmony will be attended with a corresponding diminution of liberty. And this is as true of the separate parts or powers of the mind as of the whole; and is as true of the Will as of any other part.

§ 476. Evidence of the freedom of the will from consciousness. Having made the foregoing remarks in explanation of the nature of the freedom of the Will, and of the occasions on which it exists, we are now prepared to proceed to a consideration of the proofs in support of the position that there is such a freedom. And we accordingly remark, that the doctrine of the freedom

of the will is sustained, in the first place, by CONSCIOUSNESS.—When we assert that men have a knowledge of the Freedom of the will by Consciousness, we mean merely to declare, that such knowledge is the result of an inward conviction, an internal experience. In other words, every man knows himself, in the exercise of volition, to be free. It is a knowledge which we possess, not by deduction, but by a species of intuitive conviction; not by inference, but by an original perception.

We will only add, that the argument from Consciousness is as decisive, as it is plain and simple. Some writers, indeed, have been disposed to rely upon this argument alone. They consider it (and perhaps it may be admitted with entire justice and correctness) as conclusive against any considerations which may be adduced adverse to it. "Our own free will," says Mr. Stewart, "we know by consciousness; and we can have no evidence of any truth so irresistible as this."

Cred

§ 477. Objection to the argument from consciousness. It ought to be noticed, however, that from time to time, a few individuals have been found who have asserted the opposite, viz., a consciousness of internal compulsion or slavery. Surprising as such a declaration is, we are bound in candour to receive it as truly indicating the internal experience of those who make it, although it may be in opposition to the testimony of thousands and even hundreds of thousands to one. But these exceptions do not at all overthrow our argument. If there truly be such exceptions, they can undoubtedly be explained in entire consistency with the general truth, that the Freedom of the will is ascertained and proved by the consciousness of mankind. Is it not true, is it not accordant with common experience and with the Scriptures even, that any man and every man may enslave himself? And, when that is the case, what could we expect but that consciousness, the true index of what takes place within, should bear its testimony to a state of thraldom?