beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." "Known unto God," says the apostle James, "are all his works, from the beginning of the world."* Nor does the doctrine of God's foreknowledge rest upon general statements alone; but we have instances, again and again, of predictions, uttered long before the events came to pass, which were strictly fulfilled. The deluge was predicted one hundred and twenty years before it came on the face of the earth. It was foretold that the children of Israel should be in bondage four hundred years. The cruel conduct of the Syrian Hazael, and the deliverance wrought out by the hand of the Persian Cyrus, are matters of precise and specific prediction. The destruction of Babylon and of Nineveh, with many of the circumstances attending their overthrow, was predicted also. The coming and the preaching of Jesus Christ, and particularly his humiliation, trials, and death, were foretold by the mouths of holy men many years, and even ages, before the events themselves took place. The destruction of Jerusalem (not to mention other instances equally decisive in their bearing on this subject) was depicted long before it happened, and with a wonderful particularity and vividness.-In view of these facts, and others like them, we have only to make the remark that predictions so numerous and specific, and so exactly fulfilled, could not have been uttered without the possession of foreknowledge or prescience on the part of their author. § 464. The foreknowledge of events implies the foreknowledge of volitions. And it is further to be noticed, in regard to many, if not all the events which have taken place in accordance with such predictions as those referred to in the last section, that they were dependent on the volitions of men. The voluntary actions of men necessarily imply the antecedent exercise of volitions; and, *Isaiah xlvi., 9, 10; Acts xv., 18. such being the fixed relation between volitions and actions, it is difficult to suppose that any being whatever should foresee the actions of men without a foresight, at the same time, of their volitions. As an illustration, it was foretold to Abraham that his descendants should go into Egypt, and should take up their residence there; but such a prediction evidently implies a knowledge of all the circumstances under which this event should take place, including, in particular, every motive and every volition connected with it. Such a prediction implies a knowledge, not only of the volitions and acts of the immediate agents in the events foretold, but of those persons also who were concerned in them incidentally and collaterally. In the present case, it implies a knowledge of the jealousies of Joseph's brethren, and of their perverse and wicked conduct in selling him to the Ishmaelites; it implies a knowledge of the wants, interests, and motives of the Ishmaelites themselves, not to mention the situation and motives of other individuals and bodies of men, which were undoubtedly among the preparatory steps and means to the wonderful events which followed. Every one knows that events of the greatest magnitude are dependent upon circumstances apparently the most trivial. It is a remark of Dr. Dwight, that the "motions of a fly are capable of terminating the most important human life, or of changing all the future designs of a man, and altering the character, circumstances, and destiny of his descendants throughout time and eternity." Now, if these things are so, it cannot for a moment be conceded that God foreknows and predicts events without a knowledge of all those circumstances, even the most trivial, upon which those events may, by any possibility, be dependent. In particular, and above all, He must be minutely and fully acquainted with the volitive acts or volitions of the immediate agents in them. In foreseeing events in which men are concerned, He must, of course, foresee what men will do; but it is incon * Dwight's Theology, Sermon vi. ceivable that he should know this without knowing what volitions they will put forth. § 465. Application of these views to the will. But if it satisfactorily appears that God foreknows all things, particularly the volitions of men, then it clearly follows that the volitional power or Will has its laws. The opposite of an action which is in harmony with law is perfect contingency; and the very idea of contingency or of contingent action implies that it is something which cannot possibly be foreknown. Whatever is foreknown must be foreknown to exist at a particular time or place, or under some particular circumstances; but that action or event, which it is ascertained and certain will exist at a particular time or place, or under any particular and definite circumstances, cannot, with any propriety of language, be deemed a perfectly contingent one. Since, therefore, nothing which is foreknown is contingent, and since the volitions of men are obviously the subjects of foreknowledge, it follows that there must be some definite laws or principles by which the action of the voluntary power is, to some extent, regulated. § 466. The views of this chapter in harmony with the doctrine of the influences of the Holy Spirit. As in some respects closely connected with the views of this chapter, we may here, with propriety, refer to the Scripture doctrine that God, through the influences of the Holy Spirit, has the power, and, when in his providence He sees fit, exerts the power, of enlightening, sanctifying, and guiding the minds of men. The reader of the Bible will naturally be reminded here of the Saviour's interesting expressions on this subject, which are found in the concluding chapters of the Gospel of John: "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever." "And the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatso ever I have said unto you." John xiv., 16, 26.—"So they, being sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleucia."--"Then Saul, who is also called Paul, filled with the Holy Ghost, set his eyes upon him, and said, Oh full of all subtlety," &c.-" And were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to preach the word in Asia." Acts xiii., 4, 9; xvi., 6.- Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 1 Cor. ii., 13.-" Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i., 21. All these passages, and others like them, necessarily imply that the human mind, whatever may be true of its freedom and responsibility, is, nevertheless, susceptible of being held in subordination to the all-pervading and transcendent control of the Supreme Intelligence. CHAPTER IV. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. § 467. Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight. Ir may, perhaps, be objected by some that the argument drawn from the prescience of the Deity is less satisfactory than it would otherwise be, in consequence of the unspeakable elevation and incomprehensibleness of the Divine Mind. That the divine mind is, in some respects, incomprehensible by man, is true; but it does not follow that an argument, founded upon what we know and can understand of the divine nature, is therefore incomprehensible or even obscure. But whatever weight, whether more or less, may be conceded to this objection, we come to another view of the subject, analogous indeed to that of the last chapter, but drawn from a different source, and level to every one's comprehension. Man himself, restricted and dimmed as his conceptions undoubtedly are, has a prescience of the future, a foresight of what is to come to pass, as well as the adorable Being who made him. Not in an equal degree indeed, but still in some degree. And this fact also goes to confirm the position which we are now examining in regard to the Will. § 468. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct. In the first place, man can foretell (we do not say with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our argument) his own situation, actions, and success at some future time. Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to Boston or New-York, or to some place of common resort, no matter where it is, for the purpose of transacting business there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it is difficult to mention one more common and simple, implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, and that he makes his calculations without fear, and with a feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. He evidently proceeds upon the supposition (although he may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never have made it a matter of distinct reflection) that the operations of the Will exist in reference to some fixed principles; and particularly in connexion with motives in their various kinds and degrees. And looking at his proposed undertaking with care, and understanding well the claims, both of interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever it may be, without even doubting that all the future acts of the voluntary power will be accordant with its requisite details; and that, in due season, it will be brought to a fulfilment in all its parts. But we may assert with confidence, that this could never be done if volitions were entirely contingent; in other words, if they were |