worthy of some notice, viz., that the volition does not always exist with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one must have been conscious, that the exercise of the voluntary power is more prompt and energetic at some times than others. We are aware that it is liable to be objected to this statement, that if we will to do a thing, there can be nothing less than the volition; and that it is necessarily the same under all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we never will to do an act with anything less than a volition; and that, if there be any act of the will at all, it is one truly and fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as far as its intrinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying that it may exist with different degrees of force.

The existence of a mental state, which is always the same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to volition. The same trait is characteristic of the mental act in all cases where we yield our assent or belief. The state of mind which we denominate BELIEF is undoubtedly always the same in its nature, but admitting of various degrees. We determine these differences of strength in the feeling by means of that same internal consciousness which assures us of the existence of the mere feeling itself. In other words, we are conscious of, or feel our belief to be sometimes weaker and at other times stronger, which we express by various terms, such as presumption, probability, high probability, and certainty. And by appealing in the same way to our consciousness of what takes place within, we shall probably come to the conclusion that we put forth the act of volition with much greater strength at some times than others; that at some times it is so feeble as hardly to be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely recognised as a volition, while at other times it is exceed ingly marked and energetic.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE LAWS OF THE WILL.

§ 459. On the universality of law.

THE will is free; but it is also true, that it acts in connection with law. In entering specifically upon the question, whether the will is susceptible of determinate principles or laws of action, we may reason in support of that view, in the first place, from the general likeness or analogy of nature. If the universe is everywhere legibly inscribed and written over with the great truth, that all things are subject to law, are we not furnished with a strong presumption that we shall not discover an exception in any part of man's mental nature? As to the alleged fact on which we base this presumption, there can be no doubt of it.Let us look, in the first place, at material things. The parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by the operation of some fixed law; the various immense bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable principle; there is not even a plant, or a stone, or a falling leaf, or a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regulation and control. And what is true in these few instances, is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be found.

And this great truth holds good also of things which have life and intelligence. Objects of a spiritual or mental nature (if not in precisely the same sense in which the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and important meaning of the expressions) have their appropriate and determinate principles of being and action. There may, indeed, be some things which are as yet unexplainable by man; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot as yet reach; but still the vast majority of objects, coming within the ordinary range of our inspection, ob

viously tend to found and to foster the general con viction, that there are laws wherever there are exist. ences, whatever the kind or nature of the existence.— There is, therefore, undoubted truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he introduces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, after some suggestions on the meaning of the term, "all beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws."

§ 460. Remarks of Hooker on the universality of law.

"Of law," says the learned Hooker in a passage often quoted, "no less can be said than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."*

It is a sublime truth, that law, the great bond of the universe, finds its origin and support in the bosom of the Deity, and is, in its basis or elements, co-substantial with his nature; and going forth from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direction, like rays from the sun, embraces, harmonizes, and controls every form and modification of being, whether intelligent or unintelligent. And how full of grandeur and of consolation is the thought! If we could suppose that even a single unintelligent atom had broken loose from the countless extensions and applications of the great Principle of Unity, which is only another name for that law which binds one existence to another, and both to a third, and all to the great central and superintendent Power, it would not fail to fill us with misgivings and anguish. The doctrine of the universality of law, which is the same as the universality of power under the guidance of fixed * Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, book i.

principles, recommends itself to the heart as well as the understanding, and dispenses happiness while it controls conviction. Is any one prepared to say that he is not rendered happy in the recollection that God is around us and in us? Is it not a source of consolation, that his paternal eye rests for ever upon our path; that he knoweth our lying down and rising up, our going out and coming in? And that, while he superintends the minutest actions and events pertaining to ourselves, He extends abroad, amid the numberless varieties of existence, the watchfulness of his pervading control,

"And fills, and bounds, connects and equals all?"

461. A presumption thus furnished in favor of the subjection of the will to law.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject, when contemplated under this general form, at much length. What has been said will answer our present purpose. If the doctrine of the universality of law be tenable, what shall we say of the Will? Does not the position, that the Will is not subject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe? Whatever is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily irresponsible to the supervision of any thing, even God himself. We have, then, an exceedingly strong presumption, when we look at the subject in the most general light, in favour of the proposition that the Will has its laws.

CHAPTER III.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF THE DEITY.

§ 462. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity implies foreknowledge.

IN further proof of the general proposition that the Will has its LAWS, we now enter very briefly upon some distinct trains of thought. In the present chapter we propose to bring forward in its support the Prescience of the Deity.

And we naturally remark, in the first place, that the idea which all men agree in forming of the Deity implies foreknowledge. We do not have reference in this remark to the light which Revelation throws upon this subject, but refer merely to the notion of the Deity which men form of themselves. In all countries and among all classes of men; in the cheerless hut of the Esquimaux; in the rude dwellings of the uncivilized tribes inhabiting the islands of the Pacific; in the tent of the vagrant Arab, as well as among those who are refined by the arts and enlightened by science, we find the notion of a God. The conception may indeed be a feeble and imperfect one, compared with that developed in the Scriptures; but, feeble as it is, it always includes the idea of Prescience or Foresight in a much higher degree than is possessed by men. The very heathen would scoff at the idea of a God whose knowledge is limited to the present moment.

§ 463. The prescience of God directly taught in the Scriptures. The divine prescience or foresight is distinctly made known in a multitude of passages of Scripture. The Supreme Being himself, in the language ascribed to Him by the prophet Isaiah, asserts, “I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the TT