sary," says Mr. Stewart very justly, "to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to understand the import of the word will; for this last word properly expresses that power of the mind, of which volition is the act, and it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand anything concerning the nature of the power."*

§ 453. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions.

Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and exercise of the volitional power, we are unable to give any definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true, we may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice, and the like, but this is only the substitution of other terms, which themselves need explanation; and, of course, it throws no light upon the subject of inquiry. And hence we are thrown back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases where the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of investigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are then placed in the possession of all that knowledge which the nature of the case seems to admit of. And we must suppose that every one has, in some degree, done this. It is not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men who are constantly in action, pursuing one course and avoiding another, adopting one plan and rejecting another, accepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which things, and many others, imply volitional action, are still ignorant of what an act of the Will is.

§ 454. Volition never exists without some object. Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon * Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § 1.

consciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is still true that we can make some statements in respect to them which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among other things, it is an obvious remark, that every act of the will must have an object. A very slight reflection on the subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of which imply some object, in reference to which the mental act is called forth.

"Every act of the will," says Dr. Reid, "must have an object. He that wills must will something; and that which he wills is called the object of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of something, nor remember without remembering something, so neither can he will without willing something. Every act of will, therefore, must have an object; and the person who wills must have some conception, more or less distinct, of what he wills."*

§ 455. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power.

Another circumstance may be pointed out in illustration of volitions, viz., that they never exist in respect to those things which we believe to be wholly beyond our reach. As no man believes that it is in his power to fly in the air like a bird, so we never find a person putting forth a volition to do so. As no man believes that he can originate what never had a being before; in other words, that he can create a new existence out of nothing, so we never find a man determining, resolving, or willing to that effect. Indeed, we are obviously so constituted, that, whenever we believe an object to be wholly and absolutely beyond our power, volition does not and cannot exist in respect to it. The farmer, for instance, in a time of severe drought, desires rain, but he does not will it. He is conscious of a desire, but he is not conscious of a volition. The very nature of the mind interposes in such a case, and effectually obstructs the origina* Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, Essay ii., ch. i.

tion of the volitional act. And this is so promptly and decisively done, and done too in all cases without exception, that we find it very difficult even to conceive of anything which we are certain is wholly beyond our power, as being an object of the will's action. There may be a desire in such cases, but there is no volition.

And the usage of language will be found to throw light on this distinction, making the term DESIRE applicable both to what is within our reach and what is not; and the term VOLITION applicable only to the former. In some cases we speak of willing or determining to do a thing, while in others we invariably limit ourselves to the mere expression of a wish or desire. Accordingly, it would comport with and be required by the usage of language, if our thoughts and conversation were directed to those matters, to say, that we determine or will to walk, but desire to fly; that we will to build a house, but desire to create a world.

§ 456. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us.

Although the statements thus far made tend to throw some light upon the nature of the Will's acts, something further remains to be remarked. It does not seem definite enough merely to assert, that volitions relate solely to those things which are in our power, or are believed to be so. We may inquire further what is meant by being in our power, and how far the import of the phrase may justly extend itself. And hence it is necessary to add, that volitions relate, in the first place, to our own action, either some bodily movement or some act of the mind. In saying this, however, we do not mean to say that volition is necessarily limited to the present action. We may will to perform something of the simplest kind, which will exact, in its execution, merely the present moment, or something of a more complicated nature, which will require no inconsiderable time. Any series of actions, intellectual or bodily, capable of be

ing performed by us, which the understanding can embrace as one, and by means of any relations existing among them can consolidate into one, the will can resolve upon as one. So that the action, dependent upon volition, may be the mere movement of the foot or finger; or, it may be the continuous labours of a day, a week, or a year, or some long and perilous expedition by land or sea. It is just as proper to say that a man wills to take a voyage to England, as to say that he wills to put one foot before the other in stepping from his door to the street.

Volition may exist, in the second place, in respect to anything and everything which is truly depend ent upon us, however circuitous and remote that de pendence may be. It is proper to say that a mer chant has determined or willed to fit a vessel or a number of vessels for sea, and to send them to differ ent parts of the world, although his own direct and personal agency in the thing is hardly known. The effect of his volition, extending far beyond his own direct and personal capabilities, controls the acts of a multitude of individuals who are dependent on him. Previous to the commencement of his celebrated expedition into Russia, the Emperor Napoleon undoubtedly brought all the objects relative to the intended expedition distinctly before his understanding; the number and the kind of troops, the arms and ammunition with which they were to be furnished, the means of subsistence in the various countries through which they were to pass, and the expenses incident to the arming and support of a body so numerous. The action of the intellect enabled him to assimilate and combine this vast complexity of objects into one. Although numberless in its parts and details, it assumed, as it passed before the rapid glances of his understanding, an identity and oneness, which, for all the purposes of volition and action, constituted it one thing. And, accordingly, it is altogether proper to say, that Napoleon purposed, determined, or willed the expedition into Russia, although the agencies requisite to carry it into effect were not lodged directly in

himself, but in millions of subordinate instruments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. Certain it is, if he had not put forth his volition, the subordinate instrumentalities, however numerous and powerful in themselves, would never have united in and secured the result in question.

§ 457. Volitions involve a prospective element.

Another mark or characteristic of volitions, by which they are distinguished from some, though not from all states of the mind, is, that they have exclusive relation to the future, to something which is to be done. A volition is "futuritive" in its very nature; it involves in itself, and as a part of its own essentiality, a prospective element; it has no capacity of turning its eye backward, but always looks forward.

An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent. It takes its position, and there it stands; furnishing an occasion, it is true, for other feelings to exist and to operate, but in itself remaining not only complete, but satisfied and quiescent.

But it is not so with a volition, which, from its very nature, cannot rest satisfied with the mere fact of its own existence. If we may be allowed the expressions, it continually reaches forth its hand to grasp objects which have not as yet a being. In other words, it always has in view something which is to take place hereafter; something which is to be done, the completion of which is, therefore, necessarily future. This trait is an element of its nature, or, rather, is naturally and necessarily involved in its nature, and may be regarded as one of the characteristics which help to distinguish it from the perceptive and emotive states of the mind at least, if not from others.

§ 458. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength. There is one additional characteristic of volitions