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to be asserted is, that when persons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong, (that is, in doing what is condemned by the general moral sentiments of mankind, and by the will and law of God,) and yet have within their reach neglected sources of knowledge, which, on being laid open to the mind, would have caused different feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the information before them, and consequently cannot, under such circumstances, be rendered otherwise than criminal by any internal approbation.

CHAPTER III.

FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

398. Feelings of moral obligation distinct from feelings of moral ap proval and disapproval.

IT has been remarked in a former chapter, that the Moral Sensibilities, or Conscience, will be found, on an examination of its elements, to resolve itself into two classes of feelings, viz., Moral Emotions, and Obligatory feelings or feelings of Moral Obligation. Having given some account of Moral Emotions, viz., the feelings of moral approval and disapproval, which are all the states of mind that properly come under that head, we are now prepared to proceed to the consideration of the second class, viz., Obligatory feelings.

It is proper to remark here, that this class of mental states, considered as a separate and distinct class, has re ceived but little notice in philosophical systems; having generally been confounded, under the familiar designations of conscience and the moral sense, with the moral emotions which have already been considered. On this account, therefore, and also for the reason that they have an important connexion with the actual operations and with the philosophy of the Will, it will be necessary to examine them with some degree of care.

$399. Proof of the existence of obligatory feelings from consciousness.

Our first inquiry relates to the actual and distinct ex

istence of the states of mind which now come under consideration. The existence of feelings of this description is evinced, in the first place, by our own CONSCIOUSNESS. We might safely appeal to the internal conviction and the recollections of any man whatever, and ask whether there have not been periods in the course of his life in which he has experienced a new and authoritative state of mind; a peculiar, but undefinable species of mental enforcement, which required him to perform some particular act, and to avoid doing some other act, even when his interests and his desires seemed to be averse to the requisitions thus made upon him? And if so, we have here an instance of moral obligation, a feeling or sentiment of duty, the precise thing which is meant when we say we ought to do or ought not to do.

Take a common and simple illustration. A person, in passing along the streets, saw an old man sitting by the wayside who bore about him the most convincing marks of want, wretchedness, and sincerity in his applications for relief; he gave him bread, clothing, and money, conscious that it was done, not in view of any personal interest or gratification, or of any selfish object whatever, but under the impulse and guidance of a peculiar enforcement within, such as we commonly have when we speak of doing our duty; and if so, he then and there had a distinct knowledge of the moral sentiment or feeling under consideration. And this knowledge was from. Conscious

ness.

§ 400. Further proof from the conduct of men.

The existence of feelings of obligation is further shown by the general conduct of men.-It cannot be denied that other motives, distinct from convictions of duty, often operate upon them. Their desires, hopes, fears, sympathies, their present and future interests, all have an effect. But it would certainly argue an evil opinion of human nature altogether unwarranted, to maintain that they are never governed by motives of a more exalted kind. In a multitude of cases they are found to perform what is incumbent upon them in opposition to their fears, in opposition to their sympathies, and their apparent interests. Differ

ent persons will undoubtedly estimate the amount of interested and selfish motives as greater or less, according as a greater or less portion of the good or evil of human nature has come within their own cognizance; but it is impossible, after a cautious and candid review of the prin ciples of human action, to exclude entirely the elements of uprightness and honour. If there is any truth in history, there have always been found, even in the most corrupt periods of society, upright and honourable men. And if we are at liberty to infer men's character from their actions, as assuredly we are, we may assert with confidence that there are such at the present time. But a man of true uprightness and honour is one who acts from the sentiment of duty, the feeling of moral obligation, in distinction from motives of an inferior kind.

§ 401. Further proof from language and literature.

The existence of obligatory feelings is further proved, not only by each one's consciousness, and by the conduct of men generally, but by language and literature. In most languages, and probably in all, there are terms expressive of obligation or a sentiment of duty. No account could be given of the progress of society, and of the situation and conduct of individuals, without making use of such terms. If the words rectitude, crime, uprightness, virtue, merit, vice, demerit, right, wrong, ought, obligation, duty, and others of like import, were struck out from the English tongue, (and the same might be said of other languages,) it would at once be found unequal to the expression of the phenomena which are constantly occurring in the affairs of men. Now, as these terms occur, it is rational to suppose that they intimate something, that they have a meaning, that they express a reality. But it does not appear how this can be said of them, unless we admit the actual existence of obligatory feelings.

Turning our attention from single words and phrases, if we enter into an examination of the literature of a language, we shall come to the same result. A great portion of every nation's literature is employed in giving expression and emphasis to moral principles and sentiments. They find a conspicuous place in the most valuable spec·

ulations, not of professed moralists merely, but of historians, poets, orators, and legislators. But their frequent introduction would seem to be altogether misplaced, unsuitable, and unmeaning, if there were no real and permanent distinction between virtue and vice, between the acred requisitions of duty and those of mere personal in

Lerest.

§ 402. Further proof from the necessity of these feelings.

And in connexion with the observations which have been brought forward, we may further ask, What would men be, or what would society be, without the basis of moral obligation? There must be somewhere a founda tion of duty. It does not appear how the bond which unites neighbourhoods and states can be maintained, with any requisite degree of permanency and strength, without something of this kind. Annihilate this part of our constitution, and would not civil society be dissolved? Would not violence, and wrath, and utter confusion immediately succeed? The natural desire of society, the sympathies, and the selfish interests of our nature might do something by way of diminishing these evil results, but could not wholly prevent them. With the dislocation of the great controlling principles which regulate the action of the moral world, there would soon be an utter confusion in the movements of society, and all the unspeakable evils attendant on such a state of things.

403. Feelings of obligation simple and not susceptible of definition. In view of what has been said, we assert with confidence that feelings of moral obligation, or obligatory feelings, in distinction from the antecedent acts of the Moral Sensibility, which consist in mere approval and disapproval, actually have an existence. In looking into their nature, in distinction from the mere fact of their existence, although we do not flatter ourselves with being able, by a mere verbal statement, to give a satisfactory notion of them, we would direct the attention to some characteristic marks. And the first observation to be made is, that these states of mind are simple. We cannot resorve them into parts, as we can any complex state

of mind. And, as a necessary consequence of this, they are not susceptible of definition. Still we cannot admit that this simplicity, and the consequent inability to define them, renders men ignorant of their nature. It is true that the man who has never experienced the sentiment of obligation in his own bosom, can have no better meant of knowing it from the descriptions of others than the blind man can have for understanding the nature of the ,colours of the rainbow. But such a case is hardly a supposable one; among all the tribes of men, and amid all the varieties of human degradation, it will probably not be found to exist; and we may, therefore, say with confidence, that every man knows what the feeling of obligation is, not less than he knows what the feeling of joy, of sorrow, and of approval is. In other words, men have as ready and clear an idea of it as of any other simple notion or feeling.

§ 404. They are susceptible of different degrees.

In obtaining this knowledge, however, which evidentıy cannot be secured to us by any mere process of defining, we must consult our consciousness. We are required to turn the mind inward on itself, and to scrutinize the process of interior operation on the various occasions of endurance, trial, and action, which so often intersect the paths of life. The same consciousness which gives us a knowledge of the existence of the feeling and of its general nature, assures us, furthermore, that it exists in various degrees. This fact may be illustrated by remarks formerly made in reference to another state of mind. The word belief is the name of a simple mental state; but no one doubts that belief exists in different degrees, which we express by a number of terms, such as presumption probability, high probability, and certainty. In like man ner, the feeling of obligation may evidently exist in vari. ous degrees, and we often express this variety of degrees by different terms and phrases, such as moral inducement, slight or strong inducement, imperfect obligation, perfect. obligation, &c.

§ 405. Of their authoritative and enforcing nature.

It may be remarked further in respect to obligatory

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