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more than their original freshness and power; perhaps, in the hour of misfortune, in the prison-house, or in the land of banishment, they pay their visitations, and impart a consolation which nothing else could have supplied; they come with the angel tones of parental reproof and love, and preserve the purity and check the despondency of the soul.

173. Connexion of this doctrine with the final judgment and a future life There remains one remark more, of a practical nature, to be made. The views which have been proposed in respect to the ultimate restoration of all mental experiences, may be regarded as in accordance with the Divine Word. It may be safely affirmed, that no mental principle which, on a fair interpretation, is laid down in that sacred book, will be found to be at variance with the common experience of mankind. The doctrine of the Bible, in respect to a future judgment, may well be supposed to involve considerations relative to man's intellect ual and moral condition. In various passages they explicitly teach that the Saviour in the last day shall judge the world, and that all shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body, whether they be good or whether they be evil. But an objection has sometimes been raised of this sort, that we can never feel the justice of that decision without a knowledge of our whole past life on which it is founded, and that this is impossible. was probably this objection that Mr. Coleridge had in view, when he proposed the opinion, that the clothing of the soul with a celestial instead of a terrestrial body, would be sufficient to restore the perfect record of its past experiences.

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In reference to this objection to the scriptural doctrine of a final judgment, the remark naturally presents itself, that it seems to derive its plausibility chiefly from an imperfect view of the constitution of the human mind. It is thought that we cannot be conscious of our whole past life, because it is utterly forgotten, and is, therefore, wholly irrecoverable. But the truth seems to be, that nothing is wholly forgotten; the probability that we shall be able to recall our past thoughts may be greatly diminished,

but it does not become wholly extinct The power of reminiscence slumbers, but does not die. At the Judg ment-day, we are entirely at liberty to suppose, from what we know of the mind, that it will awake, that it will summon up thought and feeling from its hidden recesses and will clearly present before us the perfect form and representation of the past.

"Each fainter trace that memory holds

So darkly of departed years,

In one broad glance the soul beholds,
And all that was, at once appears."

CHAPTER IX.

REASONING

174. Reasoning a source deas and knowledge.

LEAVING the consideration of the memory, we are next to examine the power of Reasoning; a subject of inquiry abundantly interesting in itself, and also in consequence of its being one of the leading and fruiful sources of Internal knowledge. For our knowledge of the operations of this faculty, we are indebted, as was seen in a former chapter, to Consciousness, which gives us our direct knowledge of all other mental acts. But it will be remarked, that Reasoning is not identical with, or involv ed in, Consciousness. If consciousness give us a knowl edge of the act of reasoning, the reasoning power, opera ting within its own limits and in its own right, gives us ? knowledge of other things. It is a source of perceptions and knowledge which we probably could not possess in any other way.

Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have a knowledge of our existence; without Consciousness, we should not have a knowledge of our mental operations; without Relative Suggestion or Judgment, which is also a distinct source of knowledge, there would be no Reasoning; and, unassisted by Reasoning, we could have no knowledge of the relations

of those things which cannot be compared without the aid of intermediate propositions. The reasoning power therefore, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its developement, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency. Accordingly, Degerando, in his treatise entitled De la Generation des Connoissances, expressly and very justly remarks, after having spoken of judgment or Relative Suggestion as a distinct source of knowledge; "The Reasoning faculty also serves to enrich us with ideas; for there are many relations so complicated or remote, that one act of judgment is not sufficient to discov er them. A series of judgments or process of reasoning is therefore necessary."-But we would not be understood to limit the results of reasoning, considered as a distinct source of knowledge, to a few simple conceptions, such as the discovery, in a given case, of the mere relation of agreement or disagreement. It sustains the higher office of bringing to light the great principles and hidden truths of nature; it reveals to the inquisitive and delighted mind a multitude of fruitful and comprehensive views, which could not otherwise be obtained; and invests men, and nature, and events with a new character.

§ 175. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions. Reasoning may be defined the mental process or oper ation whereby we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised.—A train of reasoning may be regarded, therefore, as a whole; and, as such, it is made up of separate and subordinate parts. These elementary parts are usually termed PROPOSITIONS; and before we can proceed with advantage in the further consideration of reasoning, it is necessary to go into a brief explanation of them.

A PROPOSITION has been defined to be a verbal representation of some perception, act, or affection of the mind. -Accordingly, when we speak of a Proposition, we are usually understood to mean some men al perception or combination of perceptions, expressed and laid out befors

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us in words. Although such seems to be the ordinary meaning of the term, we may admit the possibility of propositions existing wholly in the mind, without being expressed in words. Mr. Locke expressly speaks of mental propositions, or those states of mind where two or more ideas are combined together previous to their being imbodied and set forth in the forms of language.

The parts of the proposition are, (1.) The SUBJECT, or that concerning which something is either asserted or denied, commanded or inquired. (2.) The PREDICATE, or that which is asserted, denied, commanded, or inquired concerning the subject. (3.) The COPULA, by which the two other parts are connected. In these two propositions, Cæsar was brave,

Men are fallible,

Men and Cæsar are the subjects; fallible and brave are the predicates; are and was are the copulas.

Propositions have been divided, (1.) Into SIMPLE, or those whose subject and predicate are composed of single words, as in this:

Benevolence is cornmendable. (2.) Into COMPLEX, or those where the subject and predicate consist of a number of words, as in this: Faithfulness in religion is followed by peace of mind. (3.) Into modal, where the copula is qualified by some word or words, representing the manner or possibility of the agreement or discrepancy between the subject and predicate, as in these:

Men of learning can exert an influence;

Wars may sometimes be just.

PROPOSITIONS, more or less involved, are necessary parts in every process of reasoning. They may be compared to the separate and disjointed blocks of marble which are destined to enter into the formation of some edifice; the completed process of reasoning is the edifice, the propo sitions are the materials.

§ 176. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning.

Leaving the consideration of its subordinate parts or elements, we are further to consider the general nature of reasoning; in other words, we are to examine the

character of the complex mental process involved in that term. The definition given of reasoning, it will be remembered, was, that it is the mental process by which we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised. Hence there will be in every such process a succession of propositions, never less than two, and often a much greater number. The propositions often follow each other with much regularity; and hence not unfrequently we consider the arrangement of them as entirely arbitrary. This is a mistaken supposition. It is true, when a number of ideas or propositions are presented nearly at the same time, the mind puts forth a volition, or exercises choice, in selecting one idea or proposition in preference to another. But the ideas or propositions from which the choice is made, and without the presence of which it could not be made, are not brought into exis ence by a direct volition, and, therefore, mere arbitrary creations; but are suggested by the laws of association

177. Illustration of the preceding statement.

As an illustration of what has been said, we will suppose an argument on the justice and expediency of capital punishments in ordinary cases. The disputant first denies, in general terms, the right which social combinations have assumed of capitally punishing offences of a slight nature. But, before considering the cases he has particularly in view, he remarks on the right of capital punishment for murder; he admits, we will suppose, that the principle of self-defence gives such a right. He then takes up the case of stealing, and contends that we have no right to punish the thief with death, because no such right is given by the laws of nature; for, before the formation of the civil compact, the institution of property, as a matter of civil and judicial regulation, was not known. He then considers the nature of civil society, and contends that, in the formation of the social compact, no such extraordinary power as that of putting to death for stealing, or other crimes of similar aggravation, could have been implied in that compact, because it never was possessed by those who formed it, &c.

Here is an argument, made up of a number of propo

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