43. trusted, and his troops

44. in great numbers he levied.

45. Saniru,* a mountain peak

46. at the beginning of the Lebanon, for his fortress

47. he made. With him I fought;

48. his defeat I accomplished. 6,000

49. of his soldiers with arins

50. I slew. 1,121 of his chariots,

51. 470 of his saddle horses, with his camp,

52. I took from him. To save

53. his life he went away. I pursued after him.

54. In Damascus, his capital city, I shut him up.

55. I cut down his parks (and) marched to the mountains 56. of the Hauran.

Cities

57. without number I wasted, destroyed,

58. burned with fire. Their prisoners

59. without number I carried away.

60. To the mountains of Bali-ra'si,

61. by the sea, I marched. My royal statue

IX. OBELISK INSCRIPTION BENEATH ONE OF THE PICTURES.

(B. C. 842.)

The tribute of JEHU, son of OMRI: silver, gold, shaplu § of gold, zuqut § of gold, kabuati § of gold, dalani § of gold, lead, khukuttu § for the hand of a king, budilkhati§ I received from him.

X. OBELISK INSCRIPTION. (B. C. 839.)

102.... In the twenty-first of my years of reign, I crossed, for the twenty-first time, the Euphrates. Against the cities

Biblical, Schenir (Deut. iii, 9).

son

To set up a king's statue was an expression of his sovereignty over the place. * Jehu was not a member of the house of Omri, but a usurper. He is mistakenly so called by the Assyrians, because they had their first knowledge of Israel when Omri was on the throne. Commonly thereafter they called Israel "the land of Omri," and the king of Omri." The name "Samaria" is, however, not unknown. Compare, for example, Sennacherib, Taylor Inscription II, 47 (Rogers, Records of the Past, new series, vol. vi, p. 88). § The meaning of these Assyrian words is unknown or uncertain. Delitzsch thinks that dalani means "pails," but it is very uncertain. (Delitzsch, Assyrisches Handwörterbuch, Leipzig, 1894, s.v.)

103. of HAZAEL, of Damascus, I marched. 4 of his cities I captured. The tribute of the Tyrians,

104. the Sidonians, the Byblians I received.

These selections are in most cases the same as have already been quoted by Schrader in his great book (Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, 2te Auflage, Giessen, 1883); and they are exactly the same as those given by Hugo Winckler in his useful manual (Keilinschriftliches Textbuch zum Alten Testament, Leipzig, 1892). The author's obligations to them are herewith gladly expressed, though the translations are not based upon their work, but in every case on the original texts. Besides this, Winckler's book is entirely without explanatory notes and introductions. It may be well to add that these selections are complete, in the sense that they contain all the passages in Shalmaneser's texts which cast any direct light upon the Old Testament. Ancient and unimpeachable wit nesses are they to the soberness, carefulness, and solid historical work of the Books of Kings. Their discovery and decipherment have added new difficulties to our study of the chronology of the kings of Israel and Judah, at the same time that they have given us new and definite dates. But the difficulties which they have solved are far greater than the new difficulties they have made. The boastful records of an Assyrian conqueror, who despised the Hebrews, have their deepest interest for those who have inherited Israel's sacred books. "This is the Lord's doing; and it is marvelous in our eyes."

Robert W.

Rogers,

ART. IV.-PSYCHOLOGY VERSUS METAPHYSICS.

Or late there has been an estrangeinent between the two. The former, under the name of the new psychology, very eager and bright, bears itself with an obtrusive and saucy independence toward the mother science. This is unbecoming and unnatural, for a real separation is impossible. The statement, "Psychology versus Metaphysics," implies more than mere juxtaposition in their relations; rather, antithesis and, possibly, antagonism-much as in the antique legal formula, "John Doc versus Richard Roe." John and Richard are not simply joined in suit, but are opposed. But with such a construction the two sciences would be arrayed in unnatural war, like a child entering suit to overthrow its mother. In some recent presentations of the claims of the new psychology, as well as of other sciences, there is this species of antagonism, with a spirit of matricide as unwise as it is unnatural, ungrateful, and unscientific. Those who promote such strife resemble vicious people urging on a family fight. The true antithesis in the "versus" should rather resemble a suit in chancery to adjust amicably an estate, in which the parental will may be established and rightly settled upon the child, according to the law of the case. The boundary line in this case is more difficult to trace than that over which the British lion and American eagle have quarreled in past years; and it would require a more skillful commission to accurately adjust the lines between metaphysics and psychology than any that ever met over national boundaries.

Within the realm of psychology, used in the broader sense, there are three departments: 1. phenomena of mind, or scientific psychology; 2. laws of mind, called nomology, which belongs to the province of logic, but is not concerned in the antithesis of our discussion; 3. ontology, or being, inferential and general, in which realm lies the philosophy of spirit. Between the first and the third-that is, between the phenomena of mind, or so-called scientific psychology, and ontology, or the philosophy of mind-lies the contrast intended by "Metaphysics versus Psychology."

For the purposes of discussion our distinction is more ideal than real, the separation being in thought rather than in fact;

the two are really inseparable. As there can be no physics with out metaphysics, nor metaphysics without physics preceding, so there can be no psychics without metapsychics, nor yet any metapsychics (called, in this case, metaphysics) without psychics, or soul-facts. Just as we can have no peninsulas without continents to which they inhere, or bays without oceans to mother them, or planets without a solar system to house them, so there can be no scientific psychology without metaphysics, the mother of all. Antagonism or airy superiority on the part of our "new psychology," whether it be of a species psychological, neurological, or physiological, as based on soul-facts-all this quite prevalent in some laboratories, essays, booklets, and even textbooks-is callow and conceited, with a strong flavor of matricide. We know not an instance of this but that the very pretenders have strutted forth to the world, after all, in the garb of metaphysics, often of the sorriest kind, appearing in society clad in metaphysical raiment.

As in physics facts precede their philosophy, so in psychology, or soul science, facts go before their explanation and arrangement. But be it remembered that, in turn, the facts of physics are largely discovered by aid of the theories of metaphysics. Our philosophies organize our expectations and direct them into the realm where the facts are to be found. So in psychology, no new fact is seized upon in the laboratory but by the foresight and forcordination of the philosophy of psychology already in the field. No matter whether one be materialist, spiritualist, idealist, or realist, he reaches his conclusions by, and defends them with, metaphysical measures, and such as originate in the ontological and inferential department, which is metaphysics par excellence. The three departments of psychology-phenomenal, logical, and ontological-form one endless fugue, each in turn pursuing the other. It is an eternal round of search after new or old facts to furnish logic, to fill up metaphysics, then of search after more facts, to furnish more logic, to fill metaphysics, and so ad infinitum. A homely parable may illustrate. When I was a lad I knew three cows-White, Red, and Spot. In an encounter White drove Red, Red drove Spot, and Spot drove White. So metaphysics dominates logic, and logic dominates psychology, and psychology dominates metaphysics.

On account of this interdependence confusion may easily arise. A phenomenon is brought to light. Let us suppose it to be the affirmation that observation shows in a thousand cases the children of drunkards to be sober. Logic seizes upon the supposed fact and reasons, "If in a thousand cases an acquired tendency is nontransmissible, any number of acquired tendencies is nontransmissible; therefore, drunkenness, being an acquired tendency, is not transmissible." Logic, having thus seized upon the so-called fact, passes it over to metaphysics. Possibly it is assigned to the department of ethics; and at once may arise the proclaination, “Eat and drink, for to-morrow we die; heredity has no influence in the case of acquired habits." Or possibly the contrary verdict is heard, that the iniquity of the fathers is visited "upon the children, to the third and fourth generation." A council must be called. Judgment, we will say, presides; Will summons Logic into court; Conscience prosecutes; Memory is called as a witness; Imagination pleads the case. Logic is charged with a mistreatment of the fact and the false inference that any number of thousands can be judged from a given thousand. Some captious member of the assembly springs the question whether heredity contains a "tendency," or vice versâ; or whether there be design in producing tendency or in preventing it; or whether the observation which discovered the fact was inspired by some design; or whether there. was not design on the part of those who inspired the search for so-called facts. As a collateral there might be brought up the question of stronger motives, as commercial advantage to the liquor traffic, or the support of some psychological theory; and, lo! we have already arrived at "confusion confounded," which may be translated, "confounded confusion." Or, suppose it to be a case of ethnology, and one talks learnedly and calmly about "our arboreal ancestry," affirming that it is too plain to be doubted, because a monkey can climb, and so can a boy. Here, again, we are on the verge of metaphysics; for this is ontological in its very essence. Or, suppose it to be a question concerning our "molluscan ancestry." Immediately Logic takes up the case, and often argues as follows: "Such are some facts. There must be other like facts to prove our descent. If it is not so, how is it? Therefore, it is so."

15-FIFTH SERIES, VOL. XI.