thereby corrupt his nature, or he would have been immutable and immortal like God. Free will was, according to him, given to man to cause, not the excellence, but the degradation of his nature. This solution is not more happy than that of other divines.

St. Basil says, that the reason God does not influence all men by his Holy Spirit to love and obey him, is that he wishes to be served voluntarily, and not by compulsion. Why? The nature of God

Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indigna nostri "-

cannot have any need of our services voluntary or involuntary. His commands to us are all intended for our own happiness, not for his service, properly speaking. His commands to us to discharge our moral duties are obviously intended solely to promote our individual and social happiness. Nor

are his commands to us to worship him less so: the worship of him, while it preserves the human mind from all the pernicious and debasing effects of idolatry, necessarily induces a consideration of his nature and attributes; of all subjects of contemplation the most elevating, expanding, invigorating, and ennobling that can possibly occupy the human mind. It is unnecessary to add, that a contemplation productive of such effects on the mind must be the most efficient of all possible secondary causes of human happiness. Besides, the worship of God consists in adoration of, and in grati tude to him for blessings received, and in prayers for further blessings, than which it is impossible that more pleasurable dispo sitions could influence the human mind.

Thanksgiving, the offspring of gratitude, necessarily begets a habit of more attentively considering the blessings for which

we return thanks; a more attentive consideration leads to a deeper sense and fuller appreciation, and this sense and appreciation produces a more perfect enjoyment of them. Prayer sensibly connects (if I may be allowed the expression) the creature with the Creator; and the divine command given to us to pray, gives to us at the same time the glorious consciousness that it is by his authority, and at his express desire, we draw nigh to and hold converse with the Mighty Spirit of the Universe. What exalted notions of his nature should such a privilege give to man!

The habit of prayer also produces the delightful assurance that we who can do so little for ourselves are under the protection of a Being whose power all nature testifies. It also impresses upon the mind an ever present conviction, that our thoughts as well as actions are observed by Him, who

who is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity." The salutary effects of such an impression constantly operating on the mind are too obvious to require specification.

Thus every command which has been given by God to man is calculated to produce, by its immediate effects, the most important benefits to the latter; and for this purpose alone is it reasonable to suppose that Infinite Goodness ever gave his commands. Thus the question why God has not inspired all his creatures with a resistless propensity to observe his laws, which he has imposed on them solely for their happiness, is not satisfactorily answered by St. Basil's conjecture.

I have said nothing about the scholastic distinction between God's causing and his permitting evil, because there is in truth no such distinction. God is the primary, and consequently, if omnipotent, the sole cause

of every thing that exists; and nothing but most erroneous notions of the Divine nature could for a moment tolerate the assertion, that any thing ever did or ever will exist for one instant contrary to his pleasure. If his commands are disobeyed in any instance, it is because he chooses that they should be disobeyed. "Quod est causa causæ est causa causati."

Nothing can be more fallacious than the argument of Thomas Aquinas: "Siminister faciat aliquid contra mandatum Domini, hoc non reducitur in Dominum sicut in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum aibitrium committit contra præceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in

A master is not the cause of what a ser

* Summa, part II. quest. lxxix. art. 1.

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