Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis treatise explores what is at issue in narrowly moral questions, and in questions of rational thought and conduct in general. It helps to explain why normative thought and talk so pervade human life, and why our highly social species might have evolved to be gripped by these questions. The author asks how, if his theory is right, we can interpret our normative puzzles, and thus proceed toward finding answers to them. |
Contents
The Puzzle | 3 |
Nature and Judgment | 23 |
Analyses Broached | 36 |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
PSYCHE IN NATURE | 103 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
Rationale and Warrant | 204 |
Pragmatic Support | 219 |
Communities of Judgment | 233 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
Moral Concern | 253 |
Assessing Feelings | 274 |
Structural Questions | 293 |
Moral System | 310 |
in NORMATIVE OBJECTIVITY | 151 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
Parochial Judgment | 189 |
329 | |
339 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept norms accord action adaptive alternative analysis anger apply authority bear beliefs better biological circumstances claim coherent commitments concepts concern consensus consistency constitute conversational cooperation coordination course culture demands depend desires develop emotions expect experience explain express facts feelings give governance Greeks grounds guilt hold human ideal influence inquiry interpretation involved irrational judge keep kind lead least lives look matter meaning ments mind moral motivation mutual nature normal normative discussion normative judgments objective observer one's ourselves Perhaps person philosophers picture possible pragmatic problem proposal psychological question rational rationale reason reject represent require respect response rules seems sense shame share simply situation social speak standards story suggests Suppose talk tell tend theory things thought treat various wrong