uncertain of all games, proves nothing to the contrary. It only shows that the true apprehension of the above elements of the calculation is excessively difficult in practice. Experience in war is universally acknowledged as the best teacher; and the precise knowledge which experience brings of the data before mentioned, and of the principles of action which spring from them, proves that there is in war a sufficient sequence of cause and effect to constitute it a science.

of little consequence where the enemy is. There may be a decisive object to be attained, and this object may be to provoke him to concentrate in order that he may be the more easily annihilated. But the use of the term point evidently introduces a geometrical or at least a topographical idea into the axiom, which had best be avoided.

But although the real science of war, as deduced from historic fact, has been sadly overloaded with definitions and axioms, it would be unsafe to neglect on that account the study of the principal writers of strategy and tactics. One writer, indeed, is almost absolutely exempt from this fault, and, which strongly confirms the truth of our position, that writer is the only one who ever commanded large armies in the field. We allude of course to the admirable work of the Archduke Charles on the Principles of War. Of tactical works we know scarcely any that can compare with Frederic's Instructions to his Generals, and Crawford's Standing Orders. But the best of all studies is that which the student carves out for himself, by collating the historical account of military events with the despatches of the chief actors. In this course at least all pedantry will be avoided, and we may add that it is admirably adapted to the studies of the English officer who has before him for the purpose the pages of Napier and Gurwood.

There are, then, principles of war, fixed and real; and if principles, then there is a science which combines and elaborates them. Of what nature, then, is this science? Napoleon gives us the best clue to the answer by telling us in what respect war is not a science. We must not expect, with the limited knowledge which under the best of circumstances we can hope to acquire of the data above mentioned, to attain to anything resembling a demonstrative certainty. 'Nothing,' says the great warrior, 'is absolute in war.' Accordingly we find that principles which in some wars are unquestionable are not applicable at all to others; for instance, the principles on which wars against independent chiefs of half-savage peoples should be conducted are totally different from those which should govern military operations against regular armies. If any one doubt this, we will ask him to take one of the first principles laid down in all scientific military works, from Jomini downwards-viz., that of destroying your enemy in detail by opposing masses of your forces to fractions of his. Now in a war such as we are considering, so far from this being the object to be attained, the real object is to induce the enemy to unite his forces, in order that you may destroy them once and for all. Again, the first of all principles of quelles qu'aient été d'ailleurs l'audace de

war is said to be to concentrate superior forces upon the decisive point. But, as in the illustration just given, there is in many cases no decisive point whatever. It is

The following opinion of Napoleon, while confirming the truth of the above remarks on war as a science, justifies the course taken by our author in his interesting an 1 instructive treatise :

Tous les grands capitaines n'ont fait de grandes choses qu'en se conformant aux règles et aux principes naturels de l'art, c'est à dire par la justesse des combinaisons et le rapport raisonné des moyens avec les conséquences, des efforts avec les obstacles. Ils n'ont réussi qu'en s'y conformant,

leurs entreprises et l'étendue de leur succès. Ils n'ont cessé de faire constamment de la guerre une véritable science. C'est à ce titre seul qu'ils sont nos grands modèles, et ce n'est qu'en les imitant qu'on doit espérer d'en approcher. J. E. ADDISON,

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT HISTORY.

THE Budget of 1861 was intro

duced in a speech which has been allowed by most of those who heard it, and by a still greater proportion of those who read it, to have been one of Mr. Gladstone's happiest efforts. It bespoke a great fund of native audacity, and an admirable consciousness of strength, to address the House, after the events of last year, in a speech so airy, light, and jocose. Quotations from Tennyson and Virgil, jokes about young ladies, and a facetious allusion to Godiva, decorated an exposition of financial details which would have been dry and cumbrous in the hands of any other man. But Mr. Gladstone possesses in a marvellous degree the art of stating a case. He can put point after point so as to make everything seem clear to the dullest hearer, and he can weave his web so adroitly that the most vigilant and suspicious adversary can seldom lay his finger at once on a flaw. Besides, Mr. Gladstone was in the delightful position of having to announce a surplus where a deficiency had been apprehended. He might well trust that the House would let him do what he liked with a surplus that was so little expected; and if the proposal to abolish the paper duty was a political rather than a financial measure, it might be pardoned when accompanied by the remission of a penny on the hated income-tax.

There was never a Budget that presented more broad and intelligible points for discussion. There are really only two points about it worth discussing. In the first place, is it true that there is a surplus and secondly, if this surplus exists, is it wise to expend a large portion of it in abolishing the paper duty? As to the existence of a surplus, we are obliged in a great measure to trust to the calculations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The debate on the Budget showed that, although there were differences in the mode and result of the calculations of ascertainable items on the part of Mr.

Gladstone and his critics, yet that after full allowance had been made for this, the substantial difference of opinion lay in the divergent estimates of the future which he and his opponents had formed. Mr. Gladstone prophesies prosperity; Mr. Baring and his supporters prophesy distress. If neither of them were in office, we should think both these men likely to be good prophets; and should not perhaps know on whose prophecy we ought to rely. But Mr. Gladstone is a Minister, and Mr. Baring is not. We have, it may fairly be said, selected Mr. Gladstone as the person who is to prophesy for us this year. This is true in constitutional law, and it is true in fact. The great majority of Englishmen are content to see Mr. Gladstone at the Exchequer; and if he tells us there will be a surplus, we cannot tell him we disbelieve him without implying that he is unfit for his post.

We must, therefore, take the surplus for granted, so far as its existence depends on a calculation of the general features of the country during the current financial year. Is it wise to apply a large portion of this surplus to a remission of the paper duty? Financially it is obviously unwise. A remission of a portion of the war duties on tea and sugar would be a far greater boon to the poor. The abolition of the paper duty may possibly do some one good besides a few newspaper proprietors and vendors of cheap romance; but it also may very possibly benefit them alone; whereas the cheapness of tea and sugar would be felt as a gain in every cottage in the kingdom. The tea and sugar duties have also this great advantage. If we lower them, and find that the debated surplus does not exist, we could easily raise them to cover the deficiency; but the paper duty once gone is gone for ever. Financially, therefore, Mr. Gladstone was wrong; but politically he has made a choice which has endeared him and recommended the Government

man and as the equal of the European. The object of the occupation of India is not to enable English settlers to acquire rapid fortunes, but to make the natives of India happy and prosperous. If we do not propose this to ourselves as the one aim of our government of India, we shall only bring curses on our own heads and on the heads of the wretched Hindoos. That a Hindoo who does not fulfil a civil contract should be treated as a criminal, because, if civil remedies alone are provided, the English seler will, as Mr. Laing says, pack

his portmanteau, is so wild a fusion of those first principles of ice and law which should reguthe government of a depenby like India by a free country, we may tremble at the thought a when it was announced as the foundation of a Government measure only two members of the Legislative Council were found to vote against it. We may also tremble at the thought that the decision of such vital points of Indian Government hangs on the accidental fluctuations of our parliamentary struggles. Sir Charles Wood happened to be in office, and has decided, as became a man who cares more to adhere to great principles of justice and good government than to please the noisy cliques who rage and write at Calcutta. But Mr. Danby Seymour, who was Under-Secretary for India in Lord Derby's Administration, took the side of the planters, and thought that the natives should be compelled to cultivate indigo. That the Derby Cabinet would really have sanctioned this gross injustice if it had been in office is very doubtful, for Lord Stanley has always shown himself a friend to the natives of India; but that a man who has held office at home, and has had an opportunity of knowing the real question at issue, should have been capable of defending a measure that would have placed the ryot at the mercy of a taskmaster, is a sign of what Parliamentary Government may do for India that gives rise to the gravest apprehensions.

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It has often been said that the danger of allowing English settlers to treat the Hindoos as slaves, or, to use the term actually in vogue in India, as 'niggers,' is quite as great for the English as for the natives. The settlers would become rapidly demoralized unless Government kept a firm hand over them. How strong is the propensity of a portion of this class to tyranny and cruelty, and how easily authority entrusted to them is abused, even when they are neither tyrannical nor cruel, may be gathered from the facts collected together in Mr. Layard's recent speech. It must be remembered that Sir Charles Wood declared after this speech was made, that all the assertions contained in it were strictly true. He invited the House to hear what had been the effect of the temporary Act of last year, the Act which the Legislative Council now proposed to renew. The Act, as appears from the evidence and judgment of independent eye-witnesses, was virtually a Slave-law, and amounted to an attempt to get indigo sown at the point of the bayonet. The administration of the Act was entrusted to a large number of inexyoung, perienced men sent up to the indigo districts. It was found that hundreds of the agreements between planters and ryots were forgeries, that great numbers of the ryots were in prison, and that the indigo districts presented one horrible scene of reckless injustice and oppression. In one gaol there were no fewer than 588 ryots, criminally convicted under the Act; one man had to pay 217 rupees, who had had an advance of only six, and another 161 rupees for an advance of only two. One case deserves to be singled out and engraved in the memory of all those who concern themselves with the manner in which we fulfil the responsibility we have assumed by occupying India. An unhappy ryot was said to have bound himself and his heirs never to repay back an advance in any other way than by cultivating indigo. This agreement was a forgery, and was of a date as recent as November, 1859. The ryot was