granted, not onely as an act of State-policy and neces-` sity, but of Christian charity and choyce.

It is all I have now left me, a power to forgive those that have depriv'd me of all; and I thank God I have a beart to do it, and joy as much in this grace which God has given me, as in all my former enjoyments; for this is a greater argument of God's love to me, than any prosperity can be.

Be confident, as I am, that the most (of all sides) who bave done amiss, bave done so, not out of malice, but misinformation, or misapprehension of things.

None will be more loyal and faithful to me and you, than those Subjects who, sensible of their errors and our injuries, will feel in their own souls most vehement motives to repentance, and earnest desires to make some reparations for their former defects *.

But, if all this be not enough to fuperfede fufpicion and doubt, let me yet add a farther teftimony. The King admits at this day to his bofome and neerest trust, feveral perfons, that, have been engaged against his father, and fome of them in actions moft fatal to his affairs; an infallible affurance, that it is only the fault of the reft, that they are not there too. More then this, concerning a future performance, to affure it, can not be faid or done, except it fhould please God to work Miracles; which, I hope, no body does now expect.

The fhort of all is. Without trufting fome one or other, the Nation is certainly destroyed: and no perfon in the world, befides the King, is in a capacity to avert the impendent ruin, or can give the like fecurity of himself, as he can do. I will not now prescribe unto the reader's underftanding, in dictating an inference;

but, from the Premifes, defire him at his leifure to draw◄ out the conclufion.

Having thus without paffion, partiality, or prejudice, endevoured clearly, to lay-down the exact cafe of the Nation, both in refpect of its difeafe and cure; 'twill be fuperfluous to add perfwafives: for men do not ufe to be importuned to leave their torment or disease, or want rhetorical Enducements, after the pleadings of Intereft and Profit. I forbear therefore to addreffe myself unto Affection, and to beg that thing, which vifibly it concerns them that are courted, to render their importunate request and fuit: Nor will I enlarge upon the motives yet untoucht, drawn from Religion, and the refpects of Proteftations, Covenants, and Oaths; as alfo native Allegiance; or (what is infinitely confiderable,) motives taken from the ftate of publick affairs abroad; our neighbour Nations being now at peace among themselves, and looking-out for forraign war, thereby to employ their uselesse forces; pretence, and colour, and defire too, for the undertaking of which, we have given to every one about us, in our late attempts on them; and [our prefent unfettled ftate] likewife yeelds [them] affurance, that they fhall fucceed by our difagreement here among our felves. Let all this be feriously weigh'd: I am factor for no Intereft or Party, nor feek the thanks, or favour, of any person, but rather expect the fate of Reconcilers, " to displease every body." But let that fucceed as it shall happen: the injury that I have done cannot certainly be efteemed great; all that is faid, amounting but to this very reasonable defire, "that my fellow-fubjects will remember thefe two plain truths, first," that they are Englishmen," and fo confider the good of the Nation; and then, "that they are men, and fo pursue their own.

SUBSTANCE OF THE SPEECH

OF THE

EARL OF SELKIRK,

On Monday, the 13th of April, 1807, on the Motion of the Marquis of Stafford, That the House should come to a Resolution, "That "this House, feeling the necessity of a firm and stable Government "at this most important crisis of publick affairs, is impressed with "the deepest regret at the change which has taken place in his "Majesty's Councils, and that such regret is greatly increased by

the cause to which such change has been ascribed, it being the " opinion of this House, that it is contrary to the first duties of the "Ministers of the Crown to restrain themselves by any pledge, "expressed or implied, from giving to his Majesty any advice, "which, in their judgement, the course of circumstances may "render necessary for the honour and security of his dominions."

THE Earl of SELKIRK declared, that the propofitions contained in the Refolution moved by the noble Marquis had, in the abftract, his unqualified affent. He had no dobt of the principle, that a privy Counsellor, who should restrain himself by a pledge, from advifing His Majefty to the best of his judgement, would be guilty of a high breach of duty. He was also satisfied, that the late Administration poffefssed and deserved the confidence of the country. He did not mean to imply an unreferved approbation of all their proceedings; but he did not expect to fee an Adminiftration of more than human perfection. The fair criterion, by which to judge the late Administration was to compare their conduct with that of others; and in this view he was ready 2 G4

to maintain, that confidering the fhort duration of their power, they had accomplished, or put into a fair train of accomplishment, more important measures of publick good, and that with lefs of reprehenfible conduct, than perhaps any Administration within our memory. He was also of opinion, that in the prefent state of Europe, the lofs of a firm and ftable Administration was an event deeply to be deplored.

The queftion before the Houfe, however, was not whether thefe principles were true, but whether it was proper, under all the circumftances of the cafe, for the House to record an opinion on the fubject. The plain object and intention of the motion, was to convey a cenfure on the difmiffal of His Majefty's late Minifters, as founded on an unconftitutional act,-a cenfure in which he could not concur. The adoption of this motion, or of any other of a fimilar tendency, he confidered as an unwarrantable interference in the exercise of the Prerogative.

The right of parliament, he faid, to advise the crown upon the choice of Minifters, cannot go fo far as to entitle the Houfe to queftion the motives of His Majesty, for difmiffing Minifters, who had loft his Confidence. The King cannot be required to take advice from men, in whom he cannot confide; and, were there no other reafon, a diminution of Confidence is a fufficient ground for a change in His Majefty's councils. If, upon fuch a change, improper perfons are fubftituted, it becomes the duty, as it is the right, of Parliament to ftate their opinion of the unfitnefs of the perfons appointed: but it is on thefe grounds of expediency only, that they can recommend one fet of men, or reprobate another. It can never be maintained, that the King is accountable to Parliament, for his conduct in changing his Advisers. Such

Such a doctrine would fap the foundations of the Con ftitution. If the motives for a change in His Majefty's Councils be a fit fubject for Parliamentary investigation, as well might the two Houfes proceed to the election of N. B a miniftry by a ballot.

Except upon the principle here contended-for, it would be impoffible to prevent difcuffions, which are admitted on all hands to be utterly unfit for Parliament;difcuffions upon the personal conduct of the King, and on points at iffue between him and his Minifters. Ta illuftrate this, let it be fuppofed, that the oppofite principle were established, "that the motives for a change of Ministers are a fit fubject of Parliamentary inquiry;" and then let an extreme cafe be put let it be fuppofed, that a Minister fhould in council offer a grofs perfonal infult to His Majefty, fuch as would be an unpardonable offence from one individual to another, would there be a doubt that fuch a Minifter, (be his talents and his virtues what they may,) might be properly difmiffed ? Now let the fuppofition be varied: inftead of a grofs infult, let us fuppofe an offence lefs unpardonable. The fuppofition admits of every poffible gradation between the groffeft infult, and the moft venial inattention. Between the two extremes, cafes may undoubtedly be imagined, in which it would be a matter of the utmost nicety to determine, whether the offence were, or were not, a fufficient ground for difmiffing a Minifter. If fuch queftions as thefe are to be determined by Parliament, where is an end of the improprieties into which it would lead? and how are fuch queftions to be avoided, if the motives of His Majefty for difmiffing His Minifters are to be held a fit fubject of inquiry?

When a change of Administration takes place, on the ground of any great publick meafure, the propriety of

the