To raise the Austrian monarchy to its natural standard has, I believe, ever been the leading motive by which the Arch-Duke's conduct has been guided: he fought like a hero as long as he believed that he was thereby serving the state; but when he saw that to continue the war was to endanger the future independence of his country, he advised to make peace. Whenever the Duke shall see his sove- reign in a state to avenge his country's wrongs, he will, you may depend upon it, advise him to do so. In the mean time, it is much to be wished, that an alliance, formed upon liberal principles of national interests and reciprocal advantage, could be brought about between the Austrian and British monarchies. The phrase natural ally, like that of natural enemy, has in itself neither sense nor any sort of meaning; all communities of men are naturally allies: but, in as far as the security and political independence of a state constitute the leading interest of the nation, the Austrian and British monarchies are upon that principle politically allies. Since Spain and Holland were, as we may now fairly consider them to be, both completely subjugated, or become dependent on the government of France, if the British nation have an interest, either political or commercial, in the destiny of Europe and Asia, that interest should, by every rule of political combination, be supported by the powers and perfect independency of the Austrian monarchy: were it not for the intervenient power of Austria, Russia and France could, to-morrow or next day, divide the continental part of our Eastern hemisphere between them. The power of Austria, if, however left to itself alone, may be compelled to bend; it may even be crushed between those swelling empires; but in alliance with Great Britain, and loyally supported by your marine, no power nor combination of power could ever be in any wise formidable to the one or to the other. That the dissolution of the Turkish government in Europe must very soon take place, is, I presume evident to every impartial man of com. mon knowledge. Such an event is perhaps desirable; and it might be highly beneficial to Europe in general; but the partition of the Turkish dominions, and to whom the several lots may fall, must be to Great Britain and Austria considerations of the very highest importance. Should the Dardanelles and Bosphorus fall under the dominion of either France or Russia; or should these two powers be allowed to join hands in the demarcation line between Europe and Asia, the consequences cannot be foreseen. To prevent the evils that must otherwise arise out of the partition treaty now contriving between the cabinets of Petersburgh and St. Cloud, and by which the king of Hungary is allowed a share, the most effectual measure would be a close connection and cordial alliance between Great Britain and Austria. Supported by Great Britain with vigor and in good faith, Austria would very soon, or before any of her neighbours were in a state to quarrel with her, be able to cover most effectually the land frontiers of European Turkey; and if you retain the island of Malta, your navy may as effectually cover the water frontiers of that empire.' An alliance between Great Britain and Austria would destroy the prospect of the consul being able to divide Turkey, and might arrest his progress in other quarters; Bonaparte's usurpations would then 6 be be at an end; and peace and security might be re-established in Europe. • Thus, Sir, I have pointed out to you two allies, Denmark and Austria. With the efficacious support and steady friendship of Great Britain, the one, whatever you may think of it, might always maintain the freedom of the Baltic and peace in the North; and the other could preserve the independence of the Dardanelles, and prevent for ever, the co operation of the powers of France and Russia, the only combination of power the world has to dread. Do not however, I beg of you, believe that I am such a novice as to presume, that your leading politicians will ever see the state of Europe in the same light that I now represent it.' In the present, as in his former tracts, the author recommends to us a more active hostility than we now display: but why does he not lay the scene of it, and state the object at which we should aim? We must all be sensible of the advantages of offensive operations, but the field in which they can be executed does not present itself to our view. It is consolatory to learn that the war, the pressure of which we so much feel, raises a barrier against the power of France by assisting Austria to regain her former ascendancy. The communications of this intelligent writer warrant the conclusion that the fate of Europe, though placed in imminent hazard, is not yet hopeless; while they also shew that there never was a period which required so much integrity, ability, and firmness, in the persons to whose management the interests of states are intrusted. The writer contrives to make very humorous and sarcastic attacks on some of our national failings and political errors, under the cover of certain pretended extracts from a memorial said to be delivered to Bonaparte, containing a plan for the destruction of Britain by means of peace, and a treaty of commerce favourable to the views and wishes of its inhabitants. This jeu d'esprit, which pleasantly submits very grave matter to our consideration, thus concludes; "Permit me to remark to you, citizen Consul, that the dismissal of Marlborough, Godolphin and their colleagues in 1710, sunk the power and influence of England from the dictatorship of Europe to their natural level, and enabled Louis XIV. to raise the pretensions of France to where you have extended her dominion: when another set of daring men at the head of this government again threatened the political balance and commercial liberties of Europe, the resignation of Chatham in 1761 saved the French and Spanish em pires abroad, and laid the preliminaries to the independence of America. The king has lately dismissed an arrogant but able minister, and has thereby disarmed the most formidable enemy of the French government-do not citizen C neglect this propitious juncture; it may be of short duration; these imperious people will not long be be led by the pacific docility of their present rulers, and any change must be detrimental to the interests of the republic.” On what follows, we shall only observe that we pray that it may be correct: I have mentioned to you on former occasions, that notwithstanding the scurrility with which your English writers speak of the politics of the legitimate sovereigns of the continent, they are really honest and honourable men; you accuse them of timidity and of a connivance with Bonaparte! Sir, believe me the people of England are ill informed. I will not speak of Spain and Italy-but from a knowledge of facts I can assure you, that there is not another sovereign prince in Europe but who considers the present government of France as the heaviest malediction that ever overtook civil society. They are, every one, convinced that the dominion of that licentious nation must be circumscribed, or that Europe will be over-run by its marauding armies: these sovereigns are therefore, upon principles of self-preservation, the irreconcileable enemies of Bonaparte's usurpation; and they, that is, those who have the means, are really at this moment adopting measures to bring about its destruction. The three leading powers are, you may rely upon it as a fact, now resolved, in accord with one another, to raise their military force to such a standard, as shall not only secure their own independence, but likewise restore in time the political existence of other states. That Russia, Austria, and Prussia have been too long in coming to a frank explanation with one another on this subject, is to be regretted for, as I said to you in a former letter, were the consul less occupied about getting upon a mushroom throne, he might certainly embarrass their measures before they could singly, or united oppose his operations; but to defeat the ultimate success of their plan is impossible. Bonaparte knows that those sovereigns as well as every honest man are the enemies of his government, and that they are determined to circumscribe its dominion. He knows that the Austrian regular army amounts to 400,000 brave men in a high state of discipline; that Prussia can muster nearly 300,000 soldiers commanded by the most intelligent officers in Europe, and that Russia can in a little time organize an army of almost any number of men. Thus circumstanced, can it be presumed that the consul, presumptuous as you say he is, should export 200,000 of his best troops? The hero of Marengo could not pretend to undertake the conquest of England with a smaller number, Suppose the Gallic emperor had nothing to apprehend from his continental neighbours, by whom is his expedition to England to be conducted? Should he put himself at the head of the army, to whom could he intrust the mantle and crown in his absence? He knows that once landed in England, those who are now his warmest friends in France would instantaneously offer to the British government peace upon any terms, if you engaged to keep him there, or to send him to Botany. Bay: rather than take Bonaparte back, the French would consent to evacuate Holland, Brabant and Italy; and they would give Corsica to the Day of Algiers. This, Sir! is not plais anterie; you may believe me it is a serious fact. Should he give the command of the Expedition to any one of his generals-that would be to reinforce his enemies with his own strength-or suppose, what is not very likely, that his Aide de Camp succeeded, would le vainqueur de l'Angleterre ever again receive a parole d'ordre from a Bonaparte ?' Our political instructor is of opinion that the present unparalleled sway of Bonaparte will be of no long duration. He seems to think that we shall not make a great difficulty of acknowledging his new dignity, but he relies on it that Austria will not so far degrade herself. The fact turns out to be the reverse, and shews how dangerous it is to deal in political prophesies; while it shakes our confidence in other predictions of the author, none of which are delivered with more assurance than the one in question. Were Mr. Pitt (he tells us) to come into the cabinet to morrow, and next day to declare or cause to be proclaimed publicly to the world, that his majesty was determined to destroy the Napoleon government, and to enable the French nation to organize a rational and legal government for themselves, and that no propositions of peace should be received until that was accomplished-I am certain that half the French army would leave Bonaparte's standard in 8 days; and the whole army would leave him in less than 3 weeks. But secret intrigues inspire mistrust, and will never make these people act, except it be. against the authors of such intrigues.' We fear that the latter prediction is no better founded than that which precedes it.The author takes frequent opportunities of extolling Mr. Pitt as a statesman. Without attempting to give judgment on this contested point, we shall content ourselves with observing that, in all his attempts to humble France, and to check its aggrandizement, he has been completely foiled; and that he has studiously and uniformly avoided doing what the author so much recommends, namely, stating to the country the object of the struggles in which it has been embarked. Notwithstanding some questionable opinions, and hazardous predictions, which the work before us contains, we are very certain that the extracts which we have made from it, and the character of the author's former tracts, will secure for it due attention on the part of the public. Did it stand in need of farther recommendations from us, we should most certainly bestow them, and deem them well conferred. The residence of this Gentleman abroad gives him vast advantages, and qualifies him for offering useful instructions to his countrymen; if indeed he be an Englishman, which we sometimes doubt. Jo. ART. ART. XI. Mr. Leslie's Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat. THE for the time being t == b. {log. = a+b a+H - log. H } must evidently be the same, since b and H are the same whether they 10-0, and 20-0, or 40-30 and 50—30, or = 70-60 and 80-60. The author attributes this increase in the rate of cooling to a property peculiar to water, namely that of expanding with a rapid acceleration on receiving equil accessions of heat. If e be the dilatation, and b the temperature, then deb.db, consequently e o h2, reckoning the commencement of expansion from the point of congelation; and here Mr. L. takes occasion to controvert an idea which has recently been announced as a curious and remarkable fact, that the minimum of the expansion of water takes place, not at the point of congelation, but a few degrees above thit point. On a subject of such interest, we quote the author's own words: I have referred the commencement of expansion in water to the point of congelation. But it now seems generally supposed that water is contracted into the smallest volume about five or six degrees above zero, and, in its descent beyond this stationary limit, again undergoes a slight dilatation. I am disposed, however, to question the accuracy of a principle so discordant and anomalous. In fact the exREV. OCT. 1804. periments ། |