and we can, in fact, scarcely name a second author who has been so unanimously abused by the disciples of all schools, while at the same time he stimulated them all to greater clearness and precision.

The first founders of the State, as later in Rousseau, so in Hobbes also, make a compact; and in this respect his theory is thoroughly revolutionary-knowing nothing of an original divine arrangement of ranks, of hereditary divine right to the crown, and conservative fancies of that kind.22 Hobbes holds the monarchy to be the best form of government, although he thinks that, of all his principles, this has been least satisfactorily demonstrated. Even the hereditariness of monarchy is a mere arrangement of utility; but that the monarchy, where it exists, must be absolute, follows simply from the demand that the governance of the State, even when it is intrusted to a society or an assembly, must possess absolute force.

For his egoistical rabble of human beings has not the slightest inclination by nature to maintain any form of constitution or to observe any laws: fear alone can compel it to this. In order, therefore, that the multitude may at least continue united, and the war of all against all may be avoided as the greatest possible evil, the egoism of the rulers must have the force to assert itself absolutely, so as to keep in check the unbridled, and, in its totality, the very much more harmful egoism of all its subjects.

The government, besides, cannot be kept in check; if it violates the constitution, then the citizens, to offer a successful resistance, must trust one another, and that is what the egoistic creatures cannot do; but each individual is

22 The formula out of which grows the unity of the State runs thus:"Ego huic homini, vel huic coetui, auctoritatem et jus meum regendi meipsum concedo, ea conditione, ut tu quoque tuam auctoritatem et jus tuum tui regendi in eundem transferas." As each individual speaks thus to every other, the atomistic

multitude becomes a unity which we call a State. "Atque haec est generatio inagni illius Leviathan, vel ut dignius loquar, mortalis Dei."-Leviathan, c. xvii., iii. 131, ed. Molesworth.

As to the natural equality of all men (in opposition to Aristotle, who speaks of born masters and slaves), comp. ibid. c. xv., p. 118.

weaker than the government. Why then need it stand upon ceremony?

That every revolution that is strong enough is also justified, as soon as it succeeds, in establishing any new form of authority, is a necessary consequence of this system tyrants need not comfort themselves with the proverb, 'Might comes before right,' since, in fact, might and right are absolutely identical. Hobbes does not care to linger among these consequences of his system, and rather loves to paint the advantages of an absolute hereditary monarchy; but all this does not modify the theory. The name "Leviathan" is only too significant of this monster of a State, which is guided by no higher considerations, which, like a god upon earth, ordains law and judgment, right and possession, at its own will, and even arbitrarily determines the ideas of good and evil,23 and in return assures to all those who bow the knee before it and do it sacrifice, protection for their lives and property.

To the absolute authority of the State, moreover, belongs the right of prescribing to its subjects their religion and their whole way of thinking. Exactly like Epikuros and Lucretius, so Hobbes also derives religion from terror and superstition; but while they for this very reason declare that to rise above the limits of religion is the highest and noblest duty of the philosopher, Hobbes knows how to turn this common material to account for the purposes of his State. His real view of religion is so trenchantly expressed in a single sentence, that we cannot but be surprised at the unnecessary breath that has often been spent upon the theology of Hobbes. He lays down the following

23 So long as the State does not interfere, everything, according to Hobbes, is good for any particular man that is the object of his desire (Leviathan, c. vi. iii. 42, ed. Molesw.). Conscience is nothing but a man's secret consciousness of his deeds and words, and this expression is often misapplied to private opinions, which,

out of mere self-will and vanity, are held inviolable (loc. cit., c. vii. p. 52). That any private person should make himself the judge of good and evil, and hold it a sin to do anything against his conscience, is reckoned among the worst offences against civic obedience (c. xxix. p. 232).

definition: “Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION: not allowed, SUPERSTITION." 24 When Hobbes, then, in the same book, with the utmost calmness mentions as simple facts the building of the tower of Babel, or the miracles worked by Moses in Egypt, 25 we must nevertheless recall with astonishment his definition of religion. The man who compared the miracles to 'pills' which we must swallow down without chewing 26 can, in fact, only not have held these miraculous stories for superstitions, because in England the authority of the Bible is established by the supreme political power. When, therefore, Hobbes is speaking upon religious subjects, we must constantly distinguish these three cases. Either Hobbes speaks directly from his own system, and then he views religion as only one form of superstition; 27 or he is referring incidentally to some particular points, when he only practically applies a principle of his system-then he views the doctrines of religion as simple facts, with which, however, science has nothing more to do; Hobbes is then sacrificing to Leviathan.

24 Leviathan, c. vi. p. 45: "Metus potentiarum invisibilium, sive fictae illae sint, sive ab historiis acceptae sint publice, religio est; si publice acceptae non sint superstitio." Hobbes indeed goes on to add: "Quando autem potentiae illae re vera tales sunt, quales accepimus, vera religio;" but this is only an apparent saving clause. For as the State alone decides which is to be the accepted religion, and as it must not be contradicted for political reasons, obviously the notion of vera religio" is a merely relative one-and we may be the more content that it should be so, since in a scientific sense there is nothing to be said as to religion in general.

tus ad turrem Babel, quo tempore Deus omnem hominem sermonis sui, propter rebellionem, oblivione percussit." Ibid., c. xxxvii. p. 315: "Potestatem ergo illi dedit Deus convertendi virgam, quam in manu habebat, in serpentem, et rursus serpentem in virgam," &c.

27 Hobbes is speaking from this standpoint, for example, in treating of the origin of religion. This is referred absolutely to some natural characteristic or other of man (comp. Lev., c. xii. ad init.), among others, to the inclination to hasty conclusions, and so on. And so we have this summary (p. 89, Eng. Works, iii. 98): "In these four things-opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics -consisteth the natural seed (semen naturale) of religion."

The worst contradictions are thus, at least in form, explained away, and we have only the third case leftwhere Hobbes is offering to Leviathan, as it were de lege ferenda, respectful suggestions for the purification of religion and for the abolishing of the worst superstitions. Here we must indeed recognise that Hobbes does all that is in his power to lessen the gulf between faith and knowledge. He distinguishes the essential and the non-essential elements of religion; he tries to explain away obvious contradictions between Scripture and faith-as, for example, the doctrine of the revolution of the earth-by distinguishing between the mode of expression and the moral purpose of Scripture; he explains 'possession' as a disease; maintains that miracles have ceased since the founding of Christianity, and even allows us to see that the very miracles are not miracles to everybody.28 If we add to this the remarkable rudiments of a historico-critical treatment of the Bible, we easily see that the whole armoury of Rationalism is already to be found in Hobbes, and only needs to have its range of application extended. 29

Next, as to his theory of external nature, we must first observe that Hobbes absolutely identifies the idea of body with that of substance; so that when Bacon carries on a controversy against the immaterial substance of Aristotle, Hobbes has already got beyond him, and without hesitation distinguishes between the 'body' and the 'accidens.' Hobbes declared everything to be body that, independently of our thought, occupies a portion of space, and coincides with it. As opposed to this, the accident is not a really objective thing, like body, but it is the way in which the body is conceived. This distinction is really sharper than

23 Comp. amongst others, the following passages of the "Leviathan,' Op. Lat. iii. 64, foll. 207: "Miracula enim, ex quo tempore nobis Christianis positae sunt leges divinae, cessaverunt." "Miracula narrantibus credere non obligamur."

"Etiam

ipsa miracula non omnibus miracula sunt."

29 Comp. for instance "Leviathan," c. xxxii. 276: "Libri testamenti novi ab altiore tempore derivari non possunt, quam ab eo, quo rectores ecclesiarum collegerant," and what follows.

that of Aristotle, and, like all Hobbes's definitions, betrays the mathematically-trained mind. In other respects Hobbes adheres to the explanation that the accident is in the subject, in such a way that it cannot be regarded as any part of it, but that it may be away, and yet the body does not cease to be. The only constant accidents which cannot be wanting without the body's thereby ceasing to exist are extension and figure. All others, such as rest, motion, colour, hardness, and so on, may vary, while the body itself remains, and they are, therefore, not corporeal, but simply modes in which we conceive the body. Motion Hobbes defines as the 'continual relinquishing of one place and acquiring of another,' where it is obviously overlooked that the idea of motion is already contained in the 'relinquishing' and 'acquiring of' a place. As compared with Gassendi and Bacon, there appears not unfrequently in Hobbes's definitions a return to Aristotelianism, if not in principle, at least in the mode of expression-a fact which is to be explained by the course of his intellectual development.

In the definition of matter, this inclination towards Aristotle is particularly evident. Hobbes declares that matter is neither one of the bodies nor a special body distinct from all others, and it follows, therefore, that it is in fact nothing else than a mere name. Here the Aristotelian conception is obviously taken as the foundation, but it is improved upon in a way thoroughly corresponding to the improvements in the notion of 'accident.' Hobbes, who sees that possibility or chance cannot be in things, but only in our conception of things, quite rightly corrects the main defect of the Aristotelian system, by substituting for the accident as an accidental element in the object the accidental subjective conception. Instead of matter as a substance, that can become anything, and is nothing definite, comes in the same way the statement that matter is the body conceived generally, that is, an abstraction of the thinking subject. The permanent element, which persists