comes the realisation of the principle in the material
parts. But where, then, is the principle? In the chalk?
Obviously not in the individual particles; nor, again,
in their sum. But it is in their disposition,' i.e., in an
abstraction. The principle is, and remains, in the human
thought. Who, then, gives us the right to transfer such a
previously existing principle into those things which do
not come to pass through human ingenuity, as, for exam-
ple, the form of the human body? Is this form anything?
Certainly in our conception. It is the way in which mat-
ter manifests itself, that is, the fashion in which it appears
to us. Only, can this way in which the thing appears
exist previously to the thing itself? Can it be separated
from it?

As we see the opposition of form and matter, as soon as
we go to the root of the matter, leads us back to the ques-
tion of the existence of universals, for only as a universal
could the form in general be regarded as having an exist-
ence of its own outside man's thinking faculty. And these
Aristotelian modes of thought everywhere lead us back
when we go thoroughly into things to Platonism, and as
often as we find an opposition between Aristotelian empi-
ricism and Platonic idealism, we have also a point before
us in which Aristotle contradicts himself. Thus, in the
doctrine of substance, Aristotle begins quite empirically
with the substantiality of the individual concrete things.
This notion is immediately refined away into the theory
that the notional in the things, or the form, is substance.
But the notional is the universal, and it is yet the deter-
mining element in its relation with the in itself quite
undetermined matter. This is sensible enough in Plato-
nism, which regards the individual things as futile appear-
ances; but in Aristotle it remains an utter inconsistency,
and is, therefore, of course, just as puzzling to the wise as
to the foolish.35 *

If we now apply these remarks to the controversy
35 See Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik im Abendl, iv. 184.

* It is time that that Aristotle nad it. versal inhame in the individuare

N.B.

a icy Essence

(TO TE BY εirac), instead of in the clenss

its

retation at

between the Nominalists and the Realists (cf. above p. 85 foll.), we understand that the origin of the individual must to the Realist have presented especial difficulties. The form as universal can produce no individual out of matter; whence therefore do we get a principium individuationis, to use scholastic language? Aristotle never gives us the answer to which we are entitled. Avicenna attempted to shift on to matter the principle of individuation, and that, therefore, whereby, from the notion of dog, this particular dog is produced-a device which involves either the fall of the whole Aristotelian notion of matter (and previously, of course, the Platonic), or the Platonic subversion of the individual. Here stumbled even St. Thomas, who otherwise contrived so carefully to avoid the errors of the Arabian commentators while employing their works. He laid the principle of individuation in matter and became a heretic; for, as was shown by Bishop Etienne Tempier, this view conflicts with the doctrine of immaterial individuals, as the angels and departed souls.

Duns Scotus tried to help himself by the device of the notorious Haecceitas, which is often cited without much. regard to the connection of the notions as the height of Scholastic absurdity. It does, in fact, seem an absurd idea to make the individuality in turn merely the effect or result of a universal ad hoc; and yet this solution of the difficulty is, of all the expedients that have been proposed, the one most in harmony-or, let us rather say, the one least inconsistent-with the collective Aristotelian doctrine.

The Nominalists, however, found no great difficulty here. Occam very calmly explains that the principle of individuation lies in the individuals themselves, and this harmonises excellently with the Aristotle who makes individuals substances, but all the worse with the Platonising Aristotle, who invented the second substances' (notions of species and genus) and substantial forms. Το

take the first Aristotle literally, means to reject the second Aristotle altogether. But the second is the reigning one, and that not only in Scholasticism, amongst the Arabians and the old commentators, but also in the genuine unadulterated Aristotelian system. And therefore, we may in fact regard Nominalism, and especially the Nominalism of the second Scholastic period, as the beginning of the end of Scholasticism. In the history of Materialism, however, Nominalism is of importance not only through its general opposition to Platonism and its recognition of the concrete, but also through perfectly distinct historical traces, which indicate that Nominalism did actually prepare the way for Materialism, and that it was chiefly and most strongly cultivated above all in England, where Materialism also later found its most vigorous development.

If the older Nominalism connects itself with the tenor of the Aristotelian categories against the Neo-Platonic commentators,36 it cannot be doubted that the spread of the whole body of Aristotle's writings had a very great influence on the origin and extension of the later Nominalism. Once freed from the leading strings of Neo-Platonic tradition, and launched out on the high sea of the Aristotelian system, the Scholastics must soon have discovered so many difficulties in the doctrine of the universal, or, more fully expressed, the doctrine of word, notion, and thing, that innumerable attempts were made to solve the great problem. In fact, as Prantl has shown in his "Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande," instead of the three main conceptions (universalia ante rem, post rem, or in re), there appear the most manifold combinations and attempts at reconciliation; and the opinion that the 'universalia,' in fact, have their first origin in the human mind, is found isolated in writers who, on the whole, distinctly belong to Realism.37

36 Comp. on this point, besides Prantl, in particular Barach, Zur Gesch. des Nominalism. vor Roscellin, Wien, 1866, where a very fully VOL. I.

developed Nominalism is traced in a
manuscript of the tenth century.

37 So also in isolated passages Alber-
tus Magnus; comp. Prantl, iii. 97 ff.

come!)

A. B.

Besides the spread of Aristotle's writings, Averroism also may have had some influence, although, as the forerunner of Materialism, it is chiefly to be regarded from the standpoint of freethought; for the Arabian philosophy is, in spite of its leaning to naturalism, yet essentially realistic in the sense of the medieval factions, i.e., it Platonises; and even its naturalism is fain to adopt a mystic colouring. But in so far as the Arabian commentators energetically raised the questions with which we are here concerned, and in general compelled men to increased independence of thought, they must indirectly have furthered Nominalism. The main influence nevertheless came from a quarter from which one at first sight would least expect it-from that Byzantine logic which has been so much decried on account of its abstract subtleties.38

It cannot indeed but surprise us that the very extreme of Scholasticism, that ultra-formal logic of the schools and of the sophistical dialectic, should be connected with that reawakening empiricism which ended by sweeping Scholasticism away; and yet we have traces of this connection lasting down to the present time. The most distinct empiricist among the chief logicians of our time, John Stuart Mill, opens his "System of Logic" with two utterances of Condorcet and Sir W. Hamilton bestowing high praise upon the Scholastics for the subtlety and precision

38 The proof of the connection between the spread of the Byzantine logic in the West and the victory of Nominalism is one of the most valuable results of Prantl's "Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande." That Prantl himself designates the tendency of Occam, not as 'Nominalism,' but as 'Terminism' (from the logical 'terminus,' the chief implement of this school), is irrelevant to our purpose, as we only just touch the subject. Accordingly we still use Nominalism' in the wider sense of that body of opposition to Platonism which de

nies to 'universalia' the name of things. With Occam they are, of course, not names' but 'termini,' which represent the things comprehended in them. The terminus' is one element of a mentally formed judgment; it has no existence whatever outside the soul, but it is also not purely arbitrary, like the word by which it may be expressed, but it arises by a natural necessity in the contact of the mind with things. Comp. Frantl, iii. S. 344 ff. esp. Anm. 782.

which they have lent to the expression of thought in lan-. guage. Mill himself adopts into his "Logic" several distinctions of various kinds in the signification of words which belong to the Scholasticism of those last centuries of the middle ages, which we are wont to regard as an unbroken chain of absurdities.

The riddle is, however, soon solved if we start with the consideration that it was a principal service of English philosophy since Hobbes and Locke to deliver us from the usurpation of idle words in speculation, and to connect our thoughts more with things than traditional expressions. But in order to attain this, the doctrine of the significance of words must be thoroughly comprehended, and be begun with a keen criticism of the relation of the word and its meaning. And to this end the Byzantine logic, in the development which it had attained in the West, and especially in the school of Occam, exhibits preliminary efforts which are still of positive interest.

That empiricism and logical formalism go hand in hand is in other respects, apart from this, by no means a rare phenomenon. The more our efforts are directed to allow of things acting on us as freely as possible, and to making experience and natural science the foundation of our views, the more shall we feel the necessity of connecting our conclusions with accurately defined signs for the things we mean to express, instead of allowing the ordinary forms of expression to bring in with them into our opinions the prejudices of past centuries and of the childish stages in the development of the human spirit.

It was not, of course, that the whole body of the Byzantine logic had originally been worked out as a conscious emancipation from the forms of language, but much rather as an attempt to follow to its consequences the supposititious identity of speech and thought. Yet the result could not but end in the emancipation of the precise expression of thought from the forms of speech. He who is still in these days disposed, with Trendelenburg, K. F.