mere ideas, being nothing more than the general circumstances according to which conceptions follow conceptions in our trains of thought. The power of suggestion is the capacity of the mind by which we are sensible of the varieties of light; and we might as well speak of a power of seeing a particular colour, distinct from vision, as of a power of conceiving the same particular colour, distinct from the general power of the mind that is termed by us suggestion. When I hear the sound of my friend's name, and the conception of my friend immediately arises, there is not in the production of this one mental state the operation both of a power of association and a power of conception, but there is a development of the single capacity of the mind, in consequence of which certain other conceptions arise after certain other conceptions or perceptions.

"After showing our conceptions to be only particular modifications of the general power of suggestion, I proceeded to consider our remembrances, analysing these into two distinct parts a particular conception of some object or feeling remembered, and the accompanying feeling of a certain relation of priority to our consciousness. The simple conception which forms one of the elements of the remembrance, and differs in no respect from the conceptions that are unaccompanied with the notion of a relation, is of course reducible to the power of simple suggestion, to which all our conceptions are to be referred; the feeling of the relation of priority, which forms its other element, is, like our feeling of every other relation, an effort of that general susceptibility of relation suggested, which we are to consider afterwards. The remembrance, therefore, being a complex feeling, is a proof of these two susceptibilities of the mind, to which we owe the constituent elementary feelings; but it is not a proof of any third power. . What we term memory, then, in distinction from mere conception, is not a new power, but merely a complex result of different mental capacities." 8

He also classified and explained the secondary laws of suggestion. He enumerated nine of these which he regarded as indispensable to account for the variety in the effects of the primary laws. Thus, suggestions are as various as the original feelings have been―(1) of longer or shorter continuance; (2) more or less lively; (3) more or less frequently present; (4) more or less recent; (5) more or less

Vol. II., pp. 384-388.

free from mixture; (6) that they vary according to the difference of original constitution; (7) according to differences of temporary emotion; (8) according to changes produced in the state of the body; (9) according to general tendencies produced by prior habits. The first four touch rather the momentary feelings themselves than any particular state of the mind of an individual, and have, as it were, a double operation. But each one of these secondary laws alone may be sufficient to change the suggestion, which would otherwise have arisen from the operation of the primary laws; and it is not wonderful, therefore, that when many of them, as they usually do, concur in one joint effect, the result in different individuals should be so various.9

Under his second sub-division of mental phenomena he included all feelings of relation. He employed the term relative suggestion as nearly equivalent to comparison; and whether the relation was of two or many external objects, or of two or many affections of the mind, the feeling of this, arising in consequence of certain preceding states of mind, is what he called relative suggestion. He classified relations under two heads-(1) those of co-existence, and (2) those of succession. To the first belong the relations of position, resemblance, proportion, degree, and comprehension; to the second, as the word imports, all those which stand to each other as prior in the order of time. History is merely a succession of facts and events, together with their causes and effects, in the order of time. Thus relations of of succession are either of a casual or of invariable antecedence and consequence.10

Concerning the general terms and the early stage of generalisation, Brown sees no reason to doubt that man can reason without language; though it is equally true that, without general terms, reasoning must be very limited and imperfect. He explains the early process of generalisation thus:-"The perception of objects,-the feeling of their resemblance in certain respects, the invention of a name for these circumstances of felt resemblance,-what can be more truly and readily conceivable than this process?" He repeats this many times in varied words.11

He also endeavoured to reduce the supposed faculties of judgment, reason, and abstraction to relative suggestion, and his reasoning

Vol II., pp. 282-285, et seq. 11 Vol. II., pp. 478, 495, 504.

10 Vol. II., pp. 458, 459, 470-472.

assumed this form :-Relative suggestions are the relations of coexistence and those of succession; and we can easily separate the feeling of relation from the perceptions or conceptions themselves. We perceive or conceive objects, and feel them to be variously related; now, with this capacity of relative suggestion, the faculty of judgment may be considered as almost synonymous. Accordingly, he treated it in that light. But reasoning itself is nothing more than a series of judgments—that is, feelings of relations, which are all referable to the capacity of relative suggestion. Abstraction, in like manner, is only a feeling of resemblance, of partial similarity among objects. His classification of the mind may be tabulated thus:—

Brown treats the emotions in detail, under three divisions—1. Immediate, excited by present objects; 2. Retrospective; 3. Prospective. In the first division he includes cheerfulness and melancholy, wonder, languor, beauty, sublimity, the ludicrous, moral feeling, love and hate, sympathy, pride, and humility; in the second, anger, gratitude, simple regret and gladness, remorse and its opposite; in the third, desires of continued existence, pleasure, action, society, knowledge, power, affection, glory, the happiness of others, evil to others, fear, hope, expectation, and anticipation.

His treatment and analysis of the emotions is pretty satisfactory. In this division of mental phenomena, as in his treatment of the cognitive side of the mind, the influence of Hume may occasionally be traced; but his own emotional powers were of a warmer and keener cast than Hume's.

In the ethical department of his system Brown partly follows Stewart and Hutcheson, but applies the principle of association more than his predecessors. He contended for a moral faculty-an innate sentiment, and the following will afford an idea of his views :

"When we think within ourselves,-Is this what we ought to do?

we do not make two inquiries,-first, Whether the action be right? and then, Whether we should have merit in doing wrong; or demerit in doing what is right for us to do? We only consider whether doing it shall excite in others approbation or disapprobation, and in ourselves a corresponding emotion of complacency or remorse. According to the answer which we give in our hearts, in this respect —an answer which relates to a single feeling of moral approbation, -— we shall conceive that we are doing what we ought to do, or what we ought not to do, and knowing this, we can have no farther moral inquiry to make as to the merit or demerit of doing what is previously felt by us to be right or wrong.

"To have merit, to be virtuous, to have done our duty, to have acted in conformity with obligation,-all have reference to one feeling of the merit, that feeling of approbation, which attends the contemplation of virtuous actions. . . To this simple proposition, therefore, we must always come in our moral estimate, whatever division, or varied reference, we may afterwards make. Persons acting in a certain manner, excite in us a feeling of approval; persons acting in a manner opposite to this, cannot be considered by us, without an emotion equally vivid of a different kind. .. Why does it seem to us virtue to act in this way? Why have we a feeling of obligation or duty, when we think of acting in this way? The only answer which we can give to these questions is the same in all, that it is impossible for us to consider the action, without feeling that by acting in this way, we should look upon ourselves, and others would look upon us, with approving regard; and that if we were to act in a different way, we should look upon ourselves, and others would look upon us, with abhorrence, or at least with disapprobation.. Why do we consider certain actions as morally right,-certain actions as morally wrong? Why do we consider ourselves as morally bound to perform certain actions,-to abstain from certain other actions? Why do we feel moral approbation of those who perform certain actions, moral disapprobation of those who perform certain other actions? For an answer to all these, I would refer to the simple emotion, as that on which alone the moral distinction is formed." 12

This is the most definite statement on the moral faculty in his lectures. He seldom uses the term conscience, but leaves his meaning to be gathered from such sentences as these :-"There is then, in the

12 Vol. III., pp. 568-573, 581, et seq.

mind of each individual, a principle which leads him to divide actions into two classes, virtuous and vicious." "There is in our breast a susceptibility of moral emotion; and the principle which thus approves or condemns in us, is the noblest of the ties that connect us with the universal community of mankind." "All our moral sentiments then, of obligation, virtue, merit, are, in themselves, as we have seen, nothing more than one single feeling, variously referred to actions, as future, present, and past. With the loss of the susceptibility of this one peculiar species of emotion, all practical morality would instantly cease."

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He gives an exposition of practical morals under the most common heads (1) Duties to our fellow men; (2) Duties to ourselves; (3) Duties which we owe to the Supreme Being. He treats the family and parental duties with much insight and judgment, and with elevated feeling.

His lectures on the existence of God exhibit fine moral feeling and good intention; but they lack metaphysical grasp and range of intellect. He dwells chiefly upon the design argument, on which he worked wonderfully well. But it is, at best, only a creeping mode of proving the existence of a Supreme Being; and if a belief in God is to continue among men, it must be placed upon higher grounds and arguments than the evidence of mere mechanical design.

Brown also treated at length on the immortality of the human soul; and on this subject his arguments are well worked out, and worthy of attention. On this his psychological theory of the mind was available, and he made a good use of it. His closing lectures are devoted to an exposition of duty of cultivating our moral sentiments, our religious and intellectual nature, in order to render ourselves happy and glorious; and he expatiated eloquently on these themes.

In forming an estimate of Brown's philosophy, we should recall attention to his position, and the aims which he immediately had in view. He was only thirty-two years of age when appointed to teach the moral philosophy class, and ten years after he died in the midst of his work. His lectures were hastily prepared for oral delivery, and many things might be quite appropriately introduced, as merely spoken to the students, with the object of interesting them in the subjects of the course, but which would be out of character in a work

13 Vol. IV., pp. 152, 158.