feel in some degree what the suffering or joy of another really is; so the feeling of a spectator corresponds to what, by bringing the case of another home to himself, he imagines should be that other's sentiments; since sympathy is based on an original tendency to reflect the emotional states of those around us. We therefore form our moral ideas from observation and reflection on the sentiments and emotions of our neighbours. 23

Accord of feeling produces pleasure, and consciousness of its absence pain. As the sympathy of others is more necessary for us in grief than in joy, we are more desirous to communicate to others our disagreeable feelings than our agreeable ones. "The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy." But we are pleased ourselves if we can sympathise with. another's success or misfortune, and pained if we cannot.

The following remarks on the operations of sympathy are from Mr. Sully's able, careful, and valuable work, Outlines of Psychology, published in 1884 :"Sympathy in its simplest form shows itself in an unconscious reproduction or imitation of another's feeling. The mind of the person affected does not consciously represent or dwell on the feeling which affects him, but simply vibrates in unison with it.

"This tendency manifests itself very early. There is possibly some instinctive knowledge of the signs of feeling, and connected with this, a native disposition to answer smile with smile. . . . But some amount of individual experience is needed for fixing the connection between the several feelings and their external expression. When this is acquired the child tends automatically to take on the moods of hilarity, anxiety, depression, of those about him. This appears to be due to the working of an imitative impulse which leads to the more or less complete adoption of the external attitude, gesture, tone," etc. In a note he says—“ That the child has a vague intuitive knowledge of other's feelings seems to be shown by the fact that he responds to the smile of his mother long before his own experience could have taught him to associate pleasurable feeling with this particular facial movement."-Pp. 508-511.

I have for a long period specially observed the early development of conscious feeling, and intelligence in infants; and my observation as to the primitive nature of sympathy agrees with Mr. Sully's view.

But concerning the record of the signs of intelligence which Mr. Darwin has given of several of his own infants, my observation of infants does not tally with his. Taking the ages by months, I have found more signs of intelligence in infants than he did. For instance, I have found unmistakable signs of memory in relation to external and inanimate objects, in infants of three and four months old. Again, with regard to vision, I have observed an infant of four months old, fixing its eyes, and looking steadily at the flag on the top of the mast of a ship, at a considerable distance off.

The amount of pleasure or pain felt by one person in the conduct or feelings of another is the measure of his approbation or the contrary. Thus the sentiments of anyone are just and proper, or the reverse, according as they coincide or not with the sentiments of someone else, who observe them; while his approbation varies according to the degree in which he can sympathise with them. A full accord of sentiments means perfect approbation. Just as a man's sympathetic indignation fails to correspond to mine, according as his compassion falls short of my grief, does he feel a stronger or weaker disapproval of my feelings. Moral and intellectual approbation admits of a similar explanation for to approve or disapprove of the opinions of others is only to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own; so to approve or disapprove of their feelings and emotions is merely to mark a similar agreement or disagreement between our own and theirs. Thus it appears that the sentiments of each individual are the standard of the correctness of another's, for we can hardly judge of matters of sentiment by any other canon than the correspondent affections in ourselves; and the only measure by which any man can judge of the faculty of another is by his own faculty of a similar kind. On our efforts to sympathise with the feeling and passion of others are founded the gentle virtues of condescension, toleration, and humanity; while the sterner virtues of self-denial and self-command are founded on our effort to attune our passions and feelings to such a pitch as others can approve. The harmonious operation of these two sides of virtue, feeling much for others, and little for ourselves, restraining our selfish, and cultivating our benevolent affections, constitutes the highest perfection of human nature. 24

He does not directly face the problem of the supreme end of life, nor propose the question whether virtue and morality are only means to the attainment of happiness; but it is pretty evident that he admits the utilitarian view of happiness. He makes no great effort to analyse human happiness, but says that it consists in tranquility and enjoyment; for without tranquility there can be no enjoyment, and with it there is scarcely anything that may not prove a source of pleasure. "In ease of body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are nearly on a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the

24 Smith's work must be read itself to attain a full conception of the richness of its illustrations and its attractive character.

highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for. What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is not in debt, and has a clear conscience? If you would live freely, fearlessly, and independently, never come within the circle of ambition. Power and riches are enormous and operose machines, consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, and which, in spite of all our care, are ready every moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessors."

One of the most interesting parts of his book is the account which he gives of the many fortuitous circumstances which affect the sentiments and moral judgments of men. The most important of these irregular influences spring from the different positions of prosperity and adversity, custom or fashion. As those in high social positions are not exactly judged with the same strictness as the poor and humble, in equal degrees of merit there is hardly anyone who does not show more respect for the rich and great than for the poor and humble; while an equal, or even a far greater, amount of vice and folly is regarded with less aversion and contempt in the former, than in the latter. He explains that this arises in our sympathetic emotions as these enter more vividly into the joys than into the sorrows of others, we consequently feel far more pleasure in the condition of the rich than in that of the poor; for we are apt to imagine the one class happy, but the other wretchedly unhappy. So, it is agreeable to sympathise with joy, but painful to enter into grief; and where there is no envy in the case, our inclination to sympathise with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathise with sorrow; and hence our disposition to admire the rich and powerful, and to despise the poor and lowly.

The longest and concluding division of his treatise is devoted to a review of other systems of moral philosophy; and from his own standpoint he gives an able and interesting account of them.

To sum up according to Smith, conscience is a derived faculty:1. We do not begin with a moral consciousness by which we learn to judge of others, but from our judgments about others we acquire a moral consciousness of ourselves. Thus conscience is formed from the central principle of sympathy. 2. The general rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral sentiments approve or condemn; they are not intuitions supplied by nature. Moral rules are formed from experience, by an inductive process, not deduced from a general principle. The sense

of duty and the feeling of obligation are both acquired from experience. 3. He recognises the existence of a benevolent and all-wise Being, who will ultimately redress all injustice; but what the Supreme Being approves must be inferred from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for Him should be shown, not in frivolous observances and ceremonies, but by a course of just and beneficent action.

Although his theory of morals cannot be accepted as satisfactory, still it holds an important place in the history of ethical systems. Its defects have often been pointed out, and it is unnecessary to enter into any further criticism of it. Smith did great service in developing the varied operations and manifestations of the sympathetic principle.

Let us now turn to his other famous work, The Wealth of Nations. It consists of five Books, each of which are divided into a number of chapters, but many of the chapters are again divided into parts and articles; and although there is a principle of method in it, still it is defective in the arrangement of materials, and abounds with digressions. Some of the subjects embraced in it are not economical, except in the most general sense; and though this wide range of topics enhances the value of the work, the task of presenting a just account of it is rendered more difficult.

The first book deals with the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order in which its produce is naturally distributed among the people. The treatment of this subject extends to eleven chapters, with a long digression concerning the variations in the value of silver throughout the four preceding centuries; the variations in the proportion between the respective values of gold and silver; and the different effects of the progress of improvement upon three different kinds of rude produce. This digression occupies about a third of the book; but it contains a vast and varied mass of facts and economical information.

Smith begins his great exposition with the simple proposition that labour is the real source of wealth; that the amount of labour expended upon any article is the true measure of its value, and that when this is ascertained as between different commodities, their exchange value will, in the long run, be regulated by it; that all exchangeable commodities are wealth, and not gold and silver only. "What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body.

Labour is the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command. .. But, though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportions between the two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different kinds of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and the ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account," and many other circumstances. 25

He explains the division of labour; the origin and use of money; the component parts of the price of commodities; the natural and market price of commodities; wages; the profits of stock; wages and profits in the different employments of labour and stock; inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves, and inequalities occasioned by the policy of Europe. Then comes a long chapter on the rent of land, concerning which he is explicit and exceedingly interesting. Among other things he says:

"As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they have never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land."

He states that the landlord exacts from the tenant for the use of a portion of land the highest rent which the latter can afford to pay

25 Intro., Book I., chap. 5, pp. 31, 32. I uniformly refer to Rogers' edition of The Wealth of Nations, in two volumes, published in 1869. Touching labour, Smith further says:- Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities at all times and places."-Ibid., p. 38.