Abstract logic is divided into pure and modified; and the former he divides into two parts: (1) The Doctrine of Elements, which are either laws or products; and (2) Methodology, or the doctrine of Method-the means of thinking well. Modified logic falls into three parts (1) The first treats of the nature of Truth and Error, and of the higher laws for their discrimination; (2) the second of the Impediments to thinking, with the means of their removal; (3) the third of the Aids of thinking. In passing, I may remark that Hamilton's treatment of modified logic, although not exhaustive, is exceedingly clear and valuable so far as it goes. This part of his lectures should be attentively read by those who wish to cultivate their minds, or to study the laws of criticism and historical evidence. The following is his tabular view of the divisions of logic: After stating the fundamental laws of thought, he proceeds to the doctrine of Elements-to the exposition of concepts, judgment, and reasoning. Five lectures are given to an explication of concepts or notions: (1) Their general character is described; (2) then their special objective relation, in regard to quantity; (3) their subjective relation, in regard to quality; (4) their imperfection; (5) their reciprocal relation, in regard to the quality of extension-subordina tion and co-ordination; (6) their reciprocal relations in regard to the quantity of comprehension, which are all explained with remarkable clearness.40 He expounds his doctrine of judgments in two lectures, and it is in connection with the quantification of the predicate of propositions or judgments that Sir William claims to have made improvements on formal logic. I am aware that his claim, even on this point, has been disputed since his death, but my limits will not permit me to enter into a discussion of the subject; yet I think that the varied materials printed in the second volume of his Lectures on Logic afford the means of placing it in its true light. Hamilton there notices many partial anticipations of this doctrine. As already stated, his projected work on logic was never finished. He introduced, however, several modifications in syllogistic theory, and signalised various distinctions, tending toward more simplicity, and constructed an ingenious scheme of logical notation. 42 There can be no doubt that he spent a considerable part of his life in prosecuting inquiries connected with logic. 40 Vol. III., p. 137, et seq. 41 In a footnote to his article on Logic, he says:-" "It will be seen from the tenor of the text, that, by the year 1833, I had become aware of the error in the doctrine of Aristotle and the logicians, which maintains that the predicate in affirmative propositions could only be formally quantified as particular, nay, that Aristotle, in his practice in the inductive syllogism, virtually contradicts the speculative precept which he, over and over, expressly enounces for syllogism in general.. The doctrine of a thorough-going quantification of the predi cate, with its results, I have, however, publicly taught since the year 1840, at the latest."-Discussions, p. 162. 42 See Discussions, pp. 614-620, and the appendices to the second volume of his Lectures on Logic. His final scheme of logical notation is inserted at the end of this volume. I can only notice a few points : 1. "That we can only rationally deal with what we already understand, determines the simple logical postulate-to state explicitly what is thought implicitly. 2. "All mediate inference is one-that incorrectly called Categorical; for the Conjunctive and Disjunctive forms of hypothetical reasoning are reducible to immediate inferences. "Mentally one, the Categorical Syllogism, according to its order of enouncement, is either Analytic (A) or Synthetic (B). Analytic, if what is inappropriately styled the conclusion be expressed first, and what are inappro priately styled the premisses be then stated as its reasons. Synthetic, if the premisses precede, and, as it were, effectuate the conclusion. These general forms of syllogism can with ease be distinguished by a competent notation ; and every special variety in the one has its corresponding variety in the other. He also wrote very effectively on Education, chiefly on the higher branches, and in reference to University reform. His views were comprehensive, enlightened, and liberal, far in advance of his time. But occasionally he was extremely outspoken and severe on the prevailing abuses and shortcomings of the Universities. He did not limit himself to Scotland, but wrote powerfully on the state of the English Universities, with especial reference to Oxford. He argued that dissenters ought to be admitted into the public Universities. Altogether, his articles on education contain a body of varied, curious, interesting, and valuable information. To sum up, I have presented a brief account of Hamilton's psychology and philosophy; its fundamental principles have been explained. He taught the doctrine that man, in so far as he is a mean for the glory of God, must be an end to himself, inasmuch as his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity. He seemed to value the pursuit of truth more than its possession, or rather that its pursuit afforded man more pleasure than its possession, which is quite true. He embraced the doctrine of intuitive perception-natural realism; and drew up a scheme of all the possible theories of perception. He maintained that the human mind possesses native notions, necessary cognitions, which afford the requisite conditions of knowledge. His own vast and varied knowledge of recorded thought and philosophical systems afforded him innumerable instances of the aberrations of thought, contradictions, and vain presumptions; and so he constructed his Philosophy of the Conditioned, which indicates the limits of human thought. "Taking the syllogism under the latter form (B), which, though perhaps less natural, has been alone cultivated by logicians, and to which therefore, exclusively all logical nomenclature is relative, -the syllogism is again divided into the non-figured (a) and figured (b).”—Discussions, pp. 614-616. 3. "Quantity and quality combined constitute the only real discrimination of syllogistic mood. Syllogistic figure vanishes, with its perplexing apparatus of special rules; and even the general laws of syllogism proper are reduced to a single compendious canon. "We have shown that a judgment or proposition is only a comparison resulting in a congruence, an equation, or non-equation of two notions in the quantity of extension; and that these compared notions stand to each other, as the one subject and the other predicate, as both the subject, or as both the predicate of the judgment. If this be true, the transposition of the terms of a proposition sinks into a very easy and a very simple process; whilst the whole doctrine of logical conversion is superseded as operose and imperfect, as useless and erroneous."-Lectures, Vol. IV., App., pp. 275-276. He took a strictly formal and limited view of the province of logic; and upon this conception his exposition of the science is clear and masterly. He also endeavoured to simplify the common syllogistic system, and introduced several useful improvements. His conception of method, his skill and care in arrangement, and in brief and clear summaries, are admirable; while his powers of exposition were of the highest order. The style of his lectures is lighted with a fire and glow of thought and a genuine human feeling rarely found in philosophical literature. Hamilton attained a European reputation in his own lifetime, chiefly through his articles in the Edinburgh Review, and his teaching in the University of Edinburgh. Since his death his writings have had a considerable influence. He had of course a certain number of direct followers, very few of whom are now alive. But several other schools of thought are indebted to Hamilton; and perhaps Herbert Spencer is more indebted to him for the fundamental conceptions and principles of his system of philosophy than to any other philosopher. This of course, mainly refers to Spencer's First Principles, but partly also to his Psychology. On the other hand, Hamilton's philosophy has been subjected to severe criticism from various quarters. 43 I can, however, only mention the fact, and must refrain from entering into any discussion. 43 J. S. Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy is well known, and it is an able and acute work; but I affirm that Mill did not, in all respects, present a fair and just estimate of Hamilton. He did not take any account of the circumstances in which Hamilton was placed; and so when reckoning up the little that Hamilton had produced in philosophy in comparison to what he might have done, and began to seek for reasons to explain this, it never occurred to him to assign any weight to these circumstances. Unfortunately Hamilton's father died when he was an infant; Mill's father not only lived to bring him up, but also to educate him personally, and to cram him with all kinds of knowledge and science, so that long ere he reached the years of manhood, he was a prodigy ; then, when he came of age, his father got him into a position in the Indian Office, where he had only to work a few hours a day. Thus his father did everything for him that could be done. Mill never knew the difficulties of finding a post for himself, or the humiliation of going about seeking employment. Hamilton had to face a very different career, as he had to struggle hard for existence, and fight many a battle ere he attained a position. But Mill himself avows that he wrote his Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy for the express purpose of reducing his too great reputation, and explicitly declares in his own Autobiography that it had fully effected its original Dr. J. F. Ferrier was an intimate friend of Sir William Hamilton, and at one time he was professor of civil history in the University of Edinburgh; but in 1846 he was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of St. Andrews, which he held until his death in 1864. When the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh became vacant on the death of Hamilton, Ferrier entered the field as a candidate for it, but he was not successful. However, in connection with this he published a pamphlet in 1856, entitled Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New, the new being his own. In this pamphlet he complained against the town. council of Edinburgh for allowing themselves to be influenced by certain outside parties in favour of candidates who professed to teach the old Scottish philosophy in preference to the new. It seems that he was greatly disappointed when he failed to obtain the Edinburgh chair.44 Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysics, the Theory of Knowing and Being, appeared in 1854. It consists of an introduction, partly historical and partly critical, and three sections, the first of which treats of the theory of knowledge, the second of the theory of ignorance, and the third of the theory of being. He adopted the demonstrative method of exposition, states his propositions and counter propositions in a series, and reasons them out in a precise and rigorous form. His thinking is acute, definite, vigorous, and easily followed. In short, his style is unusually clear, simple, and concise. Ferrier's first proposition is headed, "The primary law or condition of knowledge," and it is worded thus:" Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself." This is a very primitive truth, and he tells us over and over that it is the keystone of his system. "Looked at in itself, or as an isolated truth, our first proposition is of no importance; but viewed as the foundation of the whole system, and as the single staple on which all the truths subsequently to be advanced depend, it cannot be too strongly insisted : 44 In this pamphlet he replied to criticisms on his own metaphysics, and says "It has been asserted that my philosophy is of German origin and complexion. A broader fabrication than that never dropped from human lips or dribbled from the point of pen. My philosophy is Scottish to the very core; it is national in every fibre and articulation of its frame. It is a natural growth of old Scotland's soil, and has drunk in no nourishment from any other land," (p. 12). |