to certain great departments of study: and, what is of more importance, the character of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method which an enlightened science of education must adopt."

In practical knowledge it is clear that truth is not the ultimate end; as the knowledge of a moral truth, a political, or a religious one, is of value only as it affords the condition of its exercise. But Sir William further held, "that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity. A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized, less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation. . . Accordingly, the sciences always studied with the keenest interest. are those in a state of progress and uncertainty; absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study.

"But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of intellectual activity, these studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently a less improving, exercise. It is on this ground that I would rest one of the permanent utilities of mental philosophy." This doctrine is stated in other parts of his writings; and he had sounded the range of its consequences pretty definitely.

In his opening lecture he told his class that the communication of knowledge was a high, but not the highest, aim of instruction; and that he would not merely deliver lectures" By all the means in my power I shall endeavour to rouse you, gentlemen, to the free and vigorous exercise of your faculties; and shall deem my task accomplished, not by teaching logic and philosophy, but by teaching to reason and philosophise." 9

In these introductory lectures he also explained the nature and comprehension of philosophy, its causes, and the disposition with

Vol. I. pp. 8-13. In the Discussions he says :-"We exist only as we ener gise; pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the end of which their development proposes. Speculative truth is subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy it occasions immediately in its discovery, mediately through its consequences" (p. 39).

Vol. I., p. 18.

which it ought to be studied. Touching the method of philosophy, Hamilton affirms that there is only one possible method-a combination of analysis and synthesis, and the purity and equilibrium of these two elements constitute its perfection.

Concerning the divisions of the philosophy of the mind, he adopted, from Kant, the threefold division of mental phenomena; and the whole subject is enounced in these three questions:-1. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? 2. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? 3. What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these phenomena warrant us in drawing?

First, we should investigate the facts; second, discover their laws; and third, ascertain by legitimate inference their ultimate results. Thus we obtain three branches of mental science, which he designates as phenomenal psychology, nomological psychology, and ontology. Each of these chief classes of the phenomena of mind has a science, which is conversant about its laws. But there is no general science of the cognitive faculties; and the only one of these faculties, whose laws form the object matter of a separate science, is the understanding, the faculty of relations, of thought proper-logic, the science of the laws of thought, in relation to the end which our cognitive faculties propose, that is the true. To this head might be referred universal grammar-philosophical grammar, or the science conversant with the laws of language as the instrument of thought.

The science of the laws of our capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which they propose, that is, the pleasurable, has no precise name in English. It has sometimes been called the philosophy of taste, the theory of the fine arts, the science of the beautiful and sublime; and on the Continent it has been termed Esthetic; but none of these are quite appropriate.

The nomology of our exertive powers and tendencies constitute practical philosophy; for it is simply the science of the laws which regulate our will and desire, in relation to the end which our conative powers propose, that is, the good. This, as it treats these laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation to man as a member of society, will fall to be divided into two branches-Ethics and Politics; and these again admit of various sub-divisions-such as jurisprudence and legislation.

Empirical psychology is limited to the facts afforded in consciousness, considered exclusively in themselves. But these may be such

as not only to be objects of knowledge in themselves, but may also afford us the grounds of inference to something out of themselves. As effects of a peculiar character, they may enable us to infer the analogous character of their unknown causes; as phenomena of particular qualities, they may warrant us in drawing many conclusions regarding the character of that unknown principle, of that unknown substance, of which they are the manifestations. It is true, that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are not presented to us as phenomena, or as objects of immediate knowledge; still, if the phenomena actually given do inevitably render it requisite, for their rational explanation, then the hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are certainly entitled, from the existence of the former, to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science which treats of all such inferences of unknown being from its known manifestations, is called ontology, or metaphysics proper.

The following is his tabular view of the distribution of mental philosophy :

Hamilton considered this distribution of philosophy as the simplest and most exhaustive; and he specially marked out the branches which belonged to his course of instruction. 10 In his lectures he

10 Vol. I., pp. 120-128. As already mentioned, he originally intended to deliver a more advanced course, and the following sentences, bearing on the point, appear in the manuscript of his seventh lecture :-"The plan which I propose to adopt in the distribution of the course, or rather courses, is the following: I shall commence with mental philosophy, strictly so-called, with the science which is conversant with the manifestations of mind-phenomenology or psychology. I shall then proceed to logic, the science which considers the laws of thought; and finally to ontology, or metaphysics proper, the philosophy of results. Esthetic, or the theory of the pleasurable, I should consider subsequent to logic, and previously to ontology" (p. 128).

treats only one of the three main groups-empirical psychology—and even this he has not treated exhaustively; only cognitions—the cognitive faculties are fully discussed; but one division of the second group is treated in his lectures on logic. Will and desire receive only incidental notice.

A large part of the first volume is occupied with the discussion of Consciousness, which in his system is the primary and fundamental characteristic of mind, and the universal condition of intelligence. He discusses the special conditions of consciousness; its relation to the cognitive faculties; consciousness and attention; the evidence and authority of consciousness; and violations of its authority. Many other interesting questions are discussed, such as the general phenomena of consciousness; whether the mind is always consciously active, or if it is ever unconsciously modified; and an exceedingly interesting lecture on the difficulties and facilities of studying mental science.

While consciousness cannot be logically defined, it may be philosophically analysed. This is effected by observing and holding fast the facts of consciousness, comparing these, and then evolving the universal conditions under which alone an act of consciousness is possible. It is by following this method that we can attain to accurate knowledge of the contents of consciousness.

The nature of the act of consciousness may be shown thus : "When I know, I must know that I know; when I feel, I must know that I feel; when I desire, I must know that I desire. The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the condition of being known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know; if I did not know that I felt, I would not feel; if I did not know that I desired, I would not desire. The expressions I know that I know, I know that I feel, I know that I desire, are thus translated by: I am conscious that I know, I am conscious that I feel, I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind of its own acts and affections; in other words, the self-affirmation that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine. But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything different from these modifications themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of their existence within the sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of the mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one

hand, an I or self, as the subject of a certain modification; and, on the other hand, some modification, state, quality, effection or operation belonging to the subject. Consciousness thus in its simplicity necessarily involves three things: (1) a recognising or knowing subject; (2) a recognised or known modification; and (3) a recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification." 11

He explains and illustrates this fundamental characteristic of mind
at great length, and with an analytic power and clearness of state-
ment as yet unmatched in the annals of philosophy: "Every mental
phenomena may be called a fact of consciousness. But as we
distinguish consciousness from the special faculties, though these are
all only modifications of consciousness, only branches of which con-
sciousness is the trunk, so we distinguish the special and derivative
phenomena of mind from those that are primary and universal, and
to give the latter the name of facts of consciousness, as more
eminently worthy of that appellation.
A fact of conscious-

ness in this sense is a simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate
or a primary datum of intelligence. It obtains also various denomi-
nations; sometimes it is called a principle, sometimes a fundamental
law of mind, sometimes a transcendental condition of thought, etc."
He insists on its characteristics of ultimate priority and necessity;
that, as an ultimate fact, it is also given to us with a belief of its
reality. It reveals what it is, but not why or how it is. "To ask
how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness
itself is possible; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to ask
how an intelligent being like man is possible.
But as we

did not create ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our
creation, we must take our existence and our knowledge upon trust."

The result of this inquiry concerning consciousness is-(1) The facts which are given in the act of consciousness itself; and (2) the facts which consciousness does not at once give, but to the reality of which it only bears evidence. As to the first class of facts, no doubt can be or ever has been entertained; it is only the authority of these facts as evidence of something beyond themselves, only thus the second class of facts, which become matter of discussion; it is not the reality of consciousness, but its veracity, that may be questioned.12

As psychology is only a developed consciousness, a scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the guarantee and 11 Vol. I., pp. 189, 190-193.

12 Vol. I., pp. 269-276, et seq., and Discussions, p. 62.

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