CHAPTER XXXIX. Hamilton-Ferrier-and Robertson. IR WILLIAM HAMILTON,1 the most learned of all the Scottish anatomy in the University of Glasgow, a position formerly held by his grandfather, Dr. Thomas Hamilton. Sir William was the lineal representative to the title of Sir Robert Hamilton, the leader of the Covenanting army at Drumclog, and he manifested at least one feature of the spirit of his ancestors—the energy and will to combat when occasion occurred. His father died when he was an infant, but he received an excellent education. He passed through the arts classes at the University of Glasgow, and studied medicine one session at Edinburgh, having intended at first to follow the hereditary profession of the family. But in 1807, having obtained a Snell exhibition, he went to Oxford. There he entered deeply into the study of ancient philosophy, and finally graduated in the highest class. He returned to Scotland in 1811, studied law, and was called to the bar in 1816. In 1820, Hamilton became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy, vacant by the death of Dr. Brown. The contest for the chair was very keen, and finally lay between Hamilton and John Wilson. But Hamilton was a Whig, Wilson a Tory; and as the appointment turned upon political grounds, the majority of the town council of Edinburgh,—the patrons of the chair, voted for Wilson, who accordingly obtained it. It should be observed, however, that neither of the two gentlemen had up to that time published anything which could be referred to as evidence of their special qualifications for the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.2 1 Born in 1788; died in 1856. 2 In reality, Wilson was quite out of his element in the chair of moral philosophy. But "the chair of moral philosophy in a Scottish university seems to be elastic in its adaptability. Brown made it a chair of psychology; Ferrier, at St. Andrews, a chair of metaphysics; Wilson made it a chair of rhetoric and I Belles Letters. It is true that he treated of the passions, virtues, duties, and so on, but he dealt with them in the concrete, with illustrations from literature."-Sir A. Grant's Story of the University of Edinburgh, Vol. II., pp. 345346. The following year Sir William obtained the chair of civil history in the University of Edinburgh, and he entered on his duties with ardour and energy; yet his success was comparatively limited. The salary attached to the chair was only one hundred pounds a year. His wide range of historical knowledge enabled him to handle the subject in a comprehensive and attractive manner, and for some years he had a class of about thirty students. He petitioned the Senatus in 1824 to include his subject in the arts curriculum, but the arts faculty gave him no encouragement. Hamilton then, in 1828, enunciated his views to the Royal Commission, but the commissioners, instead of protecting the chair of history, recommended its abolition. In 1833, when the city became bankrupt, the small salary of the chair ceased to be paid, and Hamilton ceased lecturing.3 In 1836, Dr. Ritchie resigned the chair of logic and metaphysics, which he had held for a period of twenty-eight years, and four candidates entered the field for the vacant office-namely, Sir William Hamilton, Isaac Taylor, Patrick C. Macdougall, and George Combe, the popular phrenologist. It was seen that the real contest would be between the first two candidates; and after a hard struggle, of which the issue seemed doubtful, when the final decision was taken, out of thirty-two votes Hamilton had eighteen-a majority of four. Although then in his forty-eighth year, he entered on his new task with all the emotion and ardour of youth, and threw his heart and intellect into the work. With his exact method and lofty ideal of philosophical style, he felt much difficulty in deciding on the character of the course of lectures on philosophy which would meet the wants of the young students, and at the same time do justice to the subject; and, after three months of intense thought and reflection, at the opening of the session he had only a few of his lectures written. Thus it happened that his lectures on metaphysics were composed during the first session which he taught. He often sat up nearly all the preceding night preparing his lecture for the next day, with his loving wife by his side acting as his amanuensis. These lectures being composed in such circumstances, and solely designed for the instruction of his own * This chair of civil history continued in an anomalous position, though sometimes held by able men, such as Professor Ferrier and Cosmo Innes, until 1862, when the Executive Commission changed the title of the chair to that of history, and then made the lectures of the professor on constitutional law and history necessary for a degree in law, class, it is not surprising that they may not at all points present a consistent and complete exposition of his philosophical views; still, so far as they go, they may be fairly assumed to contain a reliable statement of his chief doctrines. His lectures on logic were composed during the next session, and under the same pressure as the former course. Hamilton greatly felt the want of text-books suitable for his purposes, so he resolved to edit an edition of Reid's works, and projected a new work on logic. It has been affirmed by some that the dedication of his powers to the service of Reid was a great mistake, that he should have built entirely upon his own foundation. Be this as it may, the form of exposition which he selected was in some respects unfortunate. His numerous footnotes to Reid's works were written as the text was passing through the press in 1837 and 1838, and the supplementary dissertations to the end of D were written and stereotyped in 1841 and 1842. But, in 1838, a quarrel arose between Hamilton and the town council of Edinburgh about his lectures, which had the effect of preventing him from delivering a separate and more advanced course of lectures on metaphysics. Then his brother died, to whom he was warmly attached. Next came the threatened disruption of the Church of Scotland, which he struggled hard to avert; and in 1844, in the midst of his arduous labour and duties, a severe paralytic stroke almost deprived him of the use of his right side for the rest of his life. Though he partly recovered, and his mental faculties seemed unimpaired, he never regained his former energy and health.5 So when his edition of Reid's works was issued in 1846, it still remained incomplete; one of his supplementary dissertations breaking off in the middle of a sentence; and although afterwards added to, it was never completed. The fragmentary materials which his editors collected and published, after his death, form but a small portion of what Hamilton originally intended to present; while only an outline of his projected work on logic ever appeared. All hope of revising his lectures seems to have been relinquished, save by occasional oral "It was a loss to the University that Sir W. Hamilton's separate class in metaphysics was put a stop to; but this was due to his own uncompromising temper, as well as to the somewhat ignorant interference of the town council."Sir A. Grant's Story of the University of Edinburgh, Vol. II., pp. 62-65. I may add that it was a loss to the nation and to philosophy. * Veitch's Memoir of Sir W. Hamilton, pp. 266, 270, 278, et seq. interpolations. But he continued to lecture and instruct his classes, though sometimes an assistant read his lectures, when the effort of delivery had become too painful for himself. He expired shortly after the close of the session of 1856, tended in his last moments by his faithful wife, and surrounded by his children. Hamilton was much beloved by his pupils; and all who called on him for information were kindly treated. Although his temper was warm and sometimes easily roused; on the whole, however, his life was a noble struggle; and, if he occasionally manifested an impatience of ignorant opposition, it was only natural and human. Yet, in one or two of his controversies with opponents of his special doctrines, his vehemence passed the limits of fair discussion. His writings consist of:--1. Sixteen articles contributed to the Edinburgh Review, chiefly on philosophy, education, University reform and methods of teaching, and on literature; the first of these appeared in 1829, and he republished the whole of them in 1852, with large additions. 2. His notes and supplementary dissertations to Reid's works. 3. His lectures on metaphysics. 4. His lectures on logic. All his writings bristle with quotations and references to the views of previous thinkers; his erudition was vast and varied. In order to give his views the justice to which they are well entitled, and to mark the gratitude for his memory which I warmly feel, I will indicate the lines on which his philosophy may be justly appreciated and fairly expounded. The first requisite is to understand the purpose of a writer's works, and in the case of Hamilton, to take special account of the immediate aims which he had in view; guided by these considerations, I will begin the exposition of his system with his lectures on metaphysics-his psychology, then the philosophy of the conditioned, and close with his logic. The fundamental principles are these:-(1) His peculiar view of the end of speculation; (2) his theory of external perception--natural realism; (3) his doctrine of a priori laws or native notions of the mind; (4) his philosophy of the conditioned; (5) his conception of logic, and the peculiarities of his logical system. 6 I never had the gratification of even seeing Sir W. Hamilton; yet I may be permitted to state, that the first philosophical writings which I ever read with interest was his volume of discussions, which I perused shortly after the date of his death. His edition of Reid soon after came into my hands; and his four volumes of lectures, almost immediately after their publication. And I now gratefully record, that his writings first roused me to think for myself. In his introductory lectures he explained to the students the utility of philosophy on its subjective and objective sides; its absolute utility viewed simply in itself, and its value viewed in relation to other sciences. He endeavoured to impress their minds with just ideas of the importance of philosophy, and to clear away all superficial misconceptions of the end and objects of education. He discussed philosophy as means and ends in relation to the culture and happiness of man. While man himself, being in so far a mean for the glory of God, "must be an end unto himself, for it is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection that, as a creature, he can manifest the glory of his Creator. I say it is manifest that man is by nature necessarily an end to himself—that his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity, to which he tends, and ought to tend, when not diverted from this, his general and native destination, by peculiar and accidental circumstances." In the realities of social life, however, "each man, instead of being solely an end to himself instead of being able to subordinate everything to that full and harmonious development of his own faculties, in which his real perfection and his true happiness consists-is, in general, compelled to turn himself into the mean towards the accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and for the benefit of others. So the perfection of man as an end, and the perfection of man as a mean or instrument are not only not the same, but in reality they are generally opposed. even admitting, therefore, that the study of the mind is of no immediate advantage in preparing the student for many of the subordinate parts in the mechanism of society, its utility cannot on that account be called in question, unless it be asserted that man 'liveth by bread alone,' and has no higher destination than that of the calling by which he earns his subsistence." 7 He drew a distinction between the mere possession of truth and intellectual development; by the latter he meant the power acquired through the exercise of the higher faculties of a more varied and vigorous mental activity. This led him to his peculiar view of the end of speculation, and he asks :-"Is truth or is the mental exercise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end this is perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole compass of philosophy. For, according to the solution at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or lower rank 7 Vol. I., pp. 2, 7. |