To prevent Feroze Shah's doing mischief, Brigadier Somerset (who had arrived from Bombay to command a field force, and had assumed charge of Colonel Benson's column while it was watching the Banswara passes) received orders to take two guns, D troop Horse-Artillery, and seventy Highlanders, and proceed to Augur, where Major White, with a squadron 17th Lancers and wing of the 9th Native Infantry, had been despatched from Mhow to meet him.

When Tantia moved south from Saloombur, Major Rocke also skirted the jungle, and took up Colonel Benson's position of Purtabgurh, the latter officer placed himself on the edge of the jungle twenty miles to the south. On the 24th December, Brig adier Parke, who had made a considerable detour to the westward, again got correct intelligence of the rebel's dispositions. His orders from General Michel were to keep up a constant pursuit wherever the rebels went, while the other columns would be manœuvred so as to head them when practicable. Accordingly Parke, leaving his artillery, plunged into the jungles from the westward, and the rebels at four o'clock on the afternoon of Christmas Day suddenly emerged on the other side opposite Major Rocke at Pertabgurh. Major Rocke had not men enough to close the passes, of which there were two or three. He placed himself at Pertabgurh because it was a central position about two miles from the jungle, whence he could march to any particular point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided he had sufficiently early intelligence of their movements. But he had no notice of Tantia's approach until the rebel army appeared in the open, and marched straight upon his positionthe only occasion on which they deliberately assumed the offensive. His force did not consist of more than two hundred infantry, two guns, and a few native cavalry, and could merely remain on the defensive during an action which lasted without much result. The rebels only wished to keep him in play while their elephants, and what little baggage remained to them, got clear of the pass.

Colonel Benson was accompanied by Captain Hutchinson (assistant to the Governor-General's agent at Indore), who supplied him with early and correct intelligence of the rebels' movements. He started that forenoon, and marched after them nearly due east at the rate of five-and-thirty miles a-day, till the 29th, when he came up with them at Zeerapore, and captured six elephants. During the rapid pursuit which had preceded, the few infantry and badly-mounted troopers who remained with Tantia dropped off into the villages and jungles; those who adhered to his standard effected their escape from the British without much loss. It was absolutely necessary for the small attacking force to keep well together, and make no rash charges into the centre of their opponents.

The rebels, however, were to be pushed yet harder before they could get any respite from their pursuers. Brigadier Somerset arrived at Zeerapore the morning after the action. He had two horse-artillery guns with him, and taking the fresh horses out of his ammunition- waggons, attached them to Colonel Benson's two guns; and the ammunition-waggons, with Benson's tired horses attached, remained in his charge, while the four guns accompanied Brigadier Somerset. Their limbers alone contained quite enough ammunition for an action with Tantia Topee. After marching seventy miles in the next forty-eight hours, Brigadier Somerset attacked the rebels at Burrode. Some shells from the artillery killed a good many, during a stand which they made for a few minutes-after this they galloped off as usual. Somerset then waited for his baggage to rejoin him, and was ordered to Chuppra, where the General shortly expected to arrive.

The rebels were on Feroze Shah's tracks, and effected a junction with him at Indergurh, on the west bank of the Chumbul. Brigadier Smith, whose brigade we have before adverted to as advancing on Rajgurḥ, had been very near when Somerset's action was fought. He continued the pursuit towards Indergurh with a force of infantry and cavalry, but did not overtake the rebels.

General Michel left Mhow in the end of December to meet Somerset

near Augur. He arrived just after Benson's action at Zeerapore, and proceeded with his column instead to Chuppra. Colonel Beecher, who, with one squadron 17th Lancers, two horse-artillery guns D troop, and his own regiment of irregular cavalry, had been moved up in that direction from the other side of the Nerbudda, was directed to join him there, and thus formed a strong column, comprising the whole of the 17th Lancers, Beecher's Irregulars, the D troop horse-artillery, and a hundred Highlanders mounted on Barras's camels.

One of our elephants gave no little trouble the day General Michel arrived at Augur. Some elephants are subject to periodical fits of sexual madness, or must, as the natives call it. In this state they attack whatever comes across them, whether man or beast, their own driver (between whom and his charge great mutual affection generally exists) being often the first victim. The situation of mahout or driver, however, is a favourite one among natives, and there is never any difficulty in finding a fresh one to undertake that duty, when the animal recovers. Your mahout is high up in the world, and looks down on camel-men or bullockdrivers with the contempt with which a Hansom regards his four-wheeled rivals. "He's been through the winders of two chaney-shops since we have had him," says young Bailey, speaking of brother to Cauliflower, "and was sold for killing his missis. That's a horse, I hope." With similar pride a mahout describes the homicidal propensities of the animal you are riding, as constituting him something like an elephant, and grins expressively at the evident de sire to get down which such information produces. At Augur, an elephant on the march showed signs of must, but the driver contrived to slip off his back. The brute first attacked a Highlander, and trampled him to death. He then charged a baker's cart; the frightened bullocks rushed from the road, and tumbled cart and all into a ditch. The elephant did not hurt the bullocks, but ate up two hundred loaves in about five minutes. After this feat he made a luxurious dessert in a sugar

cane field, and liquored up to the extent of twenty or thirty gallons at a muddy tank. In three weeks' time (during which he wandered at large) this disagreeable fit passed off, and the driver, who had followed him about, retook possession.

On hearing at Mhow that Tantia had left the Banswara jungles, and Oodeypore was no longer threatened, the General had also sent directions to Brigadier Honner commanding at Nusseerabad (who was already in the field with a column moving on Oodeypore) to march in a north-easterly direction and watch the fords of the Chumbul, between Kotah and Indergurh. He reached Indergurh the day after Tantia and Feroze Shah left it in a north-easterly direction. These harassing pursuits had much diminished their army; indeed, it is astonishing how their horses had a leg to stand upon, or their riders the physical endurance to remain in the saddle. Those who could find fresh horses in the villages bought or stole them, and many a well-bred charger was left standing by the roadside, its back swarming with maggots and its hoofs worn to the sensible sole. After their junction with Feroze Shah, the whole force did not muster more than two thousand men, whose only hope was to escape death by the sword or rope.

He

Their next adventure was to fall in with Brigadier Showers on the 15th January, near Dewassa. had come down with a light_column from Agra, and took their last two elephants. After this they tried to enter the town of Ulwur, capital of a Rajpoot state, but Lieutenant Impey, the political agent, held a pass in front of the town with the Rajah's troops, who remained faithful

General Michel's pursuing columns were somewhat thrown out by the tremendous pace at which the rebels rushed from the centre of Malwa to the northern extremity of Rajpootana. Parke had crossed the Chumbul at Kotah, and was now moving up toward Ulwur. The General did not choose to get too far north, or wear out the strong column with which he hoped to strike a decisive blow when opportunity presented.

Honner also, instead of following the direct tracks, kept to the south of them, in case Joudhpore or Jyepore were threatened.

When Tantia Topee crossed the Chumbul, Colonel Holmes, of the 12th Native Infantry, was sent out from Nusseerabad with a few men of H.M.'s 83d and 12th Native Infantry and four guns (native artillerymen), to save any towns which might be in danger of being plundered, and do what he could in a general way. On the night of January 21st the rebels were encamped at Seekur, when Holmes, after marching the astounding distance of fifty-four miles through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-four hours, completely surprised their camp, and threw it into the greatest confusion by a few rounds from his guns. They abandoned a quantity of horses, camels, and arms, and afterwards spoke of this as one of the most disastrous affairs in which they had been engaged. The flat and sandy district in the north of Rajpootana abounds in excellent camels. Many of the rebels, taking a hint from their pursuers, exchanged their jaded horses for riding-camels, which accounts for the number of these animals captured on this occasion. Next day Tantia Topee left the rebel camp, worn out with fatigue; accompanied by thirty or forty followers, he escaped to the east of the Chumbul, and concealed himself in the jungles near Seronge. A few days later, six hundred men surrendered to the Rajah of Bikaneer, and requested his mediation on their behalf. The British Government were only too glad to be saved the trouble of hunting them down, and desired they might all be sent to their homes, with the single proviso that those who could be proved guilty of deliberate murder might at any time be brought up for execu

tion.

General Michel apprehended that the rebels would reckon on having drawn all his columns after them to the north, and then make a desperate burst to the southern extremity of Malwa. This they were most likely to do by passing through the Joodpore territory, and then turning to their left across the Aravelli range,

which separates Joodpore from Oodeypore. They knew no column with guns could follow them through these hills a comforting reflection to men whose ears tingled at the bare mention of British artillery. To be prepared for this contingency, Brigadier Somerset was ordered, by forced marches, to take up a position near and to the south of the Oodeypore side of the Chutterbhooj Pass, which is the principal road across the hills, but there are several smaller pathways near it.

The General did not allow the pursuit to languish in the north; he fixed his headquarters for a few days at Nusseerabad as a central position from which to direct operations. Brigadier Showers was ordered to the north of the rebels, Parke to the west, and Honner to the south; on the east lay the great desert. Holmes, who was moving about with his detachment inside this ring, forced the rebels to cross it somewhere. They chose the route which General Michel had anticipated, shot past Honner's right flank, and fled south through the Joodpore territory. Honner overtook them on the 10th February at Kosanee, after a march of 145 miles in four days, killed upwards of 200, and captured a number of camels. A curious incident occurred on this occasion: Lieutenant Stourton of the 8th Hussars made desperate efforts to cut down, or rather to cut up, a rebel chief mounted on a swift Sandney camel, but his horse always swerved before bringing him within sword's length. A sergeant of the 8th coming up, exclaimed, "Why don't you try him with your revolver, sir?" Stourton, who had forgotten his revolver, took the hint, and brought down both man and camel at the first discharge. On examination, the ball was found to have passed through the rider's body into the back of the camel's head, killing both outright.

The Rao Sahib (who, since Tantia's departure, himself assumed the charge of directing their strategical movements) reached the Chutterbhooj Pass on the 15th. Brigadier Somerset arrived within a few miles of it the same day. Most unfortunately, he had no one with him who

knew the country; and a few precious hours had to be expended in the necessary reconnoitring, during which the enemy threaded the pass. Their joy at getting safe through was soon turned into mourning when they learned that a British column was hovering in the the neighbourhood. They had confidently believed all our columns to be behind them in the Joodpore territory, and were in despair at finding the sole result of their last frantic rush was to carry them close up to a fresh band of pursuers. The Rao made for his old haunt in the Banswara jungles, but the General had already sent an express order to close the passes with small infantry detachments from Neemuch. Finding these defiles occupied, the rebels turned eastward, and passed within a few miles of Pertabgurh, where the action with Major Rocke took place just seven weeks before. They had made a circuit of 900 miles in the interval.

Brigadier Somerset marched 230 miles in nine days. He was close behind the rebels all the time; and a majority of them fell out of the line of march, threw aside their arms, and sneaked away towards their homes. The remainder made an offer of surrender, and 200 men (all Mussulmans from Cawnpore and Bareilly) actually gave themselves up near Runnejah, on the 22d February 1859. The chiefs, who did not come within the provisions of the general amnesty, were merely seeking a temporary cessation of hostilities by these advances, and effected their escape into the Seronge jungles.

This was the end of these operations. The Rao Sahib and Feroze Shah, when they reached the jungles, no longer sought safety in numbers as open enemies of the British Government, but sometimes disguised themselves as religious mendicants, and sometimes with a handful of men levied contributions of food from the villages.

During the pursuit of Tantia Topee, a portion of the Indian journals were not slow to assume the privilege, so freely enjoyed by their contemporaries in England, of abusing the arrangements of our own generals, and praising those of our adversaries.

Because operations were so long protracted, Tantia was held up as a dexterous strategist, who could give Generals Roberts and Michel a few useful hints in the art of war. Those who look below the surface will find nothing to bear out such a conclusion. Marshal Saxe has said that the whole secret of war is in the legs; but he did not mean they were always to be used for running away, which seems to have been the only manner that Tantia had any idea of employing them. He fled till he was outmarched, and then sacrificed some guns and men on the spot where he was overtaken, only to escape with the remainder and be again outmarched, and again driven from the field. His soldiers could have done as much without any leader at all. With an immense cavalry force under his orders, he made no attempt to harass the pursuers on their line of march, to spread confusion among their long train of baggage, or cut up the foragers around their camp. It never occurred to him that cavalry who cannot stand the shock of battle may yet be turned to good account in irregular warfare. We may indeed be thankful to Providence that he did not try such tactics, for he had horsemen enough to have afforded us work in front, in rear, and on both flanks; and an Anglo-Indian army, with its numerous array of camp-followers, is peculiarly susceptible to such demonstrations.

These omissions of Tantia Topee's materially lightened the burden of our own generals, yet still left them a most difficult task to accomplish. They had to cover or overawe the most important towns in their division, and endeavour to exterminate the rebel army, which always far outnumbered them, especially in cavalry. To drive the rebels from their positions with infantry and artillery was easy enough, and in ordinary warfare this constitutes a victory. But a battle lost to the rebels was only so many guns abandoned, or so many men killed. They had no communication with a base of operations to preserve; no line of country to defend; no strategical front, or flanks, or rear. When hard pressed, they only made a stand to let their trea

sure be carried off (many of the chiefs thought their proper place was with the treasure on these occasions), and then got out of range of the cannon and rifles as soon as they could. The British cavalry followed, but were rarely sufficiently strong to do much execution. At the Bunnas General Roberts had five hundred cavalry (including three hundred Beloochees on ponies). He was able to send them right into the middle of the retiring enemy, and great slaughter ensued. So also at General Michel's actions of Sindwaho and Khoraie. But at Sanganeer, at Rajghur, at Mungrowlee, at Zeerapore, and at Barode, our handful of cavalry had to rest content with seeing their enemies fly before them, and picking up elephants, camels, or worn-out horses, or killing a few stragglers. To charge home, without any infantry support to fall back upon, was certain destruction. It would have let the rebels know their own strength when forced to a hand-tohand action.

General Michel, by judiciously distributing his columns over the immense district of which he had charge, always contrived to have a force of some kind or another, either infantry or cavalry, in tolerably close pursuit. This saved the important towns from plunder or mutiny, for they would not admit the rebels when a British force was near. The fugitives, moreover, got no rest, and it was the loss by stragglers in these continued long marches which weakened and finally dissipated their army, quite as much as the casualties in battle. An angler with a heavy salmon on his hook does not break the line by attempting to land him at once, but keeps up a constant strain till the fish gradually loses its strength, and is led powerless to the bank. Tantia Topee's followers were too numerous and too nimble to be despatched at a blow; but when they had worn out one British column, they generally found their movements had been anticipated, and another was ready to take its place, and the rebel hordes melted away under the ceaseless pressure. It was unfortunate that when the General, having more troops at his

disposal towards the end of the campaign, collected a strong force under Brigadier Somerset and despatched it to the very point (a hundred miles distant from his own headquarters) through which the rebels passed, a few hours' unavoidable delay lost the opportunity of winding up with a good coup de grace. Although this column did not strike a blow with the sword, yet its appearance immediately after Honner's hard chase finished the campaign. The chiefs could not persuade their disheartened soldiers to attempt a stand. It was sauve qui peut for 250 miles, at the end of which 200 surrendered. Feroze Shah and the Rao Sahib, with 300 men and the treasure, hid themselves in the Seronge jungles; the remainder abandoned their standards during the flight, threw away their arms, and straggled homewards in twos and threes, generally unmolested, though the villagers sometimes relieved them of a few gold mohurs.

The rebels at first carried their treasure on camels and elephants. When the silver was all spent, they put the gold and jewels on horses, under a guard of picked men. It is probably now buried in the jungles, and the secret of its place of deposit may have been the cause of more than one tragedy among men so habitually distrustful of each other as Orientals. The whole distance for which they were pursued, between the 20th June 1858 and 1st March 1859, was more than 3000 miles. General Michel marched 1700, Parke 2000 miles. Captain Clowe's troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke all the time, and had marched 400 miles under General Roberts before joining him. When a column started in rapid pursuit, the tents followed in charge of a small guard, and often did not come up for days, during which the troops had to shelter themselves under the forest trees from sun and rain.