mouth, that probably the garrison would be very much larger, because you would have all the troops and volunteers of that part of the country concentrated at Plymouth, their centre of action; whereas Portsmouth is part of the defence of London, and therefore you could not afford such a large garrison there."

"Q. The army which is to defend London could not affect the defence of Ply

mouth?

"A. No; for you could not leave the whole of that western district unprovided for without a distinct force, which would probably be chiefly at Plymouth."

The position of Chatham is so near London that its defence becomes still more closely interwoven with that of the metropolis. The plan of the Commissioners for enclosing the ground opposite Chatham on the north of the Medway is almost the only one of their plans which we should venture to criticise. It seems to us that the fortification of Chatham on the north should only be considered with reference to its defence after London had fallen. The promontory which is formed by the Medway below Maidstone and the Thames, is the last place where an invading army would like to venture. Although we do not place much confidence in a river for strategical purposes of defence, the Medway between Maidstone and Chatham would offer a serious bar rier the line is short, and therefore easily watched, and the ground on the left bank favourable for defence. It may be assumed, therefore, that an invader would turn the Medway, either passing through Maidstone or leaving it on his right flank. Maidstone is thus an important strategical point. If our army had not already met the invader before he reached Maidstone, or if it had met him and been defeated, it must-it could only be in front of London. Should the invader, after passing Maidstone, turn to his right and enter the promontory between the Thames and Medway, he would enter a cul de sac. Our army could advance behind him, and make him fight a battle in a position where all retreat would be cut off in case of defeat. We do not believe a general would be justified

in exposing himself to an engagement under such circumstances, even if numerically superior; and the real attack on Chatham from the north would only be made after London had fallen. When this unfortunate event had occurred, the French would be in possession of the north bank of the Thames, and could enfilade and take in reverse the line sioners across the promontory. Would of works proposed by the Commisit not be better to adopt one of the other plans which they themselves suggest, having both its flanks resting on the Medway? A small fort at Cliffe Creek could be added. This would compel the enemy to make his attack from the west. If he attacked from the north, his works would be taken in reverse by the fort at Cliffe Creek. If he attacked the fort at Cliffe Creek, he would be taken in reverse by the Chatham lines. These two forts would thus mutually support each other. The fort at Cliffe Creek would form a barrier to the navigation of the Thames, and the north and east portion of the Chatham lines might be constructed on an inexpensive scale, being less liable to attack than the west front, which would be proportionately strengthened.

In some of the additions proposed to the seaward defences of Plymouth, the Commissioners have really gone too far on the side of security. It is wasting money to build expensive casemates on Drake's Island. The entrance to Plymouth harbour is the easiest defended of any in the world. There are plenty of officers in the Royal Engineers who would, at an expense of one hundred pounds, and in less than forty-eight hours, throw up and arm a sufficiency of earthen batteries on Mount Edgecombe to blow any fleet that tried to force an entrance clean out of the water; and this might be done without inflicting the slightest permanent injury on the noble demesne of Mount Edgecombe, which would be little less than sacrilege. But earthen batteries thrown up at the beginning of a war could, at its conclusion, be levelled in as short a time as they took to construct

and in that warm and moist climate the succeeding spring would

see the daisies and ferns growing as white and green as ever; or if a hostile fleet was sunk by these batteries, the grassy mounds might remain for future ages as a picturesque memento of the struggle. The Gothic ruin near them would be much improved by having its buttress knocked away by a French bullet, for it would then become a real ruin, whereas it is now avowedly a sham one.

The subject of seaward defences at Portsmouth is difficult and complicated; what between the sands, and the shoals, and " Motherbank," and "No man's land," and the contradictory opinions of naval officers, the Commissioners deserve great credit for having come to any decision at all, and we have no intention of trying to disturb it.

The Commissioners state their demands on our pockets as follows: -"The amount of our special estimate is £10,390,000, of which sum £1,885,000 is for the purchase of land, £7,005,000 for the fortifications recommended for erection, £500,000 for the armament of works, and £1,000,000 for floating defences. To this must be added £1,460,000 for works already sanctioned and in course of execution the whole amounting to £11,850,000.”

The portion of this required for the seaward defences of the dockyards is £2,325,000; their armament, say, £250,000, or half of the whole £500,000 required for armaments: if we add the £1,000,000 for floating defences, it gives £3,575,000. This should be sanctioned without loss of time, because these works really are independent of any general plan for resisting invasion, and the garrisons required would be very small compared with those for the land defences probably not 5000

men.

We consider these seaward defences for the dockyards should take precedence of everything, even of the defence of London, inasmuch as the danger is far more imminent. To reach London an enemy must defeat both our fleet and army; to burn our dockyards, in the present state of their defences, he need only defeat or entice away our fleet.

The land defences resolve themselves into simple questions of men

and money. The Commissioners require 65,000 men to garrison their forts, 3721 guns to place in them, and £7,000,000 to build them: surely it would be as well to count how many chickens we can hatch, before making such expensive hencoops for them. Three thousand seven hundred and twenty-one guns! but where are the gunners ? Really food for cannon is getting so scarce and dear, and there are so many mouths to feed, that the cannon must learn to help themselves, and then indulge in an unobjectionable cannibalism. Can no one invent a gun that will load, aim, and fire itself? or, as soldiers are mere machines, can no one invent a steam regiment and steam colonel at once? We ourselves believe the number of men forthcoming, and able to garrison the fortifications, would be practically unlimited, and shall recur to the subject afterwards; but when such distinguished authorities as Sir J. Burgoyne think otherwise, it would be unwise to act without a fuller investigation. The Commissioners talk in a general way of utilising the volunteers, &c.; but it was not within their scope to estimate in detail the distribution we could make of our forces. We wish distinctly to state that our opposition to the immediate construction of these works arises from the necessity of considering the matter on a broader basis, and is free from any intention of attributing imperfections to the Commissioners' schemes taken per se. As specimens of military engineering projects they are no doubt excellent: we should like to see their plan of fortifying Chatham reconsidered, although it is very probable nothing better can be devised. As they themselves suggest three different plans for Chatham, we may be pardoned for hinting at any improvements being possible. If the nation, therefore, will undertake to find garrisons of 65,000 men, and come down handsomely with its £10,000,000, the Commissioners may safely be intrusted with seeing the money laid out to the best advantage; but the nation had better make sure that the garrisons will not be summoned at the moment of peril to protect Lon

don, and an enemy walk into the empty forts; and they must not at a future period make the payment of this money any basis for remonstrance against furnishing another twenty million to fortify London and a few other points, which may be more important than the landward defences of our dockyards.

Here we leave the "Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom," and, reserving a few remarks regarding our fleet, and means of opposing or delaying a landing, for the conclusion, take the case of an actual invasion, when the whole army of England regulars, militia, and volunteers-would be called into the field. It is not necessary nowadays to go very far for a pretext for war. We need not discuss the present aspect of European politics, try to divine how much of the Rhenish provinces the Emperor will require to balance Sicily, or what prescription the doctors have drawn up for the sick man. We may at once anticipate the year 1863, and suppose France has gone to war with England for an “ idea." Matters, moreover, are looking very serious on our side of the Channel. The Emperor is not yet established in Buckingham Palace, or the Garde Imperiale quartered in Knightsbridge Barracks; but the Parisian press talk of this as all but un fait accompli. Rentes are up, and consols are down -England has lost a great naval action, and the French admiral, like Van Tromp, may sail up the Channel with a broom at his mast-head. Tomorrow, as the Moniteur announces, the Emperor will run down to Cherbourg to witness a grand naval review, when the French fleet will tow their captured rivals into port. The French admiral who engaged the Royal Albert on one side and the Duke of Wellington on the other, till both ships struck their flags, will lead the procession with his prizes. The iron-plated Warrior and Black Prince were sunk with all hands, so they cannot grace the triumph; but a number of other vessels of all sizes will follow in the victor's wake, with the tricolor floating over the British ensign. After the fête,

the Emperor, it is whispered in London, will not go back to Paris, but proceed at once to Boulogne, to superintend in person the arrangements for embarking his army of invasion. A few swift steamers have set out from Glasgow and Liverpool, to convey orders of recall for our ships from all parts of the world. Two contractors, who built rotten gunboats, have been hanged at Blackwall. The London mob are searching everywhere for Mr Bright, but he has fortunately eluded their grasp-he is concealed in Lord Derby's dressing-room.

No

If England is ever invaded, it can only be after a catastrophe such as we have here imagined. The Emperor would never be so mad as to quit the shores of France until he had secured a command of the Channel for six weeks at least. As to seizing a moment when our fleet was out of the way, it is not possible in these days. Where could our fleet hide itself, to be beyond the reach of summons at the time of need? port of the Atlantic or Mediterranean is more than a fortnight's steaming from Land's End; and it would not suit the French to disembark in England, and then find their transports in possession of an English squadron. The Emperor had better be content with the Tuileries and Versailles, than reign for a month in Buckingham Palace, and pass the rest of his life in the Tower.

If Louis Napoleon forms the serious idea of invading England, he would not even pretend to secresy. Do what he might, it is simply impossible to carry on the vast preparations which would be necessary, without all Europe fathoming his design. The moment his concentration of troops and transports began to be matured, any attempt at secresy would merely clog his own movements, without throwing any dust in the eyes of the British Government. Our War Office should, and we have no doubt does, know the movements of every regiment in the French army just as well as our own. This may not be of much importance in peace time, but the practice should not be allowed to drop, as it keeps the machinery of our in

telligence department in good working order. The army of invasion might consist of 200,000 men, of whom 150,000 would cross in the first instance, and the remainder be brought forward to supply casualties; 150,000, more or less, may be taken as the limit beyond which it would scarcely be possible to keep up an army fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, and matériel. Of these, 100,000 (including 5000 cavalry and 200 guns) might by an extraordinary effort be passed over at once; they would require about 150,000 tons of shipping. We give a small proportion of cavalry and guns, as the country is not suited for them. With good arrangements, and under very favourable circumstances of weather, the whole could land in less than twenty-four hours. A few tumbrils or horses might remain on board, but the great mass could be ashore within that time. We have seen an artillery troop-ship completely cleared of horses and guns in eight hours, on to a beach threequarters of mile distant. At Old Fort the Allies commenced disembarking at 8 A.M., and had pretty nearly brought everything ashore by the evening of the second day, although there was a considerable surf. The 100,000 men once ashore, their first operation would be to intrench themselves in some position selected long before. The steamers, as they emptied, would go back for another cargo. Supposing the infantry took six hours to disembark, the steamers four hours to cross, two more to embark their second batch, and four hours to recross, the whole could be finished by the morning of the third day, allowing the sailors a few hours for repose. The French would try to dispense with most of the baggage and means of transport which an army usually requires, but there are certain necessary evils in the shape of impedimenta which no force in the field can entirely shake off. The soldiers would carry six days' provisions, no tents would be brought ashore. In their state of mad excitement, no complaints would be heard of the wet or cold as they lay down to sleep on the firm old sod of Kent; any privations would be cheerfully endured

except delay. By noon on the third day, 150,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 200 guns, would be drawn up in battle array, and the marshals, amid deafening shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" direct the heads of their respective columns on London.

So far it has been all plain sailing. We have no right to reckon the elements to help us. It might be that "He blew with His winds, and they were scattered;" that half the army might find themselves cut off, by a strong southerly gale and roaring surf, from all communication with their ships, and be compelled to lay down their arms; but we must not neglect human means, in the hope that Providence will a second time interpose in our favour.

We have here put aside our Channel fleet, and seen the invader safe ashore. Having thus given him a queen and bishop at the least, let us see what we can do with our knights and castles in the great game of strategy.

There are two courses open to the English general. He might assume the offensive, and force an action close to the coast, finishing the war at once, and saving all the southern counties and towns from pillage and misery; for this he must have not less than a hundred thousand disciplined men at his disposal. The second or defensive course of operations (which also applies to the case of our army losing a great battle near the coast) would be necessary, if numerical odds in regular troops (including militia and efficient volunteers) were so much against us, that the tremendous stake could not prudently be risked in a pitched battle until the enemy were far from their base, and the volunteers, acting in their rear, compelled them to detach large bodies to protect their line of operations, the main army being proportionately weakened.

"The safety and honour of the country," says Lord Overstone, "require that the integrity of the empire be defended on the sea principally, and in the first instance; and in the case of any serious mishaps there, we must be prepared to fight the battle upon the first inch of ground upon which a foreign foe sets his hostile

foot.' That the English general would adopt this course, if he could do so with any hope of success, there cannot be a doubt. The whole question is one of men, and this we shall discuss hereafter. The infantry would be forwarded by rail, the cavalry and artillery by road. As Crawford's light brigade marched sixty-four miles in twenty-six hours to Talavera, it would not be expecting too much from our mounted troops, or even foot-artillery, to make thirty miles a-day. Thus all troops within a radius of sixty miles from the point of invasion, and the infantry from a far greater distance, could assemble on the third day. Independently of the great sacrifice which a protracted war must entail, the plan of fighting at once presents great advantages in a purely military point of view. The moral effect upon our army of marching straight at the enemy wherever he landed must be admirable. We would deploy a few miles from the field of battle, and a member of the royal family, riding along the ranks, would raise the enthusiasm of the troops to an extraordinary pitch. The French would hardly be recovered from their sea-sickness, and, with the best arrangements, would still be in some confusion. They could not have any heavier guns than fieldpieces ashore, while we might hope to bring 18-pounders into action. They would be appalled at the suddenness with which their trespass was challenged, and, above all, a battle lost in such a position would be utter and immediate destruction. If left to themselves, they might form a strong intrenched camp, on which to retire after any disastrous action in the interior, but at the first nothing could be ready beyond a few fieldworks. Even a victory must paralyse the invader for many days. With 40,000 men weltering in their blood, and all their ammunition spent, they could be in no position to follow up boldly through an enclosed country.

If we were really invaded without warning, which some predict, although we cannot admit the possibility of such an occurrence, or if we were surprised through ourown negligence to take proper precautions after

:

warning had been given, or, worse than all, if we were defeated in a general action near the coast, the point to look to would be the safety of the metropolis. Of course there are different degrees of surprise, and the English army, unprepared when the enemy landed, might meet him half-way to London. Accordingly, some have proposed scarping the chalk range of hills, or forming an intrenched camp near Guildford, or elsewhere along that line. Due attention should be paid to the arguments in favour of this view from persons well acquainted with the country; but we cannot adopt it ourselves. A long line, such as would be afforded by scarping the hills, is generally a weak line. There are so many strong positions along this range of hills, that an intrenched camp, which the enemy would know of, and lay his plans to avoid, is unnecessary; and if we are ready to attack him, no defensive works or position is required. It is also quite uncertain whether an invader would land in Kent or Essex if he landed in Kent, he would certainly make a demonstration on Essex; if he landed in Essex, he would make a demonstration on Kent. But, for the sake of more easily considering the question, we take the southern counties as the field of operations. Leaving, then, any intermediate line between the coast and London as a matter of secondary importance, which can hardly be provided for beforehand, but must depend on the chapter of accidents, we come to the defence of London itself against an invader who had pushed up to its vicinity. Several projects have been put forward, all of which we desire to see investigated by a competent commission. One is to surround London with a series of detached redoubts, one mile apart, at a radius of five or six miles from St Paul's; but it certainly appears that these forts must be so masked by houses as to be generally useless. Another scheme has been very ably advocated in the Cornhill Magazineviz., to surround London with forts at Shooter's Hill, the Crystal Palace, Harrow, and other places. Previous to an expected attack, intermediate