The Limits of International LawInternational law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
From inside the book
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Page 4
... interests is not self-evident. All components of this assumption—that the state is the relevant agent, that a state has an identifiable interest, and that states act rationally to further these interests—are open to question ...
... interests is not self-evident. All components of this assumption—that the state is the relevant agent, that a state has an identifiable interest, and that states act rationally to further these interests—are open to question ...
Page 12
... self-interest without any regard to the action of the other state, we call it a coincidence of interest. There is a second possible explanation for the border. State A might be indifferent between one border and another border deeper in ...
... self-interest without any regard to the action of the other state, we call it a coincidence of interest. There is a second possible explanation for the border. State A might be indifferent between one border and another border deeper in ...
Page 13
... interested policies on the international stage. International law is, in this sense, endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest. This does not mean, as critics of our ...
... interested policies on the international stage. International law is, in this sense, endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest. This does not mean, as critics of our ...
Page 14
... interest to do so, they nonetheless have a moral obligation to comply with it against their interest. We argue, to ... interests of citizens, and that almost always produces a self-interested foreign policy. International Law Scholarship ...
... interest to do so, they nonetheless have a moral obligation to comply with it against their interest. We argue, to ... interests of citizens, and that almost always produces a self-interested foreign policy. International Law Scholarship ...
Page 28
... own (see Oye 1986; Martin 1992; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996).1 Coincidence of interest is also a possible ... selfinterest. Although an observer might applaud the outcome because the states refrain from belligerence (and therefore ...
... own (see Oye 1986; Martin 1992; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996).1 Coincidence of interest is also a possible ... selfinterest. Although an observer might applaud the outcome because the states refrain from belligerence (and therefore ...
Contents
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
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argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters