The Limits of International LawInternational law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 16
Page 11
... other (if, that is, each knew the other's interests and capacities completely), and if transaction costs were zero, their relations would adjust smoothly and quickly to the shock, and at time 3 there would be a new division of resources ...
... other (if, that is, each knew the other's interests and capacities completely), and if transaction costs were zero, their relations would adjust smoothly and quickly to the shock, and at time 3 there would be a new division of resources ...
Page 12
... other's territory, all things being equal. But each knows that if it tried to obtain more territory, the other state would resist, and a costly breakdown in relations, and possibly war, would result, making both states worse off. Thus ...
... other's territory, all things being equal. But each knows that if it tried to obtain more territory, the other state would resist, and a costly breakdown in relations, and possibly war, would result, making both states worse off. Thus ...
Page 29
... other's civilian fishing boats. They may conclude that a rule of customary international law prohibits the seizure ... other state. In the example above, state A becomes better off as a result of coercing B, and B is better off than it ...
... other's civilian fishing boats. They may conclude that a rule of customary international law prohibits the seizure ... other state. In the example above, state A becomes better off as a result of coercing B, and B is better off than it ...
Page 30
... other. But whereas the earlier example assumed that states lose 4 when they attack, because this strategy is a waste of ... other's vessels (that is, “cheat”) in period n, the victim will not cooperate in period n + 1 or in any future ...
... other. But whereas the earlier example assumed that states lose 4 when they attack, because this strategy is a waste of ... other's vessels (that is, “cheat”) in period n, the victim will not cooperate in period n + 1 or in any future ...
Page 33
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Contents
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters