The Limits of International LawInternational law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 36
Page
... 167 7 International Law and Moral Obligation 185 8 Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty 205 Conclusion 225 Acknowledgments 227 Notes 229 References 235 Index 253 This page intentionally left blank The Limits of International Law ...
... 167 7 International Law and Moral Obligation 185 8 Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty 205 Conclusion 225 Acknowledgments 227 Notes 229 References 235 Index 253 This page intentionally left blank The Limits of International Law ...
Page 6
... groups—elites, corporations, the military, relatives of dictators—have disproportionate influence on leaders' conduct of state policy. Even in democratic states, the institutions that translate individual 6 Introduction.
... groups—elites, corporations, the military, relatives of dictators—have disproportionate influence on leaders' conduct of state policy. Even in democratic states, the institutions that translate individual 6 Introduction.
Page 7
Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner. policy. Even in democratic states, the institutions that translate individual preferences into particular policies are always imperfect, potentially derailed by corruption, incompetence, or purposeful ...
Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner. policy. Even in democratic states, the institutions that translate individual preferences into particular policies are always imperfect, potentially derailed by corruption, incompetence, or purposeful ...
Page 14
... democracy, a form of government that is designed to ensure that foreign policy, including engagement with international law, serves the interests of citizens, and that almost always produces a self-interested foreign policy ...
... democracy, a form of government that is designed to ensure that foreign policy, including engagement with international law, serves the interests of citizens, and that almost always produces a self-interested foreign policy ...
Page 92
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Contents
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters