The Limits of International LawInternational law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 42
Page 3
... claim is premised on some undeniable but misunderstood facts about international law: that it lacks a centralized or effective legislature, executive, or judiciary; that it favors powerful over weak states; that it often simply mirrors ...
... claim is premised on some undeniable but misunderstood facts about international law: that it lacks a centralized or effective legislature, executive, or judiciary; that it favors powerful over weak states; that it often simply mirrors ...
Page 5
... claim that the state is losing power downward to smaller state units (for example, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia), to substate units (for example, the devolution movements throughout Europe), and to ...
... claim that the state is losing power downward to smaller state units (for example, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia), to substate units (for example, the devolution movements throughout Europe), and to ...
Page 7
... claim that the axioms of rational choice accurately represent the decision-making process of a “state” in all its complexity, or that rational choice theory can provide the basis for fine-grained predictions about international behavior ...
... claim that the axioms of rational choice accurately represent the decision-making process of a “state” in all its complexity, or that rational choice theory can provide the basis for fine-grained predictions about international behavior ...
Page 8
... claim that collectivities can have coherent preferences. But if this critique were taken seriously, any explanation ... claims of this literature. History is full of examples of state leaders committing errors while acting on the ...
... claim that collectivities can have coherent preferences. But if this critique were taken seriously, any explanation ... claims of this literature. History is full of examples of state leaders committing errors while acting on the ...
Page 10
... claims—for example, that international law does not shift power or wealth from powerful to weak states, and that states cannot solve largescale collective action problems through customary international law— that empirical evidence ...
... claims—for example, that international law does not shift power or wealth from powerful to weak states, and that states cannot solve largescale collective action problems through customary international law— that empirical evidence ...
Contents
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters