CHAPTER VI. EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. 74. General nature of emotions of the ludicrous. IN prosecuting the general subject of emotions, we are next to consider another well-known class, which are of a character somewhat peculiar, viz., emotions of the ludicrous. It is difficult to give a precise definition of this feeling, although the same may be said of it as in respect to emotions of beauty, that it is a pleasant or delightful one. But the pleasure which we experience receives a peculiar modification, and one which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in consequence of our perception of some incongruity in the person or thing which is the cause of it. In this case, as in many other inquiries in mental philosophy, we are obliged to rely chiefly on our own consciousness, and our knowledge of what takes place in ourselves. 75. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous. It may, however, assist us in the better understanding of them, if we say something of the occasions on which the emotions of the ludicrous are generally found to arise. And, among other things, it is exceedingly clear, that this feeling is never experienced except when we notice something, either in thoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is unexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this emotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by us of some new relations.-But then it must be observed, that the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in consequence of the discovery of such new relations merely. Something more is necessary, as may be very readily seen. Thus we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, presented with unexpected and novel combinations of the properties and qualities of bodies. But, whenever we disVOL. II.-I cover in those sciences relations in objects which were not only unknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludicrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprised. Again, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech imply in general some new and unexpected relations of ideas. It is this trait in them which gives them their chief force. But, when employed in serious compositions, they are of a character far from being ludicrous. Hence we infer that emotions of ludicrousness do not exist on the discovery of new and unexpected relations, unless there is at the same time a perception, or supposed perception, of some incongruity or unsuitableness. Such perception of unsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emotion a new and specific character, which every one is acquainted with from his own experience, but which, as before intimated, it is difficult to express in words. 76. Of Hobbes' account of the ludicrous. There has not been an entire uniformity on the subject of the emotions of the ludicrous. It would seem that Hobbes (HUMAN NATURE, chap. ix.) considered feelings of this kind as depending on a mc lification of mere pride in a comparison of ourselves with others to our own advantage. He says of laughter, which, when considered in reference to the mind, and independently of the mere muscular action, is nothing more than a feeling of the ludicrous, that it is "a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly." -To this notion of the origin of this class of our feelings there are some objections, viz.-(1.) In many instances we have the feeling in question when there is evidently no discovery of any infirmity, either in the witty person or in the subject of his wit, over which we can ourselves triumph with any good reason.-(2.) Further, if the doctrine which resolves the emotions of ludicrousness into a proud comparison of ourselves with other were correct, it would follow that the most proud and self-conceited men would be most inclined to mirth and sociability, which we do not find to be the fact.-According to Hobbes' notion of the origin of these feelings, we have only to go into the company of the most ignorant and stupid if we wish to be exceedingly merry. In such company we could not fail to be sensible of some eminency in ourselves, in comparison with the infirmities of others. We should here be in a situation corresponding to his definition of laughter, but there can be no doubt that multitudes would be but very little inclined to indulge that feeling in the midst of such associates. But while we cannot receive this writer's account of the feeling in question, we may undoubtedly be well agreed in respect to it, as far as this: That it implies a quick and playful delight of a peculiar kind, arising on the discovery of unexpected relations of ideas, and the perception or apparent perception of some incongruity. 77. Of what is to be understood by wit. The subject of emotions of the ludicrous is closely connected with what is termed Wit. This last-named subject, therefore, which it is of some importance to understand, naturally proposes itself for consideration in this place. In regard to WIT, as the term is generally understood at the present time, there is ground to apprehend, that an emotion of the ludicrous is always, in a greater or less degree, experienced in every instance of it. This being the case, we are led to give this definition, viz., WIT consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assemblage of related ideas of such a kind as to occasion feelings of the ludicrous.-This is done in a variety of ways; and, among others, in the two following. § 78. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects. The first method which wit employs in exciting the feeling of the ludicrous is by debasing those things which are grand and imposing; especially those which have an appearance of greater weight, and gravity, and splendour than they are truly entitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque. An attempt to lessen what is truly and confessedly serious and important, has in general an unpleasant effect, very different from that which is caused by true wit. And yet it is the case, that objects and actions truly great and sublime may sometimes be so coupled with other objects, or be represented in such new circumstances as to excite very different feelings from what they would otherwise. Among the various sayings of the Emperor Napoleon, none is more true than his very appropriate remark to the Abbe de Pradt, at the time of his secret flight on a sledge through Poland and Prussia, that there is but a single step from the sublime to the ridiculous. In the practice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there is a sudden and uncommon assemblage of related ideas. Sometimes this assemblage is made by means of a formal comparison. Take, as an instance, the following comparison from Hudibras: "And now had Phoebus in the lap And, like a lobster boiled, the morn We find illustrations of burlesque also in those instances where objects of real dignity and importance are coupled with things mean and contemptible, although there is no direct and formal comparison made. As in this instance from the above-mentioned book: "For when the restless Greeks sat down So many years before Troy-town, And were renowned, as Homer writes, In the first In these instances we have related ideas. there is undoubtedly an analogy between a lobster and the morning, in the particular of its turning from dark to red. But, however real it may be, it strikes every one as a singular and unexpected resemblance. In the other passage, it is not clear that Butler has done anything more than Homer in associating the renown of the Greeks with their boots as well as their valour. But to us of the present day the connexion of ideas is hardly less uncommon and singular, not to say incongruous, than in the former. § 79. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects. The second method which wit employs in exciting emotions of the ludicrous is by aggrandizing objects which are in themselves inconsiderable. This species of wit may be suitably termed mock-majestic or mock-heroic. While the former kind delights in low expressions, this is the reverse, and chooses learned words and sonorous combinations. In the following spirited passage of Pope, the writer compares dunces to gods, and Grub street to heaven. "As Berecynthia, while her offspring vie Behold a hundred sons, and each a dunce In this division of wit are to be included those instances where grave and weighty reflections are made upon mere trifles. In this case, as in others, the ideas are in some respects related, or have something in common; but the grouping of them is so singular and unexpected, that we cannot observe it without considerable emotion. My galligaskins, that have long withstood The winter's fury and encroaching frosts, By time subdued (what will not time subdue !), It may be proper to make the remark in this place, which is applicable to wit in all its forms, that many sayings, which would otherwise have appeared to us witty, lose no small share of their intended effect whenever we are led to suspect that they were premeditated. Hence an observation or allusion, which would be well received in conversation, would often be insipid in print; and it is for the same reason that we receive more pleasure from a witty repartee than a witty attack. Our surprise at the sudden developement of intellectual acuteness is much greater at such times. 80. Of other methods of exciting emotions of the iudicrous. But it is not to be supposed that wit is limited to the methods of assembling together incongrous ideas, which |