more directly, and to a much greater extent, under the power of others than their happiness. The sources of happiness, both mental and bodily, are to a great extent in ourselves; and although they are susceptible of increase through the instrumentality of the kind offices of others, yet not ordinarily in a very great degree. But it is in the power of any individual, who is thus evilly disposed, to plunge others, not one or two merely, but even whole neighbourhoods, into misery. The principle of Pity, which is called forth not only in the actual, but also in the anticipated prospect of suffering, aids, in connexion with other causes, in keeping under proper restraint any tendency to a wrong exercise of this important power. It not only exercises the important office of preventing suffering, by operating, as it were, in anticipation, but it visits, watches over, and relieves it when it has actually occurred. And in this last point of view particularly, as well as in the other, it commends itself to our notice and admiration, as a practical principle eminently suited to the condition and wants of man.

187. Of the moral character of pity.

It is an opinion sometimes expressed, that an affection so amiable, and generally so useful as that of Pity, cannot be otherwise than virtuous. It is not wonderful, when we take into view the interesting character of the affection, that such an opinion should be entertained; but we cannot regard it as strictly correct. It is well understood, so much so as not to be considered a matter of doubt, that this affection operates in the first instance instinctively. And it is easy to see the intention of nature in instituting this form of its action. In a multitude of cases where we can relieve the sufferings of our fellowmen, our assistance would come too late if we acted on the hesitating and cautious suggestions of reason. An instinctive action, therefore, is necessary. And, so far as the action of the principle is of this kind, it must be obvious that it is neither virtuous nor vicious.

But there is another view of this subject. The principle of sympathy may be checked in its exercise when it is too intense, or increased when deficient, under the VOL. II.-T

influences of a deliberate and voluntary effort. And, under these circumstances, its action may have a voluntary character, being right or wrong according to the circumstances of the case. It is right when it is subordinated to the requisitions of an enlightened conscience, but otherwise is wrong. And it may be wrong by excess as well as by defect. If, for instance, we happened to see a person severely but justly punished under the authority of law, we might exercise pity in his behalf. But if, under the mere impulse of pity, we should be led to attempt his rescue, in violation of the rights and interests of society, such an exercise of it would be wrong. Again, we can hardly fail to pity the wretchedness of the emaciated beggar who asks for our assistance; but if we are well persuaded that the bestowment of alms will only tend to encourage those vicious habits which have led to this wretchedness, it may become a duty both to check our sympathy and to withhold our aid.— (See § 174-176.)

At the same time, we do not deny that we may very justly draw inferences in favour of the virtuousness of that man's character in whom this interesting passion is predominant. And we say this, because, although sympathy does not necessarily imply virtuousness, yet, in point of fact, it is seldom the case that they are at variance with each other. They generally run in the same track, acting harmoniously together.

188. Of the affection of gratitude.

Another distinct modification of that general state of the mind which is denominated love, is the implanted or connatural affection of GRATITUDE. Although this, like the other benevolent affections, includes an emotion of pleasure or delight, combined with a desire of good or a benevolent feeling towards the object of it, it nevertheless has its characteristics, which clearly distinguish it from them. We never give the name of gratitude, for instance, to this combination of pleasant and benevolent feeling, except it arise in reference to some benefit or benefits conferred. Furthermore, GRATITUDE involves, as the basis or occasion of its origin, not only the mere fact

of a good conferred, but of a designed or intentional benefit. If the benefit which we have received can be traced to some private or selfish motive on the part of the person from whom it comes, we may be pleased, as we probably shall be, with the good that has accrued to us; but shall cease, from the moment of the discovery of his motive, to entertain any gratitude to the author of it. Gratitude, therefore, can never be excited within us, except in view of what is in fact, or is supposed to be, true, unadulterated benevolence.

Different individuals manifest considerable diversity in the exercise of grateful emotions. There are some persons who exhibit, in the reception of the favours conferred upon them, but slight visible marks of grateful regard; others are incapable of such a passive reception of benefits, and are strongly affected with their bestowal. This difference is probably owing, in part, to original diversities of constitution, and is partly to be ascribed to different views of the characters and duties of men, or to other adventitious circumstances.

The affection of gratitude, under whatever diversities of aspect it may show itself, at different times and in different persons, is undoubtedly to be regarded as, on the whole, one of the interesting and ennobling traits of human nature. It imparts a feature of loveliness, a mingled aspect of amiability and justice to the human character which it might not otherwise possess. It is also practically important, inasmuch as it affords an indirect, but still a decided encouragement to deeds of benevolence. And although there are some in whom the principle, if it exists at all, exists in too slight a degree, yet, in general, the man who has received what he knows to be a wellmeant kindness will not withhold this tribute of nature. There are some interesting lines of Southey, which Bishop Heber, on the occasion of his leaving England for India, has quoted as descriptive of his own personal experience, that may be appropriately introduced in connexion with this subject.

"I've heard of hearts unkind-kind deeds

With scorn or hate returning.

Alas! the gratitude of man

Has oftener left me mourning."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.-LOVE TO THE SUPREME BEING.

◊ 189. Man created originally with the principle of love to God. In order to preserve the other principles of human nature in the position which the great Author of that nature has assigned to them, and to render their action just in itself and harmonious in its relations, we have reason to believe that there was originally, in the human constitution, a principle of love to the Supreme Being. This affection, it may well be supposed, was entirely analogous, both in its nature and its operations, to the other Benevolent Affections, possessing, like them, a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. It differed, however, greatly in the degree or intensity of its action; being rendered to its appropriate object, as might be expected from the unspeakably high and holy nature of that object, with all the energy of which the mind was capable. That man must have been created originally with such a principle of love, overruling and regulating all the subordinate principles, we think must be evident, in the first place, from the considerations furnished by Analogy.

In all the departments of the mind, so far as it has hitherto passed under our examination, we have seen evidences of contrivance and wisdom; everything has its place, adaptations, and uses; and nothing, so far as we can judge, is done imperfectly. If it were necessary in this inquiry to put out of view the Intellect, so wonderful in its adaptation and its resources, we should hardly fail to find, in the distinct departments of the Sensibilities, ample illustrations and proofs of this remark. The Instincts, which naturally arrest our attention first, have obviously their appropriate place and office; and, although they rank lowest in the enumeration of our active principles, are yet indispensable. If man were constituted physically as he is at present, and yet without the Appetites, the next higher class of the principles involving de

sire, there would obviously be a want of adaptation between his mental and physical arrangements. The Propensities, also, as we advance still upward, have each their sphere of action, their specific nature and uses; and are adapted with wonderful skill to the necessities of man, and to the relations he sustains. The same remark, and perhaps in a still higher sense, will apply to the Affections. As a father, man has a natural affection for his children, that he may thus be supported in the discharge of the arduous duties he owes to them; as a child, he has naturally an affection for his parents; and as man simply, he is evidently constituted with a degree of love for his fellow-man.

When we consider the relations which men sustain, still more important than those which are the basis of the principles which have been mentioned, are we not justified in saying, on the ground of Analogy, that there must have been originally in the human constitution a principle of love to the Supreme Being? If there was not originally in the mental constitution such a principle as love to God, was not the structure of the mind in that respect obviously at variance with what the Analogy of its nature in other respects requires? If, from the urgent necessities of our situation, there must be strong ties of love binding together parents, and children, and brothers; if these ties must reach and bind, with some degree of strictness, all the members of the human family, on what principle can the doctrine be sustained, that man was originally created without an implanted love to that Being who is infinitely more and better to him than an earthly brother or father?

190. That man was originally created with a principle of love to God, further shown from the Scriptures.

In the second place, we have great reason to believe, from the testimony of the Scriptures, that man was, in the first instance, created with the distinct and operative principle of love to his Creator. At the creation, it is worthy of notice, that everything which came from the hands of the great Architect was pronounced to be GOOD. But if man, raised from nothingness into existence, furnished with high powers of thought and action, and supported