as an attribute of human nature, extinct; but has a real, although, compared with what it ought to be, a feeble existence. Nor is the benevolence of Heathen or Pagan nations limited, as some may be led to suppose, to individual instances and solitary acts, such as have been referred to. There are traces among some unchristianized nations (however cruel, owing chiefly to their mistaken systems of religion, their conduct may appear in some things) of permanent institutions of benevolence. In the recently-published life of the missionary Swartz (chap. xi.), we find the following incidental remark, which throws light upon the state of things in India. Speaking of the territory of Tanjore, the writer says, " Its capital, bordering on the Delta of the Coleroon and the Cavery, is wealthy and splendid, adorned with a pagoda, which eclipses in magnificence all other structures in the south of India; and exceeding, in the number of its sacred buildings and charitable institutions, all the neighbouring provinces."

Among other facts, kindred with those which have now been alluded to, it is well known that, when any portion of the human race have been subjected, by fire, war, famine, the pestilence, or some convulsion of nature, to great affliction, an interest is felt and efforts are made in their behalf in other countries. As an illustration of what we mean, it will suffice to remark, that when, some years since, the Greek nation, and, still more recently, the inhabitants of the Cape De Verd Islands, were in a state of extreme want, although they were a remote people and scarcely known among us, a number of vessels, in both cases, were sent from this country to their assistance, loaded with provisions at the expense of private individuals. Many facts of this kind might be mentioned, which are obviously inconsistent with the idea that man is indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, much more that men are naturally hostile to each other.

180. Other remarks in proof of the same doctrine.

In the fourth place, the principle of HUMANITY is requisite, in order to render human nature at all consistent with itself. We have, for instance, implanted within us the

desire of Esteem, which is universal in its operation. But why should we be so constituted as naturally to desire the esteem of those, whom, at the same time, we naturally hate or are indifferent to? There is no question that Sociality, or the desire of society, is connatural to the human mind; but is it presumable that men are so created as earnestly to covet the society of others, when, at the same time, those whose company they seek are, by the constitution of nature, the objects of entire indifference or of decided aversion? We have within us, as we shall have occasion to notice hereafter, the distinct principle of Pity or Sympathy, which prompts us both to prevent suffering and to relieve it when it exists; a principle which no one supposes is designed by nature to be limited in its operation to the immediate circle of our relatives and friends, but which has men as such for its object, and the wide world for the field of its exercise. But on what grounds of wisdom or consistency is it possible that nature should prompt men to relieve or prevent the sufferings of others, whom she also imperatively requires us to regard with sentiments of hostility, or, at least, with unfeeling coldness? Furthermore, our conscience requires us to treat our fellow-men, in all ordinary cases, with kindness, and we experience an internal condemnation when we do not do it; which would, at least, not be the case if we were the subjects of a natural hostility to them. -It is on such grounds, we assert, that human nature, in order to be consistent with itself, requires a principle of good-will or love to man, considered simply as possessing a kindred origin and nature.

Add to these considerations the fact that the lower animals, as a general thing, evidently discover an affection for those of their own kind. In some cases there are antipathies existing among those of different tribes; but never, it is believed, as a characteristic of those of the same species. And why should a barrier, either by the mere negation of love or the presence of actual hostility, be raised between man and man? A condition of things which, in a very important respect, places him below the brutes.

181. Objection from the contests and wars among mankind.

We are aware that the frequent wars which have existed among mankind may be brought forward as an objection against these views. But, although wars may be considered as in some sense incidental to the operations of human nature in the present state of things, yet it does not follow, and is not true, that war is the natural state of man. The simple fact is, that mankind, owing to a concurrence of unpropitious circumstances, have been placed in a wrong and most unfortunate position in respect to each other, which they at length begin to perceive.

In the first place, nations have frequently been led into wars in consequence of a misapprehension of the actual state of things. They have been made to believe (we do not undertake to say under what influences or in what way) that they are bound to maintain what are called national interests at any expense whatever. In making an estimate of the hazard and injury of these interests, as preparatory to a state of war, they have frequently laboured under great mistakes. In other words, in placing an estimate on their own interests, they have not allowed enough for the peculiar situation, the passions, and the interests of others. Either from being too intensely occupied with their own concerns, or from wanting suitable means of information, or from hasty and inaccurate judgments on the facts that have come to their notice, they have supposed others to be prompted by a deeper hostility towards them than was actually the case. they have too frequently acted upon this erroneous supposition. If they had been so situated as to understand each other better, the natural sentiments of kindness would have gained the ascendency, and they would not have committed the great error of placing the supposed claims of their country above the claims of mankind. This error they begin in some degree to perceive. But this is not all.

And

In the second place, nations have frequently been plunged into war, and have shed the blood of other nations, when the great mass of the people have never been consulted in respect to it; or, if they have been consult

ed, their feelings have been disregarded. Owing to the prevalence of monarchical and despotic forms of government (a state of things which is undergoing a rapid modification), the destiny of nations has often been placed in the hands of individuals, who were too ignorant, prejudiced, or unjust to sustain a responsibility so immense. The result has frequently been, that the most trifling circumstances, operating upon minds of such a structure, have plunged nations into wars, when, at the same time, the great body of the people entertained towards each other entirely friendly sentiments. We will illustrate what we mean by a single instance out of hundreds, perhaps we may say, thousands of others. Frederic of Prussia (Frederic the Great, as he is commonly designated in history) entered into a war with Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary and Bohemia. This king afterward wrote a history of the war. In the manuscript history, as it was originally written, he gave the following

concise statement of the motives under the influence of which he engaged in it. "I had troops entirely prepared to act; this, the fulness of my treasury, and the vivacity of my character, were the reasons why I made war on Maria Theresa, queen of Hungary and Bohemia." In a few sentences afterward he added more explicitly some other motives, which are to be united with these. "Ambition, interest, and a desire to make the world speak of me, vanquished all, and war was determined on. It certainly cannot be pretended that such a war as this is a proof that the Prussians, Bohemians, and Hungarians possess an implanted or connatural enmity to each other. The probability is, that they were as much taken by surprise, and as much astonished, as the whole civilized world were at its occurrence. A war, existing under such circumstances, may prove that the rulers are perverse and cruel, but does not necessarily prove this in respect to the people generally.-It will, of course, be seen, that things of this nature are to be taken into consideration, before we are at liberty to say, in opposition to the arguments which have been brought forward, that man is by nature, and instinctively, the enemy of his fellow-man.

* See the Memoir of Voltaire, appended to Condorcet's Life of Voltaire.

§ 182. The objection, drawn from wars, further considered. But there is a third view of this objection which remains to be taken. If we could arrive at the truth on the subject before us, it would undoubtedly be seen (and the distinction in respect to all inquiries into the active principles of human nature is frequently an important one) that, in times of national war, men fight together as corporations rather than as individuals; and while, in battle, they shoot at the man who happens to be opposite to them, they subdue the voice of pity and conscience by the mistaken and illusive consideration, that the wound is aimed, not so much at the poor bleeding individual as at the state or nation. If they could thrust aside this idea, and separate the man from the political corporation to which he belongs, it is beyond doubt that they would reach forth the hand of kindness, bind up the wounds of their victim, and breathe their consolations into his dying bosom.

In consequence of early associations, and what are supposed to be conflicting national interests, it is not an uncommon thing for Englishmen to say that they hate the French nation, while the same persons will frequently admit that they have no hatred to individual Frenchmen; but, on the contrary, have a regard and love for those with whom they happen to be acquainted. We maintain, therefore, that a hatred against nations is not necessarily a hatred against humanity. And men begin to understand this. They make a broader distinction than they were wont to do formerly between the government and the people, between the responsibilities of public policy and the responsibility that attaches to private individuals. And, accordingly, in times of war, if the action of armies in the vicinity of each other is suspended by a truce, nothing is more common than to see both officers and soldiers reciprocating acts of hospitality and friendship. Acting as men, and with the natural feelings of men, they sympathize in each other's personal sufferings, and endeavour to render each other happy. And yet, acting in their national capacity, and as members of their respective political corporations, they will be found, in a few days after, coolly putting each other to death. The fact