Meuse by the 29th, but part of it re-crossed the river next day, to give aid to the routed 5th corps, in its precipitate retreat from Beaumont, and it suffered heavily, and caught the contagion of defeat. The first corps only remained intact, and this composed of the soldiers of Wörth and the best part of the Army of Châlons, was moved on the 30th across the Meuse, a large detachment being sent on to Carignan, on the roads leading to Montmédy and Metz, for Macmahon, it is said, had not lost confidence. Three-fourths, therefore, of the French army were already beaten and almost breaking up, before a general battle had been fought, and, in the meantime, the Army of the Meuse was rapidly advancing towards its intended prey, while the large masses of the Third Army were being moved in the same direction, along the roads between the Aisne and the Meuse, and extending over the tracts between.

Macmahon, at this moment, had reached Carignan, and, so strange are a gambler's illusions, he believed, it is said, that the Army of Châlons could still successfully make its way to Metz. This, it may be affirmed, had already become impossible, and the Marshal was on the verge of destruction, for the Army of the Meuse was stopping his advance, the Third Army was closing on his rear; he was still more than fifty miles from Metz, and the besieging army of Prince Frederick Charles lay between him and the army of Bazaine. At the intelligence of the defeat of three-fourths of his army, the Marshal hastily retraced his steps, and gave orders, by the night of the 30th, for a general movement upon Sedan, an ancient fortress of the fourth order, standing amidst plains and hills on the banks of the Meuse. By the morning of the 31st, the whole Army of Châlons was congregated on the appointed place of junction, but it presented a mournful and ominous aspect. The troops of the 1st corps still bore themselves well, but those of the three beaten corps were in a state of disorder, and almost of mutiny; the surrounding country was strewn with trains, waggons, guns, and small arms abandoned and thrown away, and the army was half famished and seething with discontent. Nevertheless, the Marshal had

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*

* Compare Wimpffen, Sedan, p. 137. La Journée de Sedan, by Ducrot, p. 41. Macmahon Enquète Parlementaire.

still a chance of safety had he possessed the resource of a great captain, such as Napoleon exhibited at the Beresina. On the 31st, the chief part of the Army of the Meuse was upon the eastern bank of the river, or making its way to effect the passage, that is, it was far to the south of Sedan; the mass of the Third Army, if drawing near, was still nearly a march from the fortress, and the Army of the Châlons could still march westwards, if with difficulty, and threatened on its flank by the enemy. On the other hand, the fortress of Mézierès was half a march to the west of Sedan, and a fresh corps, the 13th, under General Vinor, had reached the place, hastily despatched from the capital. Had Macmahon, therefore, at this supreme crisis, given a few hours rest and food to his troops, and then, forming a bold decision, moved with the bulk of his army on Mézierès, abandoning part of his material and his worst soldiery, and breaking down the bridges on the Meuse, he probably would have effected his escape, assailed and harassed as he might have been on his way. This movement-conforming to the principle of war that beaten army should seek its supports-had been already thought out by Ducrot, the skilful chief of the first corps,* and much an abler man than the Marshal, and it was indicated on the 31st by the ill fated Emperor, who had followed the army on its march from Châlons, and who, to do him justice, had utterly disapproved of the fatal resolution of the 28th of August. Had Macmahon taken this step, at the last moment, he might have lost 20,000 or 30,000 men; he might have been severely worsted on his march; but he would, it is likely, have saved three-fourths of his army, and in that event, he would have reached Mézierès, joined Vinoy, and made good his retreat on Paris.

Resolution and insight were, however, wanting to France in that miserable hour of her destiny. The precious hours of the 31st were lost; a Council of War, that plain sign of weakness, was held; and the Marshal decided, not on retreating, but to accept battle where he stood at Sedan. Little doubt can exist that

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he had no notion the Germans were near in irresistible force; but he did not even take the precaution of breaking down the bridges on the Meuse, which separated him from the hostile armies; and he made no arrangements in the event of a defeat, though his intention was still to try to break out by Carignan, and if successful, to press on to Metz. He took a position, like that of Wörth, strong against an enemy not greatly superior, but strategically as bad as could be conceived, for a lost battle meant being forced into Belgium; and he arrayed his army on a semicircle of uplands overlooking Sedan and the adjoining valley. His best troops, the 1st and the 12th corps, held the Givonne and the villages on the stream, for this was the direct way to Carignan; the routed 5th corps filled the space in the rear; and the 7th corps occupied the front to the west, covered by the villages of St. Menges, Fleigneux and Floing, by the great bend of the Meuse hard by, and by the fortifications of Sedan, and guarding the important heights of Illy, the real key of the position as a whole. Macmahon stood boldly on the ground of vantage, and he exclaimed-so bitter is the irony of fate—that he would 'not brook to be shut up like Bazaine, and driven hemmed in upon a fortress.' † These fatal dispositions, in any case unwise, marked by vacillation, perhaps by despair, and to be explained only on the assumption that the Marshal was unaware of the numbers of his foes, gave Moltke the opportunity he had sought for some days. He had not struck Macmahon down, before the Meuse was reached, as it appears he had expected; and, on the morning of the 31st, he had only hoped to drive him across the Belgian frontier, and so to compel him to cease to resist. His adversary, however, was now standing at bay, his army drawn up around Sedan, where the loss of a battle would mean ruin; and the army of Châlons was already in the toils. Orders

*

Wimpffen Sedan, p. 145. ‘Le Maréchal croyait pouvoir porter de soixante a soixante dix mille homnes la masse totale des forces ennemies de ce côté dela Meuse.'

+In Campaigne de 1870, jusque, 1er September, Par un officier de l'armée du Rhin.' Prince Bibesco, p. 105: 'Il dit que son intention n'était pas de s'acculer a une place forte comme le Maréchal Bazaine, mais de

manoeuvrer.

were given on the 31st for a great night march; the army of the Meuse was to advance to the Givonne and to assail Macmahon on his eastern front; the Third Army, which had been moving all day, but had its outposts only on the Meuse, was, leaving considerable detachments behind, to cross the river and close on the western front, preventing the means of escape to Mézierès; and should the heights of Illy be once carried, the uniting armies would surround their enemy and hurl him headlong into the valley below, where nothing could avert his complete destruction. It was a master-stroke admirably planned and delivered.

Sedan, a day of woe and mourning for France, was fought on the 1st of September, 1870. The First Bavarians, detached from the Third Army, attacked Bazeilles, a suburb of the town, to the south-east, in the early dawn; and the dense masses of the Army of the Meuse marched against the villages and the course of the Givonne. The resistance of the French was fierce and determined, and for some time the Germans made no impression on positions well defended and of natural strength. An unfortunate incident had occurred: Macmahon, riding forward to this part of the line, was struck down by the splinter of a shell; and he handed over the command to Ducrot, who, we have seen, had made up his mind that a retreat on Mézierès was the only chance of safety. Ducrot at once gave order for a general movement, in that direction, by the heights of Illy, but he was superseded in his post by Wimpffen, an officer, who had been sent from Paris, to replace Macmahon, in the event of his fall, and who, like the Marshal, thought the best course for the army of Chalons was to break out by Carignan. The only hope of escape was thus lost to the French, and confusion was caused by these counter orders,, even though probably the result of the fight, as conducted by Wimpffen, could not have been different. By degrees the pressure of superior force told decisively on the hard pressed French as the Guards came into line with the army of the Meuse: the positions on the Givonne were stormed, and the defenders were forced back into the lowlands beyond. Meantime a destructive tempest of war had been gathering upon the north-western front of Macmahon's battle, and his doomed army. The Third Army, swiftly and admirably moved, had crossed the Meuse by the early morning,

and two of its corps, the 11th and the 5th, the Wurtembergers being detached to the left, to bar a possible retreat on Mèzierès, were directed along the great bend of the Meuse, to close on the imperilled enemy. The 7th corps of Douay made a gallant stand, and furious charges of the French cavalry, aware that the toils were already laid, shed a last ray of glory on the arms of France. But the assailants were in overwhelming numbers, the tremendous fire of the Prussian batteries, brought up in masses, defied resistance; St. Menges, Fleigneux and Floing were seized, and the 7th French corps was driven by degrees, confused with the beaten 5th, into the valley below. The Third Army and the victorious Guards ere long joined hands on the heights of Illy, and a far extending circle of steel and fire-500 guns bore on the routed enemy-was drawn round the perishing French army. A few thousand fugitives made their escape, hunted through the woods, by the Prussian horsemen; but the mass of the French became a dissolving horde, crushed to atoms by the merciless German batteries. After the battle had become a mere massacre, Napoleon III. very properly ordered the white flag to be raised from the walls of Sedan.

Sedan was a tragic close to one of the most reckless and desperate efforts ever made in war. Had Macmahon had a well organized army, and been a general of a high order, he might, not improbably have crossed the Meuse before his enemy had time to stop him, but even so, he could not have reached Metz, which must be taken to have been his object, giving his adversary credit for ordinary skill. With the bad and feeble army he led, the enterprise was the very extreme of rashness; strategically imprudent, in any case, it was, under existing conditions, hopeless and fatal; and when we recollect that it was attempted, when there was the alternative of a safe retreat on Paris-a move which, if made, would beyond question have made the issue of the war different-it cannot be too severely condemned. It must be borne in mind, too, that Macmahon had an opportunity to abandon this insensate project: he could have fallen back on Mézierès on the 28th; and his persisting in his march when he well knew that the German armies were closing around him, was conduct admitting of no excuse. The course he adopted can be