tion of which this phrase is the symbol. The strength of Voluntaryism lies in the belief that the ends of Christianity are not moral ends. From this brief account of the disturbances which have interrupted the original partnership between the two elementary powers of society, some augury may be collected as to their possible re-approximation. We have found them drawn into contrast with each other by historical differences of origin in their present form; by doctrinal differences as to their ends; and practical differences as to their means. The effects arising from the first of these may fairly be expected to wear out. The accidental conditions under which Christian institutions on the one hand, and the political arrangements of modern Europe on the other, developed themselves into their present form, offer now but the mere inert resistance of custom to the permanent force of natural human sentiment: and must insensibly yield up their influence to the new social tendencies in which that sentiment will ever re-assert itself. Then, the doctrinal schemes by which the ends of Church and State have been brought into contrariety either as to their nature or as to their extent, are, in our estimation, false. Neither have the sacerdotal claims which would add a supernatural function to the moral duties of the Church, any foundation in Christianity: nor is the Lutheran disregard of Law, which would withdraw from the Church the moral aims of the State, anything but the exaggeration of a truth which leads to no such consequence. There remains, as the only real and essential distinction between the two institutions, a practical difference in their means. Coercion must be habitually employed by the civil society against the violator of its laws, irrespectively of the of fender's own sense of justice; by the religious society, never. The only punishments it can invoke in this latter relation are such as may be in accordance with the pledged conscience of the transgressor, constituting an outward expression of his remorse, and partaking of the nature of penance: or else, they must amount to simple expulsion, an act which may have no doubt a penal effect, but is intended as merely declaratory of a cessation of the bond of connection. The ground of this distinction is found in the very idea of the two associations. Both aim at the governance of life by moral law; but with this difference: the Church proceeds on the assurance that all men are conscious of that law; the State, on the observation that some men violate it. The Church assumes their anxiety to serve it; the State, their reluctance. The Church, looking round on the sphere of human temptation, speaks out in the vow, "We will not ;" the State, in the command, "Thou shalt not." The Church therefore, from its very nature, relies upon the feeling of moral Reverence; the State, on the dread of Retribution. If all its proper purposes could be accomplished by the former, nothing would remain for the latter to achieve: but conscience failing to prevent evil in its spiritual beginnings, fear must interpose to arrest its external development. The State is thus the dernier ressort to the Church,-society's forlorn hope for the check of moral ills. And hence it is, that it must never fail; or else, being an expression of the community's strength of Will, it loses its right, no less than its might while the Church, representing the common aspiration towards a perfection that cannot cease to be owned as divine, remains unimpaired through all failures. It is obvious that the characteristic use of coercion by the State, though a peculiarity in the nature of its means, must introduce a limitation into the system of ends at which it aims. There is no human good, no element of social perfection, which it might not fitly attempt to realize, if there were reasonable hope of success. But wielding no instruments except the hope of public reward and the fear of public punishment, it is unable to reach the whole of life; and large provinces of duty must remain beyond its vigilance and control. Without attempting to draw any exact boundary around its proper realm, which indeed must vary with the historical conditions by which it is environed,-it is clear that it can take cognizance only of external actions, susceptible of attestation; that it cannot regulate acts of simple prudence and imprudence; that, even of injuries, only those can be brought within its power which admit of definition, and of something like admeasurement, both as to their intent and as to their effects. Though, however, these limitations might be carried further, we altogether deny that they reduce the business of the State to the "protection of body and goods." We believe that a govern ment which refuses to attempt more will soon be unable to accomplish this: and that when it seems to move with success within these narrow bounds, the order of which it boasts is bequeathed from an age when it aspired to a nobler power, and is sustained by sentiments lingering from that better time. The superannuated village schoolmaster may retire into the dignity of village constable; and when he sees the decent habits, the quiet security, the neighbourly respect, prevailing in the place, not a cabbage stolen from the gardens, nor a bit of washed linen threatened in the fields; the old man may indulge in complacent reflections on the potency of his office, and see in all this the terrors of his staff. He forgets that he taught the alphabet before he vindicated the law; that the men and women in the cottages were, a few years ago, the boys and girls on his old school-bench; that the kindly thoughts around him were born in the play-ground, or the cricketgreen; and that the reverent sense of Christian hope and duty, first awakened by his own serious voice, are the real guardians of the peace and order he admires. A State that, on the appointment of some philosophy more easy than wise, is in a condition to retire into official "protector of body and goods," must have had some more respectable occupation in its youth. On the whole, we should say, as the general result of the previous reflections, that the CHURCH is that system of organized agencies by which men in society may be led towards compliance with the whole moral law, through reverence and that the STATE is that system of organized agencies by which men in society may be led to comply with such parts of the moral law as are within the reach of public reward and punishment. Besides the Church proper, including the arrangements (1) for worship, (2) for education, there are a number of unorganized agencies of the same class they comprise the whole set of influences proceeding from higher minds upon lower, whether in domestic government, in the exercises of charity, in literature, or in social intercourse. And besides the State proper, including (1) the legislative, (2) the judicial, (3) the executive systems, there are also a number of unorganized agencies of the same class: they comprise the whole set of prudential motives, whether from physical pleasure and pain, from public opinion, or from expec : tation of future reward and punishment. It is evident, that if the Church, in this largest sense, were perfect in its action, the State functions would never come into existence, but always stand at zero: that if, on the other hand, the Church had no action, the State functions would become infinite, and cease to be possible: and that every success of the Church is a burthen taken from the State. What then is the conclusion to be drawn as to the mutual relation of the two institutions? Manifestly this since a Society-in-State has no ends of self-government, which the same Society-in-Church does not aim to anticipate and realize in a better way, the former has the deepest interest in aiding the experiment of the latter. In principle, then, we see no ground for denouncing the interposition of civil support on behalf of educational and religious institutions. If it be competent to the sovereign authority to spend the resources of the country in punishing wrong-doers, it seems perverse to say that the same authority may not engage itself in preventing their existence. Unfortunately, however, the abstract conclusion which we have stated lies at a vast distance from the practical questions which create the ecclesiastical controversies of the present day; and affords but an incipient clue to guide us through their intricacies. The State authorities may have the right to aid the Church; but suppose they cannot find it; that the national sources of Reverence lie among the unorganized agencies, and have deserted the visible ecclesiastical system; suppose that the citizens, unconscious of the devout sentiments which unite them at heart, are so sensitive about the formal beliefs which separate them in understanding, that a common recognition by the sovereign power threatens an implacable strife; suppose it impossible to gain assurance that the thing aided is a Church and a national Church-that is, does really inspire reverence for the obligations of citizenship;-what then is to be done? Can the right take effect? or, for want of the proper historical conditions, must it be inactive till better times? We shall not attempt to resolve these questions now; anxious, in tracing our path through the theory of Polity, to admit no disturbance from the sceptic laugh, and fanatic fears, and party rage, that confuse every entrance on its practice. ART. VIII.-NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS. I. Illustrations of Unitarian Christianity, consisting chiefly of practical and moral applications of its principles. In a series of Discourses. By William Hincks, F.L.S. 12mo, pp. 324. London: J. Chapman. 1845. Adequately to review these Sermons would require a preliminary discussion of the religious philosophy of our nature. They proceed upon views of our moral constitution, and of the relations of God to the soul, which to us appear philosophically irreligious. They represent Conscience to be entirely constructive; and God to have no living contact with the soul. Our closest intercourse with God is not that of spirit with spirit, but only the inward reception and practical application of Principles; there is nothing of natural or original inspiration for each soul of Man; the sense of right and wrong is the result of education; and Christ does not aim to place us in his own relations to the Father. Thus it is denied that we have "any natural perception of the beauty of virtue and the odiousness of vice," (p. 294,) and it is maintained that any belief in divine influences, in direct communication with God, "supposes an interference with the natural course of causes and effects," miracle, however constantly repeated. (P. 116 and 131.)— Sermons cannot possibly afford the depth and fulness of treatment required for this great theme, the spiritual philosophy of our Nature;—nor could we present our own views on these subjects in the shape of strictures on a Volume of Discourses by one of the most respected Ministers in the Unitarian Denomination, without feeling that we had chosen both an unsuitable and an ungracious occasion for the exposition of a system of religious thought. Yet it would be impossible to review these Discourses without continually differing with their doctrines, and giving opinions upon points which yet we should have to leave unexamined. When we take up this discussion, as we hope -a |