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fascinating period that we have in English. Alfred de Musset's Lorenzaccio is, however, far more terrible, because there the horror is moral wholly, and never physical, as too often in Webster.

There is something in Webster that reminds me of Victor Hugo. There is the same confusion at times of what is big with what is great, the same fondness for the merely spectacular, the same insensibility to repulsive details, the same indifference to the probable or even to the natural, the same leaning toward the grotesque, the same love of effect at what

ever cost; and there is also the same impressiveness of result. Whatever other effect Webster may produce upon us, he never leaves us indifferent. We may blame, we may criticise, as much as we will; we may say that all this ghastliness is only a trick of theatrical bluelight; we shudder, and admire nevertheless. We may say he is melodramatic, that his figures are magic-lantern pictures that waver and change shape with the curtain on which they are thrown; it matters not, he stirs us with an emotion deeper than any mere artifice could stir.

OUR ONLY DAY.

BY COATES KINNEY.

WERE this our only day,

Did not our yesterdays and morrows give
To hope and memory their interplay,
How should we bear to live?

Not merely what we are,

But what we were and what we are to be,
Make up our life-the far days each a star,
The near days nebulæ.

At once would love forget

Its keen pursuits and coy delays of bliss,
And its delicious pangs of fond regret,
Were there no day but this.

And who, to win a friend,

Would to the secrets of his heart invite
A fellowship that should begin and end
Between a night and night?

Who, too, would pause to prate

Of insult, or remember slight or scorn,
Who would this night lie down to sleep with hate,
Were there to be no morn?

Who would take heed to wrong,

To misery's complaint or pity's call,

The long wail of the weak against the strong,

If this one day were all?

And what were wealth with shame,

The vanity of office, pride of caste,

The winy sparkle of the bubble fame,
If this day were the last?

Ay, what were all days worth,

Were there no looking backward or before-
If every human life that drops to earth
Were lost for evermore?

But each day is a link

Of days that pass and never pass away;
For memory and hope--to live, to think-
Each is our only day.

IT

THE ITALIAN ARMY,

BY G. GOIRAN, GENERAL STAFF COLONEL.

TALY, lying partly in the Mediterranean Sea, and with on one side France, a sister but rival nation, and on the other the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where so many interests of its Slavic, German, and Latin races mingle, seems by its very geographical position to be destined to participate more or less directly in any conflict in which other European powers may become involved.

The history of the Italian army connects itself not only with that of the Italian revolution, but also, and more especially, with the history of the army of the former kingdom of Sardinia.

It was, in fact, the kingdom of Sardinia that took the lead of the Italian movement for independence, and gave it the support of its arms in 1848 and 1849, and then again in 1859, carrying it to happy consummation through its diplomacy and the campaigns of 1859, '60, 61, '66, '70. It was during those campaigns that the Sardinian army, steadily increased by new accessions from all parts of Italy, became transformed into the Italian army.

In the time previous to the French invasion of 1796-7, and in that which followed from 1814 to 1859, all the principal states into which Italy was politically divided maintained, it is true, standing armies, but these were only partially recruited among the citizens, hired foreigners forming in most cases the principal bodies or the main nucleuses.

One state only, namely, the one governed by the house of Savoy, was an exception to this rule. That state always kept up a standing army, small but well trained and disciplined, in which the native element had the predominance. Ever since the time of Emmanuel Philibert, all the Dukes of Savoy, who became later on Kings of Sardinia, wisely made the army an object of their special attention and constant care. It was their solicitude for the army that, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, prevented Italy from becoming entirely a prey to Austria, Spain, or France. Victor Amadeus II., and more especially his son, Charles Emmanuel III., whose reign extended over forty-two years, saved Italy from such a fate. His successor, though for forty-four years-1748-92- undisturbed

by war, did by no means neglect the army. So that when, in the time of the French revolution, the soldiers of the republic tried to pass the Alps, they met with the most stubborn resistance on the part of the small but valiant army, and after five years only succeeded in evading it through the strategy of the greatest general of modern times. Then, at the first blast of the Napoleonic tempest, the armies of all the states of Italy, including that of the republic of Venice, were scattered. However, some of the Sardinian regiments were allowed to keep up their traditions, even after their aggregation to the French army, in which they distinguished themselves on more than one battle-field. After 1814, Austria, then mistress of the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, forced the inhabitants of those provinces to do military service in the interior territory of her empire, mingling them with the troops of her Slavic and German subjects. The minor Italian states had but poorly organized military establishments. Of the two more important states, viz., the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and that of Sardinia, the former maintained an army not indeed deficient in technical skill, but lacking military spirit, and its masters, the Bourbons, inflicted upon it, as well as upon the people, the shame of surrounding themselves with foreign troops as a kind of body-guard. The kingdom of Sardinia, on the contrary, following up, after 1814, the military traditions which had been interrupted by French invasion, reconstituted its army with elements entirely national, and organized and disciplined it so well that in the campaign of 1848-9 it fought with honor and valor worthy of better success.

It was natural and just, then, that in the history of the Italian revolution the honor of raising the flag of independence and unity in 1859, and of constituting the nucleus of the army of resurrected Italy, should have been reserved to the army of Savoy, which had generously shed its blood, first to save Italy from French invasion (1792-6), and then again in 1848-9 to free her from the yoke of Austria.

By the organization of 1862 the military establishment of the kingdom of Italy was

constituted thus: 80 regiments of infantry of 4 battalions each; 40 battalions of bersaglieri; 19 regiments of cavalry, each of 6 squadrons; and artillery and engineers in due proportion. This army, comprising in time of war about 250,000 men formed in 20 divisions, served in the campaign of 1866, the result of which was the accession to the kingdom of the Venetian provinces evacuated by the Austrians. Four years later it was partly mobilized for the military action which, directed by General Cadorna, ended in the capture of Rome and the overthrow of the temporal power of the Popes.

The time had now come for improvements in the organization and the system of mobilization of the army.

The experience of 1866 and 1870 had made it apparent to all that the principle theretofore followed of making the army division the normal organic unit for the three main arms, and then allowing army corps to be formed of almost any number of divisions, did not work satisfactorily. That unit was not in correspondence with the mode of division of the territory; on the other hand, some of the army corps were not army corps in the modern sense of the word, but veritable armies. Now, War-Minister Ricotti, following in this the system adopted by Germany, constituted the army normally on the basis of army corps, each of two or three divisions. It is true that the division of the territory did not yet exactly correspond with that of the forces, as the territory was divided into only 7 general commands, and 16 territorial commands of division, while the forces could be established in 10 army corps and 20 divisions; nevertheless, the great military units in time of peace were permanently formed nearly in the same way as they ought to be in time of war. In the event of mobilization it was provided that to every 2 divisions there should be added as supplementary troops at the disposal of the respective commands 1 regiment of 4 battalions of bersaglieri, and one or two regiments of cavalry, besides some field batteries. An aggregate of army corps was to constitute an army. different armies might consist of two, three, four, or more army corps, according to the different tasks assigned to them severally.

The

The mobilization of the army had not proved satisfactory in either the cam

paign of 1866 or that of 1870; General Ricotti, therefore, to make it so, created the districts. The territory was first divided into 45 districts, and afterwards into 62, and at the head of each of them was placed a superior infantry officer, to be assisted by a smaller or greater number of subaltern officers, and disposing of one or two infantry companies to do the service of the district. To the district was assigned the whole business of enlisting and receiving the recruits, of mobilizing the men recalled from furlough, and of giving the instruction. By the creation of a new corps, that of the Alpine infantry, a very important addition was given to the infantry. Originally (1872) the Alpine comprised no more than 15 companies, but in 1873 they were increased to 24. They were distributed along the frontier mountains that separate the Italian Kingdom from France, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary. Their contingents were and are recruited in the regions of the Alps, and the instruction so specialized as to fit them as well as possible for the defence of the Alpine passes.

Not less attention was given by Ricotti to the other arms. He increased the cavalry by creating a 20th regiment; reorganized the artillery into 10 field regiments of 10 batteries each, with 8 pieces to each battery; and the garrison artillery into 4 regiments of 15 companies each. The pontoniers and the sappers, who were included in the artillery, were instead attached to the engineer corps. The services of the artillery and of the engineers were, together with the service of forts, placed under the supervision of the general command of some artillery and of a few engineer corps. Finally, special corps were created for both the sanitary and the supply departments.

Ricotti's reorganization marked undoubtedly a great improvement over the preceding one. It increased to a notable degree the efficiency of the army in general for all war purposes; it better systematized all the special technical field services, secured a strong defence of the Alpine passes by the creation and organization of the Alpine troops, and lastly improved all the arrangements and services necessary to the quick and orderly mobilization of the army. Italy could now count on 300,000 combatants of the first line.

We have said combatants of the first line, for under Ricotti's administration there came into existence also a secondline army by the institution of the active militia (“Milizia Mobile"). In fact, provision was made, for the first time in Italy, to the effect that the military districts should have in readiness all the means and materials necessary for the formation of 108 battalions of infantry, 15 of bersaglieri, and of 24 companies of Alpine troops. So likewise each of the 10 field artillery, and each of the 4 garrison artillery regiments, as well as the engineer regiments, was furnished with all the elements required for the formation respectively of 3 field batteries, 3 garrison artillery companies, 1 pontonier and 8 engineer companies.

Of the local militia ("Milizia Territoriale") General Ricotti laid the foundation under the law June 7, 1875, which he obtained from the national parliament. By that law compulsory military service was extended to all able-bodied citizens, unless expressly excluded, up to the age of forty years. Under the same law General Ricotti instituted also a special militia for the defence of the island of Sardinia, forming it with those soldiers, native of the island, who, after three years' service in the regular army, were sent home on unlimited furlough.

Generals Lamarmora and Fanti were the founders and Ricotti the reorganizer of the Italian national army. Let us now see how this army, which was already considered one of the foremost in Europe, has been further improved since 1875.

The so-called progressive party having in 1876 obtained the ascendant in the Italian parliament, General Luigi Mezzacapo, a man of deep and broad mind, was called to succeed Ricotti as war minister. He accepted, in the main, the military organization adopted by his predecessor, and set about developing and perfecting it.

He increased the territorial army corps commands to 10, and the divisional commands to 20, corresponding to the 10 army corps to be formed in the event of war. The districts were established on a more solid basis, and their number raised to 88, whereby mobilization was rendered more rapid.

Through the modifications introduced by General Mezzacapo, the military estab

lishment of Italy was put in better harmony with the fundamental principle of the systems of the principal modern armies, requiring that the troops of the first line, at least, be so organized in peace-time as to correspond exactly to the war foot establishment. Besides this, better facilities for mobilization were provided, the first defence of the frontiers was strengthened, and the organization on war foot of the second line secured.

But the political relations between France and Germany on one side, and between Austria and Russia on the other, the new colonial policy of the principal European powers, especially after the conditions prescribed by the Treaty of Berlin, and the changes of a protective character in the commercial policy, particularly of France, placed Italy in a position that appeared full of danger. Furthermore, the state of the land boundaries, the enormous extension of the seacoasts, the constant improvements in the means of attack, which rendered the defences of both the Alps and the coast precarious, the geographical configuration of the country, and the limited means of communication, which rendered the mobilization and concentration of troops slow

all these things together made it plain that the ten permanent first-line army corps were inadequate to the defence of the country. The necessity of increasing the first-line forces, then, became imperative, all the more as it was not certain that the second-line corps could be formed promptly enough to be ready to take the field at the needed time. These were the reasons for the new modifications of the military system in 1882 by the minister of war, General Ferrero.

Under this system the field army was increased by 2 active army corps; the Alpine and the cavalry arms were also both increased, and furnished, the former with mountain artillery, the latter with horse batteries. The first-line army on war foot comprised 400,000 combatants, perfectly armed and equipped. The active militia was also considerably augmented.

As to the local militia, efficient measures were taken which secured the formation in case of war of 320 battalions of infantry, 30 of Alpine troops, 100 companies of garrison artillery, 30 of engineers, 13 of sanitary and 13 of supply troops.

The division of the territory of 1887 was modified in accordance with the number

of the active army corps of the first line which could be formed; consequently there were instituted 12 territorial army corps and 24 territorial divisional commands, besides a military command in the island of Sardinia.

But the system of 1882-6 had one great fault, viz., the army corps were quite deficient in field batteries, and the regiments of the arm had a very slow and difficult task to perform, being charged with the mobilization of 10 permanent batteries of 8 pieces each, and of 3 active militia batteries, these also of 8 pieces. Indeed, if the field artillery, following the example of the other European armies, had been increased in each army corps, their task would have become altogether too slow and too difficult.

This was the principal reason which caused the constitution of the national army to be modified anew in 1887, making it what it has been ever since.

The royal Italian army, as at present organized, consists of the active or firstline army, the active militia ("Milizia Mobile"), and the local militia ("Milizia Territoriale"). The first-line army is composed of corps which are kept permanently in active service. The active militia is under arms in peace-time only during the period of instruction, and occasion ally as the maintenance of public order and peace may require. In war-time it may be called out to co-operate with the permanent army in any military operations.

The local militia is likewise kept under arms in time of peace only temporarily, for the same purposes and under the same circumstances as the active militia. In time of war it has the special destination of defending the cities and fortified places of the kingdom; but in case of urgent need or foreign invasion it also may be called upon to aid in any field operation.

The organization of these three great sections of the military establishment is as follows:

Permanent army: I. A general staff of 163 general officers in peace-time, taking charge of the different permanent commands. II. A staff consisting of a commanding general, who is the chief of the army staff, of 2 assistant generals, of 68 colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, and of 84 captains. To these are to be added 120 infantry captains, 6 clerks,

and several other assistants. III. The royal carabineers. IV. The infantry. V. The cavalry. VI. The artillery. VII. The engineers; and lastly, the sanitary corps, the commissariat, the accountant, and the veterinary corps.

The staffs of all the various arms and corps of the permanent army are in peacetime composed of officers in permanent service, whose number in each arm or corps and whose rank are determined by special law. However, the distribution of the officers among the different services of one and the same arm, or any one corps, may be changed every year through the Budget law.

A hasty sketch of the constitution of the several arms and corps on both the peace and the war footing will suffice to show the degree of efficiency of the permanent army.

A large

The carabineers were instituted in January, 1861, by bringing together into one body all the military corps which had charge of the public peace and order in the different provinces of the kingdom. This body was organized on the same plan as the one formerly existing in Piedmont, from which it received the largest contingent, the uniform, regulations, discipline, and the corps pride. It is formed of men chosen with the utmost care, and is greatly esteemed for its noble traditions. In time of peace it looks to the public order and peace, and during war it furnishes to the commands of the several armies, army corps, or mobilized divisions some sections of both its foot and horse men for police and guide services. portion of the carabineer corps, being replaced in the local service by carabineers recalled from furlough, is formed into battalions of picked infantry, and is moblized for field operations. The carabineer corps comprises 1 general command, 11 local legions for police service, 1 school legion ("allievi carabinieri "), furnishing the instruction to the recruits of the arm. The entire force consists of 3 general officers, 58 superior officers, 532 inferior officers, 40 medical and accountant officerstotal number of officers, 633; 21,000 foot carabineers, 3888 horse carabineers-total number of troops, 24,888. The troop horses number 3758, of which 3518 are the carabineers' own property. All the officers are mounted. The foot carabineers mobilized in battalions constitute a somewhat heavy but select and very solid infantry.

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