that desperate and unequal fight. I have seen scarcely any mention of them, and yet the One Hundred and Twenty-second, One Hundred and Twenty-third, and One Hundred and Tenth Ohio were all in the thickest of the fight, charged the enemy repeatedly, and came out in good order, but with heavy loss. Why, the whole three regiments are not now as large as any one of them before the fight. Colonel Washburn, of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Ohio, deserves all credit for the good order with which he brought off his regiment. While you might have seen some colonels and majors straggling hither and thither, the whole field and staff of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Ohio came through as they should. Thus it will be seen that Ohio did take some part in the fight. The One Hundred and Sixteenth Ohio had three companies completely destroyed; while the other three Ohio regiments took the most conspicuous places in the fight. J. M. D. LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Explanatory of the Evidence before the Court of Inquiry relative to the Evacuation of Winchester, Va., by the Command of Major-General R. H. Milroy. To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States: SIR: Under Special Order No. 346, from the War Department, a court of inquiry was detailed, by your authority, "to inquire into the facts and circumstances connected with the recent evacuation of Winchester." This order was subsequently so amended as to make it the duty of the court to report the facts without expressing any opinion upon them. of Major-Gen. Schenck, that on Saturday night he did attempt to give me the proper orders; but as the lines had been cut, the despatch was not received. Gen. Schenck testifies distinctly that I did not disobey any of his commands. In the same order above quoted, Gen. Schenck further says: "I doubt the propriety of calling in McReynolds's brigade at once. If you should fall back to Harper's Ferry, he will be in part on your way, and cover your flank. But use your discretion as to any order to him." In the exercise of this discretion, I ordered Col. McReynolds, on Saturday morning, June thirteenth, to join me at Winchester. At this time there was no information of the approach of Lee's forces, nor any thought of evacuating the post. The object was to concentrate, in order to repel an attack either of the forces under Imboden, Jones, and Jenkins, or of Stuart's cavalry, then expected to appear in the valley. Colonel McReynolds left Berryville on the morning of the thirteenth, and, by a circuitous route of thirty miles, reached Winchester about ten o'clock that night. In the mean time, at about six o'clock that afternoon, I learned from prisoners and deserters that Ewell's and Longstreet's corps of Lee's army were in front of me. This was the first intimation I had received of the fact, and it brought to my mind, for the first time, the consideration of the necessity of evacuating the post. To have left with my forces before the arrival of Col. McReynolds would have exposed the whole Third brigade to capture, and would certainly have brought me into conflict with the enemy in the absence of one third of my command. Thus divided, my forces would have been destroyed or captured in detail. The enemy had followed Colonel McReynolds in force, and on the same day had attached our forces at Bunker's Hill, on the Martinsburgh As I was in command of the forces which evacuated Winchester, my reputation and usefulness may be affected by the result of this in-road. vestigation. Right and justice, therefore, require My line of communication with Major-General that you the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States, should read the brief remarks which I now have the honor to submit, in explanation of the testimony taken before the Court of Inquiry. The evacuation of Winchester took place about two o'clock, on the morning of Monday, June fifteenth, 1863, and "the facts and circumstances" connected with that event were all comprised within the three preceding days, beginning with Friday, the twelfth. Whether Winchester was or was not an important post, was a question not submitted to my judgment. It was determined by my superior officer, whose orders it was my duty to obey. The orders received by me on Friday morning, June twelfth, 1863, from Major-General Schenck, my immediate commander, were as follows: "You will make all required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the mean time. Be ready for movement, BUT AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS." This emphatic command irresistibly implied that, in case of necessity, further orders would be given; and it now appears, by the testimony Schenck was not cut until some time on Saturday evening. Down to that moment he could at any time have ordered me to retreat, and might have communicated any information which he deemed important. As his orders of the day before were not changed in any particular, while it was all the time in his power to have modified them, I had the continuing command of my superior officer to remain at Winchester, at least down to the time when communication by telegraph was cut off. Every thing is necessarily left to the discretion of a commander when suddenly and unexpectedly surrounded on all sides by the enemy in overwhelming force, and with no orders adapted to the emergency. Colonel McReynolds found the Berryville road occupied by the enemy on Saturday, so that he could not march directly to Wincester. He had been followed also on his circuitous route, and the enemy was probably on the Martinsburgh road. It is doubtful whether I could have marched by either of those roads on Saturday night without a serious engagement under great disadvantages. But even if I could have done so, I did not and could not know why General Schenck had withheld any orders during ter, at the earliest possible date, till Sunday mornFriday and Saturday, while the telegraph was in ing, and then it would have been improper to do operation. Was it not reasonable for me to sup- so by daylight. I waited, therefore, till Sunday pose that General Hooker would intercept the night, and then called a council of war. We left march of Lee's army, or that General Schenck at two, in the morning of Monday; and as we left would in some way provide for relieving me? in darkness, so we had to do so in quietness, as No one could have anticipated, as I certainly did the one was as essential as the other to effect our not, that Lee's army could have escaped the army escape. We, therefore, left every thing that went of the Potomac, and penetrated the Shenandoah on wheels. Weighed against the lives of my valley as far as Winchester, without timely no-brave men, they were less than nothing. tice of it being given to me through General Schenck at Baltimore. It is in proof that my small force of cavalry was most actively and industriously engaged in reconnoitring; but it was impossible for them to push their reconnoissances beyond the Blue Ridge, and they had no suspicion of the presence of any other enemy but those under Imboden, Jones, and Jenkins, whom they had long watched and thwarted in the valley. I do not suppose it necessary to defend the act of finally retreating from Winchester, although I had no orders to do so. It is now apparent to all men, that the alternative was between retreating or remaining to surrender. The only matter upon which there can be any inquiry, is as to the manner of the retreat-the energy, the watchfulness, the skill and success with which it was conducted. The severe fighting of Sunday, vigorously maintained through the whole day, had checked, Under these circumstances, I deemed it wise if not crippled the enemy, and had doubtless servand prudent to await the developments of Sun-ed to mislead him as to my designs. He fully exday, the fourteenth. If I should not during that pected to find me in Winchester on Monday mornday receive orders, or be relieved, I knew that ing. Having succeeded in making this impression the enemy would be compelled to reveal his pur-upon him, and thus allayed his suspicions as well poses, and in some measure to mass his forces, as his vigilance, that time was the most favorable so that I could then best determine how and when to cut my way through his lines. Accordingly, on Sunday night, after the enemy had massed his forces, and made an attack from the west, a council of war was held by my order; and it was therein resolved that the Martinsburgh road, being commanded by the guns of the forts, and being apparently open, offered the best route for a retreat upon Harper's Ferry, and that it was indispensable for the safety of the command to evacuate the place during the night, or in the early morning. But the enemy's pickets were within two hundred yards of our lines; and in order to escape without his notice, it was necessary to abandon the guns and wagons, which could not have been brought away, without so much noise in descending the rocky hills from the forts as to defeat the indispensable purpose of secrecy. The precautions adopted by the council of war were successful. We eluded the enemy, who surrounded us on three sides, and marched four and a half miles before encountering any of his forces. Then, after a sharp engagement of one hour, we succeeded in passing the enemy, and most of my forces escaped. A single view of the situation will make the matter too clear for a moment's doubt. that could possibly have been selected for the retreat. No skill or precaution on my part, however, could have enabled me to evade the enemy where we met him on Monday morning. He was posted in a position to command both roads, at the point where the one leading to Summit Point diverges from the Martinsburgh road. Here we fought him until we heard a signal gun in the direction of Winchester, and two sections of the enemy's artillery, on the road from that place, were seen in hot pursuit of us. I then ordered the march to be continued, and the larger part of my forces went in different directions from the field of battle. The result of this engagement would have been far different if my orders had been obeyed, or my example followed. When the retreat commenced, we anticipated the attack from the rear. But as soon as I heard the firing in front, I hastened to the scene of action. In passing along the line I found Colonel McReynolds some distance in advance of his brigade, and ordered him to return and hurry up his forces to the front. It was not my intention to continue the engagement longer than was necessary to enable all my forces to pass away. While I was actively engaged in front, I sent back no less than three different orders for the Third brigade to come up; but neither of my On Friday, I had the plain, clear, direct, and aids could find Colonel McReynolds on the field, positive order of General Schenck, commanding nor any part of his command, except the First me to remain at Winchester, and await further New-York cavalry. In consequence of this failorders. There was no known change of circum- ure-waiting for the Third brigade to come upstances, after I received that order, until Satur- I held my forces in the fight longer, and lost more day afternoon, when the prisoner was taken. But men of the First and Second brigades than would at that time the Third brigade, under a signal have been necessary, if my orders had been promptgiven in the morning, was on the march to Win-ly obeyed. The regiments of the Third brigade chester, and reached that place at ten o'clock at night. They had then marched thirty miles on Saturday, and required all Saturday night for rest and refreshment. I could not have left Winches were separated, and though they were not in the engagement, they lost as many as the other brigades, and escaped by different routes from the scene of this action. Whatever irregularities and losses occurred during the march are attributable to the failure on the part of this brigade to respond to my commands. You will find the testimony sufficiently clear on this point; although, I regret to say, the court denied my request to summon and examine two of the colonels commanding regiments in the Third brigade, who allege that their commanding officer gave them no orders, and was not seen by them on the field. Notwithstanding this unfortunate occurrence at the critical moment of my retreat, by which my plans were somewhat thwarted, out of the six thousand nine hundred brave and effective men who started from Winchester, upward of six thousand have been ascertained by General Schenck to be now on duty. Upward of two thousand men have been paroled by the enemy; but these consist of the sick and disabled who were left at Winchester, in addition to those who were taken in the engagement on the morning of the retreat. A great misapprehension has existed in the public mind, and has been promoted by reckless correspondents of the public press, in reference to the amount of public property abandoned and lost on the retreat from Winchester. You will see by the testimony that the stores on hand were extremely small. My ammunition was nearly exhausted, the men were on half-rations, and a large portion of the wagons had already been sent away in pursuance of my orders, to be prepared for evacuation. It was my intention, and orders were given accordingly, to keep always on hand five days' supply of ammunition and subsistence. Fortunately the latest requisitions of my ordnance officer, for some reason unknown to me, had not been filled, and even this small amount was saved to the Government. the same kind, will be found appended to this letter. These papers were all indorsed and returned to me, as will be seen, with a refusal to hear the testimony. If it was admissible for the General-in-Chief to introduce his telegrams, charging me at some time with having been on a stampede," it was certainly legitimate for me to call that officer, and inquire the occasion to which he referred, in order that I might prove, as I certainly could, the falsity of his information. The imputation conveyed in the words of Gen. Halleck, and perpetuated in the record of this Court, is highly disreputable to a soldier; and the most obvious principles of justice require that I should be permitted to refute it. If the substance of these telegrams be not a proper subject of investigation by the Court, then the introduction of them was calculated to serve no other purpose but to create a prejudice, and do me a wrong which I could have no opportunity to repel. In another telegram put in evidence before the Court, I am charged with "madness" by the General-in-Chief, for sending part of my forces on a certain expedition in the valley. I could easily show that this "madness" would have resulted in the capture of the enemy's camp, with a large amount of supplies, which had been left exposed by the withdrawal of his forces into Western Virginia. But this affair had no connection with the evacuation of Winchester, and the incorporation of this telegram into the record is calculated unjustly to injure my reputation, without serving any public purpose. In another telegram, likewise made a part of the record, I am charged with a failure to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Harper's FerIf the investigation made by the Court of In-ry, when I never had any command there; also quiry has not been full and satisfactory upon all with incompetency in this respect, when, with points, it is not from any deficiency on my part. my forces at Winchester, I successfully guarded Anxious to lay open the whole transaction, even that road for six months, so that during that peto its minutiæ, I earnestly urged the Court to sum-riod the enemy never touched it, within the mon and examine many other officers, who bore a limits of my command. conspicuous part in the retreat from Winchester, Gen. Halleck's telegram, of the fifteenth June, as well as others who could throw light on the gen-containing another ungenerous thrust at me, eral subject. The Court refused to grant my application, doubtless because they were satisfied that I had made my justification complete. I think I may assume that no Court would refuse to hear the testimony of some of the principal actors in the events under examination, so long as any room for censure remained against him who desired additional evidence. So far, I may have no right to complain of the decision of the Court; but in another rejected application, I think I have. At the commencement of the investigation, immediately upon the organization of the Court, the General-in-Chief of the army sent in, as testimony, copies of several telegrams, addressed by him to Major-General Schenck, in which he speaks of me most disrespectfully and unjustly, and with imputations not true in fact. I asked the Court to summon Major-General Halleck; and as they required a statement of what a witness was expected to prove, I filed the paper, which, with others of might well have been omitted from the record, inasmuch as it was written after the evacuation, and could not have the slightest bearing on the investigation. But it is quite as legitimate as the others, its only possible effect being to throw into the scale against me the weight of General Halleck's personal enmity. On the twenty-seventh of June last, I was placed in arrest by order of the General-in-Chief. No charges have been preferred against me, unless the splenetic and censorious telegrams of that officer, above referred to, can be considered such. Since the commencement of this war, no officer of my rank has been subjected to the indignity of an arrest, without the exhibition of charges to justify it. I have not yet been relieved from this arrest; and the peculiar phraseology of the articles of war seems to render it doubtful whether the expiration of the time limited for making charges operates to give me that relief. I entered the army at the beginning R. H. MILROY, Major-General U. S. V. of the war; and, until my arrest, I have never chester was of far greater value than the amount asked for leave of absence, nor been one day off of any losses incurred in the defence and evacuduty. It has been my greatest pleasure continuation of that post. ously and faithfully to perform a soldier's part in defence of my country. I confess the humiliation I feel, that the first period of rest allowed me has been one of implied censure, if not of disgrace. I am very confident that an impartial examination of the record of this Court will show nothing to justify the treatment I have received. But, at all events, I have the proud satisfaction of knowing that I have not failed, in any instance, to give my best energies of mind and body to the service. Even in the defence and final evacuation of Winchester, (although, with timely and correct information, I would have acted differently,) yet I am sure that the holding of that place, and the engagement there, gave us the information we could not otherwise have obtained, developed the plans and purposes of the enemy, checked and delayed his advance into Maryland for three days, and by these means enabled the army of the Potomac to follow with timely resistance, and to prevent the loss of millions of property, which would otherwise have fallen into his hands. The inconsiderable loss suffered at Winchester was a trifle compared with these advantages; and so far from feeling that I am chargeable with any error in judgment, or failure in duty, I shall ever, in my own bosom, enjoy a conscience without self-reproach, and wholly void of any just offence to my country. I have caused this letter to be printed for your convenience, and ask the privilege of publishing it, together with my official report made to Major-General Schenck, which has not yet been permitted to be made public. I have the honor to be, with great respect, JOHN JOLLIFFE, FRED. P. STANTON, August 22, 1868. by the order under which it is acting to enter into the investigation suggested by the within com Indorsed: The Court does not feel authorized munication. April 29, 1863. ROBERT N. SCOTT, Captain Fourth U. S. Infantry, Judge-Advocate. To the Court of Inquiry convened by Order Major-General Milroy supposing that the change of order under which the Court is acting may in some measure modify its views of the testimony to be received, again asks that Major General Hooker may be summoned to give evidence upon the points already stated. He also asks that Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief of the army, may be summoned for the purpose of explaining the telegrams introduced at the beginning of the examination, in which he suggests that Major-General Milroy is on "another stampede." It is proper that the General-in-Chief should be required to say when and where Major-General Milroy was guilty of stampeding. Other similar insinuations are contained in the said telegrams, which a due regard to the military reputation of General Milroy requires should be explained. It is also desired that Major-General Halleck shall testify as to the failure to communicate information of the approach of Lee's army, with peremptory orders for the evacuation of Winchester. September 3, 1863. R. H. MILROY, Major-General U. S. Vols. The facts expected to be proved by this witness are: First, That he communicated information of the enemy's movements toward the valley of Virginia as early as the twenty-eighth May last to the General-in-chief, and suggested the propriety of sending General Stahl's cavalry to that valley. Secondly, The value and importance of the check given to the enemy by the holding of Winchester during the twelfth, thirteenth, and eral Milroy. This Court of Inquiry does not confourteenth of June, and its effect in saving Har-sider that the order under which it is acting risburgh, and probably other important cities of authorizes the investigation suggested by this the Union. It is believed that the testimony will ROBERT N. SCOTT, Captain Fourth U. S. Infantry, Judge-Advocate. clearly show that the aforesaid holding of Win Indorsed: Respectfully returned to Major-Gen communication. September 3, 1863. Doc. 12. REBEL RAID INTO INDIANA. in their route after leaving the river. Here they demanded food of the citizens, and threatened to burn the town in case the demand was not complied with. The citizens were not prepared to accommodate such a large number of guests, and the delay in the preparation of dinner incensed the rebels so that they fulfilled their threat of setting the town on fire. As soon as they had done so they moved off, and by the exertions of the citizens a portion of the village was saved from destruction. NEW-ALBANY, INDIANA, June 20, 1863. LAST week a raid was made into Elizabethtown, Kentucky, by what was then supposed to be a force of guerrillas. They did little damage except to plunder the stores, and help themselves to whatever portable property struck their fancy. Horses suffered particularly, they being a selfmoving article of plunder. Medicines, wearing apparel, and boots and shoes were also much in From Paoli the rebels moved toward Orleans, demand. After a stay of a few hours in the town keeping up their system of stealing as they prothe rebels moved off to the southward, and it was ceeded. Shortly after leaving Paoli they made a supposed they had retired to the Cumberland halt of several hours for the purpose of gathering River. They stated that they belonged to Captain in horses from places some distance from the Hind's company of the Second Kentucky cavalry, road. News of their movements had spread like and were attached to Morgan's brigade. They were well armed with sabres, carbines, and revolvers, and uniformed in the regular uniform of rebel cavalry. They were estimated from eighty to one hundred and thirty strong-probably much nearer the former number. wildfire, and their numbers were magnified to a wonderful extent. The home guard in all the larger towns had been assembled, and made ready to meet them. Two companies from Mitchell, about one hundred strong, started as soon as they could be got together, and reached Orleans about one o'clock yesterday morning. At that time the rebels had completed their halt, and were moving After leaving Elizabethtown nothing more was heard from them until, on Thursday last, word was brought that five hundred rebels were cross-toward Orleans. Hearing of their advance the ing the Ohio, near Leavenworth, sixteen miles below this point. Hardly had the news become circulated before another messenger arrived confirming the statement of the crossing, but placing the rebel strength at three instead of five hundred. The Ohio is now quite low, and at Leavenworth it spreads out for nearly a mile in width and becomes very shallow. It is at this point that boats frequently run aground during low stages of water. Mitchell home guard moved out from Orleans to meet them. About three o'clock they encountered them three miles out from Orleans, and a brisk skirmish ensued. For fresh troops, the home guards fought well, but their enemies had the advantage of long service. The home guards were repulsed, with a loss of three wounded and twelve captured. The skirmish lasted about an hour. The encounter with the force from Mitchell convinced the rebels that their movements were known, and they beat a retreat in the direction of Salem, without attempting to enter Orleans. Shortly after the fight they met Mr. Williams, a respectable elderly gentleman, well known in Orleans County. Mr. Williams was riding a fine horse, which the rebels coveted. They ordered him to dismount and give up his horse, and on his refusal to do so he was shot through the head and left dead in the road. After crossing the river the rebels made no delay, but pushed rapidly forward for a raid into the river counties. Crawford, Orange, and Washington counties lay before them, and into these they pushed as rapidly as possible. They moved in a compact body, throwing out scouts on each side for the double purpose of guarding against surprise and bringing in any good horses that might be found. This portion of Indiana abounds in good horses, and from indications the rebels had been well apprised of this fact. They knew The Mitchell home guard rallied and attemptthe names of such farmers as had fine stock, and ed to pursue the retreating rebels; but as they were earnest in their inquiries for a Mr. Braxton, were on foot their pursuit was of little avail. A who resided near Paoli, in Orange county. On full company of home cavalry from Crawford reaching Paoli, about six o'clock on Friday even- County, led by Major Woodbury, started from ing, they immediately commenced a search for Leavenworth in pursuit as soon as he could mushorses and medicines, and before leaving they ter his men. By daylight yesterday the rebels ransacked every store, taking whatever they want-passed through Hardinsburgh, in Washington ed. They found Mr. Braxton, and, not content with taking his best horses, made him a pri soner. Most of their own horses were thin and broken down, and as fast as they found fresh ones they changed saddles and abandoned their former steeds. Nearly all the horses they left bore the brand of "M. C.," such as is placed upon all the animals of Morgan's cavalry. They had evidently seen hard service. Before arriving at Paoli the rebels entered the town of Vallini, Orleans County, the first that lay County, and, after plundering the stores in that place, left for King's Mills, in the direction of the Ohio River. Two hours after they had departed Major Woodbury came up, and, without halting, pushed on in pursuit, in the hope of overtaking the marauders at the crossing of the river. At King's Mills the latter delayed a half-hour to plunder a store, and on arriving there in pursuit Major Woodbury found he was only a half-hour behind his game. The place where the rebels crossed the Ohio on their entrance into the State, was at Blue Is |