pability of the Will. But if there is truly a power, an original and substantive efficiency, lodged in the Will, it is certainly a natural presumption that we should find degrees and diversities in this power, not less than in any other ability of the mind. "And facts which are constantly presented to our notice show this to be the case. § 173. Remarks on constitutional weakness of the will. If we will take the trouble to examine the characters of men, as we find them developed more or less in the pursuits of life, we shall not fail to find some who exhibit, not occasionally merely, but as a general thing and as a permanent trait of mind, a feebleness of resolution, a sort of vacillancy, a continual oscillation, if one may be allowed the expression, between one thing and another. No arguments, no motives, no considerations of interest, duty, or glory, are able permanently to countervail and prop up this inherent weakness. They may indeed sustain it for a time; the imbecility of purpose which marks the history of these persons may not always be discoverable in the ordinary circumstances of life, especially when the Will is supported by considerations suitable to give it strength; but in the onset of perilous circumstances, in the close pressure of portentous danger, in sudden and fearful emergencies of any kind whatever, instead of standing erect and immoveable, they are overwhelmed and driven away. If this statement is correct, it certainly presents an important aspect in the developements of human nature. We do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles; we do not expect the blind to see, the lame to walk erect, or the deaf to hear; we do not feel at liberty to require of a man, whose intellect is obviously incompetent to the task of combining more than half a dozen propositions, the production of a Spirit of Laws, a Principia, or Mecanique Celeste; and it would be almost as unreasonable, however useful they may be in other situations more adapted to their pe culiarities of mental organization, to expect from such persons a course of perseverance, fortitude, and daring. If no one is answerable for a greater number of talents than are given him, and if, in the case of particular individuals, the great Dispenser of mental gifts has seen fit to assign those talents to the Intellect rather than the Will, the requisition should be made, not only in conformity with the amount which has been given, but with reference also to the department of the mind where it exists. We may impose upon such persons a heavy burden of thought, but must be less exorbitant in our requisitions on their resolves and action in those difficult and pressing emergencies which obviously require the interposition of men of a different stamp. § 174. Of comparative or relative weakness of the will. There is an apparent, and, to all practical purposes, an actual weakness of the will, which, when we fully consider its nature, may properly be termed COMPARATIVE OF RELATIVE. We may explain it thus. The individual is not wanting in volitional decision and energy, if the Will be considered in itself and disconnected from other parts of the mental constitution. So far from this, it may perhaps be said with truth, that voluntary energy is naturally a leading trait and characteristic of the persons now referred to. And yet the Will does not fully perform the office of a controlling power; it does not act up to the standard of its own capabilities; the individual is often vacillating in his conduct, even in those cases where he acts with vigour; so much so, that, even with great confidence in his good intentions, we do not place full reliance on his future conduct. And the cause is to be attributed not so much, as has been remarked, to any weakness in the will, in itself considered, as to the want of proportion between that and other parts of the mind. In other words, the passions have become predominant; an inflammatory violence has been infused into them by nature or by accidental circumstances; and the Will, whatever may have been its original vigour, has become subordinate in its influence.-Have we not an illustration of these statements in the life of the Scottish poet Burns? It is undeniable, that he naturally possessed more vigour of purpose, more energy of resolve, than many other persons; but such was the inordinate intensity of his passions, that the power of his Will was relatively weak; it could not withstand and control those internal tempests to which he was subject. § 175. Instances of want of energy of the will. Having made these general statements concerning weakness or inefficiency of the Will (both that which is original or natural, and that which is relative and depends upon the inordinate strength of some parts of our emotive or passional nature), we now proceed to give some further instances of that want of voluntary energy which has been spoken of. Do we not often discover a defect of this kind in men in public life? How many instances are recorded in history of men who have been thrown upon the stormy ocean of politics, fitted with every capability for such a situation, with the exception of volitional energy; but who, burdened with this single defect, have at last gone down and been overwhelmed in the billows! Was not the pre-eminent mind of Cicero, capable as it was of penetrating all the mazes of philosophy, and of embracing all the heights and depths of civil and public law, greatly wanting in decision, in energy, in the firm and unshaken resolve? Although unspeakably in the advance in other respects, would it not in this particu lar suffer in comparison with the energetic purpose of Brutus and the Caesars ?-There is a name of no small note in English history, which is naturally brought to recollection in connexion with these views, as an instance of versatility, founded not so much upon incapacity of the understanding as upon imbecility and changeableness of the will. We refer to the Duke of Buckingham, who figured so conspicuously in the reign of Charles II., and who, in the language of Dryden, "Was everything by starts, and nothing long; Some of the prominent leaders in the French Revolution, that remarkable period of political tempest, showed themselves unequal to the occasion, and were overwhelmed in the convulsions which they contributed to arouse, but were unable to control. Were not the ministers Necker and Roland, whose relations to that memorable event are too well known to require a recital, instances and proofs of this remark? ́ Of Claviere also, one of the associates of Roland, it was remarked by Mirabeau, who was intimately acquainted with him, that "he was a man in head and a child in heart; that he always wanted a regulator; and that, left to himself, he never ceased to vary. Of De Graves, the successor of Narbonne, and who was required, in consequence of his situation and age, to furnish the list of the Roland ministry, it is said by a writer already repeatedly referred to, that "no man was less qualified to take a part in a stormy administration. He was an honest man, and his heart was good; he was a stranger to all party feeling, but was weak both in body and mind; he was not deficient in acquirements, and laboured hard; but he wanted energy of character, and a firm will of his own."*The mere possession of intellectual power is not enough to fit a person to take a leading part in the government of a nation, but it is necessary that he should add to distinguished powers of perception and reasoning a corresponding energy of the Will. How many, in consequence of not possessing powers of the Will commensurate with those of the Understanding, have become giddy on the pinnacle of their elevation, and have arisen only to fall! * Dumont's Recollections of Mirabeau, chaps. xv., xix. § 176. Remarks on great strength of the will. But there are instances of a different kind from those which have just been mentioned; instances, so far from weakness, that we clearly discover in them remarkable power of the will. It cannot be doubted that, among the various elements which constitute whatever is great and admirable in man, we find one here, viz., in marked decision and vigour of the will. If, in some cases, the will seems hardly to have an existence, in others it exhibits a transcendent degree of energy. There have been men who, in danger and suffering, have shown a vigour that was calculated to excite the strongest emotions; who have been inflexible, while others have been changed with every varying breeze; and have possessed themselves in stability and calmness, while many around them have been shaken in their resolutions and disquieted with fears. Of this marked decision and energy of the Will we now proceed, in addition to some cases already introduced for another purpose, to give some illustrations. § 177. Energy of the will under bodily suffering. When occupied with the general subject of the power of the will, we had occasion to make the remark that the patience which was not unfrequently exhibited in circumstances of bodily suffering, indicated the existence of such power in a greater or less degree. We might with propriety appeal to instances of the same kind, in order to show with what varieties of intensity the volitional power is dispensed to different individuals. It is often said, however, when we refer to cases of this kind, that men will calmly endure almost anything when they cannot help it. But, in answer to this suggestion, it is enough to say, that there are cases where men suffer by their own act and their own choice; and not merely in a slight manner, but in the highest degree.-The story of the Roman soldier, Mutius Scævola, so familiar to the classical student, shows us what astonishing powers of will are possessed by some persons. When required |