circumspection, to reason from the Supreme Being to the creatures he has made. Man, we are informed, was created in the image of his Maker; and accepting that as the true statement of the case, it cannot be doubted that the similitude was mental, and not bodily. It was the mind, the spiritual part, that was honoured with bearing the glorious impress of the divine lineaments.

It may indeed be said, by way of objection, that the alleged similitude between man and his Maker is limited to man's moral nature; but it should be recollected that it is impossible entirely to separate man's moral from his intellectual part. As the moral nature is based upon the intellectual (for there obviously can be no accountability where there are no powers of perceiving and judging), the existence of the former of course involves and implies the existence of the latter. If there be a reality in the distinction between right and wrong, there must be not only feeling and volition, but intelligence; and we cannot conceive of virtue or vice in connexion with the absence of either of them. With these views of the connexion existing among all the parts of man's mental nature, the intellectual, sentimentive, and voluntary, we understand the statement of man's primitive creation in the image of God to mean that there was really a likeness in kind, however diverse in degree; and that this similitude extends to all parts of our mental nature, with the exception of what are purely instinctive, or are essentially connected with our bodily and material organization. Now no one will deny that power is an attribute of the Divine Mind; and hence, reasoning from the Maker to that which is made, reasoning from the original and self-existent Archetype to the derived and dependent similitude, we have good grounds to believe that power exists positively and substantively in man as well as the Being who formed him.

CHAPTER II.

POWER OF THE WILL.

§ 159. Proof of power in the will from the analogy of the mind. BUT it is not enough to explain the nature of power, and to assert its existence as an attribute of the mind in general terms; we proceed now to consider its existence in that particular faculty or department of the mind which is denominated the WILL. Power is not only predicable of the mind in a general way, but it is predicable of its parts, and particularly and emphatically so of our volitional nature. The analogy running through our mental constitution furnishes some grounds and authority for this remark. Men universally speak (and they undoubtedly believe they have good reason so to do) of the power of sensation, of the power of perception, of the power of memory, and imagination, and reasoning; and, in fact, in all cases where there is a thing to be done, and a causative principle going before, which is prerequisite to its being done. The structure of all languages (for they appear to be all alike in this respect) proves what they think; and we may add, proves what they know on this subject. It is natural for the man who perceives to say that he has the power of perception; the man who remembers or reasons, asserts without hesitation that he has the power of remembering or reasoning; and it is impossible to convince these men either that these expressions are improperly applied, or that they are nugatory and convey no distinct meaning. But if there is truly a foundation for such expressions, and if there is a propriety and truth in the use of them, is there not equal propriety in speaking of the POWER of the WILL? If every other mental action clearly and convincingly indicates to us the existence of an innate energy corresponding to such ac

tion, it cannot be supposed that the act of willing alone, which is a pre-eminent and leading exercise of the mind, exists independently of any actual basis of voluntary energy. The analogy, therefore, of the mental constitution (for we are undoubtedly at liberty to reason from analogy in this case, as well as others) distinctly leads to the result that power is appropriate to, and is an attribute of, the Will.

§ 160. Proof of power in the will from internal experience. That power is predicable of the will, as well as of any other faculty of the mind, or of the mind as a whole, is evinced not only by the analogy running through the mental structure, but by other considerations. Among other views to be taken of the subject now before us, may we not, in this inquiry as well as in others, make an appeal to our internal experience? In other words, have we not, beyond all doubt, a testimony within us, a direct and decisive internal evidence of power in the acts of the Will? Do we not feel and know it to be so ?—Let us take a familiar instance as a test of these inquiries. When a person wills to go to a certain place, or wills to do a certain thing, does the volition appear to have been wrought within himself by an extraneous cause? Does it appear to have been created and placed there without any personal agency and effort? Or does it rather distinctly and satisfactorily indicate to him an energy of his own? Few persons, it is believed, will hesitate as to what answer to give.

Our consciousness, therefore, distinctly assures us that the action of the Will, within the limits constituting its appropriate sphere, truly originates in its own power. It wills, because it has the power to will. It acts, because it possesses that energy which is requisite to constitute the basis of action. In the language of one of the characters of the great English dramatist, when pressed for the reasons of a certain course of proceeding,

"The cause is in my Will; I will not come.”

§ 161. Proved from the ability which we have to direct our attention to particular subjects.

In one particular at least, our internal experience seems to be clear and decisive, viz., that we are able to direct our attention to some subjects of inquiry in preference to others. It is admitted that we cannot call up a thought or a train of thought by a mere and direct act of volition, although we have an indirect power in this respect, which is not without its important results. But when various trains of thought are passing through the mind, we are enabled, as it is presumed every one must be conscious, to direct our attention and to fix it firmly upon one thought or one train of thought in preference to another. It is undoubtedly the tendency of association to remove the thought or the train of thought, whatever it is, from the mind; but the power of the Will, where it is decisively exerted, can counteract this tendency, and keep the mind in essentially the same position for a greater or less length of time. And it does not appear what explanation can possibly be given of the fact that we thus frequently delay upon subjects, and revolve them in our contemplation, except on the ground of a real and effective energy of the Will.

§ 162. Proof of power in the will from observation. Furthermore, the phenomena of human nature, as they come within our constant observation, cannot be explained, except on the supposition that the Will is not the subject of any extraneous operation or power, in such a sense as entirely to exclude power or agency of its own. Do we not often see instances of persons, in whom vigour of the Will is a characteristic and predominant trait, and whose character and conduct cannot be explained except on the ground that they possess a voluntary energy of their own, and that, too, in a high degree? Men have often been placed in the most trying circumstances, called to endure the pains of imprisonment, and hunger and thirst, and torture, and exile, and death, and they have under

gone it with a most astonishing fortitude and calmness, without shedding a tear or uttering a lamentation. Here is something difficult to be explained, unless we take into consideration that innate power which we assert to be an attribute of the Will.

Whatever may be said of the fervid sincerity of his religion or the natural benevolence of his heart, are we able satisfactorily to explain the character and deeds of the illustrious Howard, except by taking this view? "The energy of his determination," says a judicious and valuable writer," was so great, that if, instead of being habitual, it had been shown only for a short time on particular occasions, it would have appeared a vehement impetuosity; but, by being unintermitted, it had an equability of manner which scarcely appeared to exceed the tone of a calm constancy, it was so totally the reverse of anything like turbulence or agitation. It was the calmness of an intensity, kept uniform by the nature of the human mind forbidding it to be more, and by the character of the individual forbidding it to be less."*

The case of Howard, marked and extraordinary as it is, does not stand alone. Every age of the world and every class of society have their men of this stamp. Extraordinary endowments of the will are as necessary to support society, and to meet the exigencies of our situation, as extraordinary endowments of intellect. But, unfortunately, though they are given in the discretion and wisdom of the great Dispenser of all mental gifts, they are not always wisely and righteously employed. A multitude of instances, of a character both good and evil, will occur to every one; among others, Alexander, Cæsar, Regulus, Charles XII., Hannibal, Columbus, the Apostle Paul, Cromwell, William Tell, Chatham, Nelson, Ledyard, Mungo Park, Napoleon, John Knox, Luther, Whitefield, Wesley, and numerous others, whose names are permanently enrolled in the religious and political history of men. The language of Ledyard will show the in* Foster's Essay on Decision of Character.