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Consciousness. And it has furthermore appeared, that the circumstances or occasion on which mental freedom actually exists in the highest degree, is to be found in the harmony of the mind's action. In other words, freedom exists in fact, and exists in the highest degree, when all the mental powers are in the precise place which their Creator designed for them, and when their operations are conducted without their coming into conflict with each other. This is a position of the mental powers which, by the very nature of the mind, is incidental and prerequisite to the highest degree of freedom, and every deviation from it is attended with an interruption and diminution of that perfection of inward liberty which men would otherwise possess.

But if this view in respect to freedom be a correct one, then we are naturally led to suppose and to believe that the precise opposite will be found to furnish the prerequisite circumstance, or the occasion of mental enthralment. And such is undoubtedly the fact. In other words, whenever we find an internal jarring and conflict, whenever one power overleaps its bounds and another is jostled from its place, we are conscious of want of freedom in a greater or less degree, or, what is the same thing, of enthralment or slavery. And especially we have a sense of this internal enthralment whenever, in consequence of some inordinate appetite or some victorious propensity or passion, that presiding authority, which is lodged in the Will, fails to execute what it obviously ought to, and what the conscience pronounces to be right and requires to be done.

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§ 139. Inability to define enthralment or slavery.

But what is meant by enthralment or slavery? What verbal definition can we give ?-If the question related to the enthralment or slavery of the body, we could probably give a statement, or definition perhaps, that would fully and precisely meet the question. But we have already had occasion distinctly to inti

mate, that the nature of corporeal enthralment and liberty throws no light, or, at most, but a feeble and doubtful ray, upon that of the mind. We are not more able, by any mere form of words, to explain what is meant by slavery, when that term is applied to the mind, than we are to define mental freedom. In both cases we are obliged to refer each one to his own internal experience, but with a full conviction, at the same time, that this reference will fully answer the purpose, and cannot leave him in doubt.

On the supposition, therefore, that each one as fully understands what is meant by enthralment as by freedom, and that there is no mistake or doubt in either case, we repeat again, that, whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always a greater or less degree of enthralment. This want of harmony, this internal jarring and conflict, this aggression and resistance of the mental powers, will always exist whenever any appetite, propensity, or passion, of whatever character, swells over its allotted limits, and becomes unduly and inordinately powerful. If we may be allowed to use such expressions, every part of the mind instinctively knows its appropriate place, and will not suffer itself to be thrust from it without much remonstrance and resistance. If such resistance is not successful, and if some inward principle, without regard to the original constitution of the mind and the equitable admonitions of conscience, usurps an undue control over others, we are conscious of what we may properly term mental slavery, at least in respect to that particular part or faculty which especially suffers under this usurpation.

§ 140. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a reference to extorted promises.

It may possibly be found difficult for the reader at first to apprehend the view here given (and the same may be said, perhaps, of various other topics which have come under our notice), in consequence of such apprehension depending so much on his own internal

reflection. That he must look within, and consult what takes place there, is true. And as it is undoubtedly desirable that such internal reflection should be called into exercise as much as possible, we will endeavour to aid it by some instances.-We will take the case of a man who is travelling through an extensive forest, and unexpectedly meets with robbers. They suddenly present their pistols to him, and threaten him with immediate death unless he promises to deposite a certain sum in a specified place on a certain day. He promises that he will do it. And it is an obvious question here, what is the view which men of plain common sense and the community generally take of such a transaction? They evidently do not consider it on the same footing with a promise made under other circumstances; they do not regard it, in the full sense of the terms, as a BONA FIDE promise and morally binding, even when they judge it expedient, in view of some incidental circumstances, that it should be fulfilled. They always make a distinction (and it is a distinction which is fully recognised in law both Municipal and International) between an extorted promise and a free promise. And if an extorted promise is actually different from a free one, it must be because extortion implies a degree of enthral ment. And this is the fact.

When the question of life and death is placed before a man at once, and without giving him time for reflection and for strengthening his resolves, the fear becomes so excessive that there is no sort of proportion between the strength of the motive and that of other principles within him which might furnish the elements of resistance. Those supports, upon which the Will is wont to rely in seasons of trying assault and great emergency, are suddenly overthrown; and it is prostrated and carried away captive almost without a conflict. The person himself, if the circumstances are of a nature so decisive as has been stated, experiences no convictions of guilt for subsequently violating a promise made under such a mental pres

sure, nor is he condemned by the moral sense of the community at large. They perceive almost instinctively, that, by a sudden conjuncture of circumstances, for which the individual is not himself responsible, the due balance and harmony of the powers of the mind has been destroyed; and that it is unreasonable, in such a state of things, to expect results which can properly be the subjects either of praise or blame.

§ 141. Illustration of the same subject from cases of torture. We may propose another illustration, which will help to make the subject more fully and clearly understood. In former ages it was no uncommon practice to put persons to the torture, in order to obtain their testimony. They were first subjected to the darkness and privations of a dungeon; and after being worn down by this gradual form of suffering, their feet were applied to heated plates of iron; their flesh was burned and torn by pincers; their limbs were wrenched and almost forced asunder; and in these, and in various other ways, they were compelled to endure almost every possible degree of misery. And it was not unfrequently the case, that persons under this extremity of suffering uttered what was untrue. But no one thinks of condemning the moral delinquency, if it existed at all under such circumstances, as equalling the aggravation of a falsehood uttered in ordinary cases. In all such cases, everybody perceives and feels that the due balance and harmony of the mind is destroyed. Such an extreme pressure is brought to bear upon the mind in a particular direction, that its parts become, for the time being, dislocated, and utterly incapable of any just and accountable action. In other words, there is an utter slavery of the volitional power; and as the individual is not the cause of putting himself in this situation, we often only sympathize and pity, when we should otherwise condemn. It is indeed possible for us to condemn, in some degree, when the suffering does not appear to be extreme; but the condemnation is always mitigated, and in many cases does not exist at all.

“The common sense of mankind," says Mr. Stewart, "pronounces men to be accountable for their conduct only in so far as they are understood to be morally free. Whence is it that we consider the pain of the rack as an alleviation of the falsehoods extorted from the criminal? Plainly because the motives presented to him are supposed to be such as no ordinary degree of self-command is able to resist. And if we were only satisfied that these motives are perfectly irresistible, we would not ascribe to him any guilt at all."*This is undoubtedly the true philosophy in this matter.

§ 142. Historical illustrations of the subject.

And here, with, the permission of the reader, we will introduce a piece of literary history, which we find in D'Israeli, who, in his attempts to interest the curiosity and to give pleasure, has, in various passages, thrown much light upon the human mind. In the reign of Charles I. of England, a man by the name of Felton, the assassinator of the Duke of Buckingham, was menaced with torture for the purpose and with the expectation of extracting from him the names of his accomplices. The communication, that it was the king's pleasure that he should be put to the torture, was made to him by Lord Dorset, who accordingly gave him notice to prepare for the rack. Felton, after solemnly affirming that his purpose to commit the crime was not known to any man living, said, "But if it be his majesty's pleasure, I am ready to suffer whatever his majesty will have inflicted upon me. Yet this I must tell you by the way, that if I be put upon the rack, I will accuse you, my Lord Dorset, and none but yourself.”+ Here is a text in ethical casuistry, affording abundant food for meditation. Felton foresaw that it would probably be impossible for him to endure the suffering which would be inflicted; that he would be under a mental necessity of accusing

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § iii. † D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. iii.

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