distinct, and are, at the same time, so appropriate to the nature of the subject to be proved, and, considered as a whole, bear upon it with so much force, that it is difficult to conceive how a well-balanced mind, which is open to the reception of truth, can resist the conclusions to which they lead.—And in making this assertion, we do not wish to be understood as offering a remark which is to be taken with some modification and diminution of its obvious import. The remark is based upon the constitution of the mind itself; particularly so far as the nature and laws of belief are concerned in, and make a part of, that constitution. Every one knows that our belief is not a matter which is under our control in such a sense, that we can believe or not believe, as we happen to choose. The mind is so constituted that we exercise belief, not in accordance with a mere and direct act of volition, but in accordance with the nature and amount of the evidence which happens to be before the mind at the precise moment of belief.

And, with this view of things in memory, we feel fully authorized in saying, that the evidence which has been brought forward in support of the proposition of the will's subjection to laws is such as, in ordinary cases, to remove all doubt. We look upon the proposition as proved; not merely as probable, but as certain. It is not a matter, the reception and credence of which is left to our own choice; but, on the contrary, such is the constitution of the human mind, we cannot possibly do otherwise than believe. And these statements will apply equally well to both propositions. The proposition of the will's freedom is attended with such an amount of evidence, appropriate to the point to be established, as to be equally beyond doubt, equally certain. We receive both with a full and unwavering conviction; and such are the nature and fundamental principles of belief, that we are unable to withhold such conviction.

If, then, our belief involves what appears to us at present an inconsistency or even a contradiction (we

do not say what we know to be a contradiction, but what appears to be such), it is a matter which we cannot help, and in respect to which, although we might wish it to be otherwise, we should give ourselves no unnecessary trouble. We are in the same situation (certainly not a less favourable one) as the sincere inquirer in other things. Does the natural philosopher, in pursuing the investigation of facts, stop to inquire what doctrines formerly received it will either favour or conflict with, what system it will build up or put down, what new and inexplicable mysteries it will involve? Is he not obliged to adhere to the testimony that is fairly presented to him, wherever it may go, even if it should lead into a world not of pure light, but of mingled darkness and light? And in like manner, in respect to the question before us, let us go firmly and frankly wherever the evidence conducts, even if it should be found to lead us, as perhaps it will, to a great mystery in the facts and relations of things, where the human mind stops and stands in silence, appalled on the one hand by the sense of its own feebleness, and on the other overwhelmed by the greatness of the divine wisdom.

§ 130. Denial of the alleged contradiction.

In answer, therefore, to the objection which has been referred to, we say in the first place that we are bound by the evidence, whatever difficulties may attend the relative adjustment of the results. If the objection were to some extent a valid and admissible one (that is to say, if there were truly an appearance, a degree of probability, of inconsistency and contradiction), this answer would be sufficient.

But it is proper to say further, that there is no satisfactory evidence, either in a higher or lower degree, of the inconsistency and contradiction which has been alleged to exist. A true philosophy of the mind, as I think we have already seen, does not allow of such evidence. A true philosophy affirms and establishes their correlation and harmony, and not their contra

diction. And yet it has undoubtedly sometimes happened, either by design or from mere carelessness, that men have so framed their speech, have so selected and constructed their formulary of words, as to make a contradiction, when there is none in the nature of things, and none in fact. If we define freedom to be an exemption from law, then no doubt the proposition of the will's subjection to law implies the exclusion of liberty. But, although bodily freedom can be defined, mental freedom, as we have already had occasion to remark, is not susceptible of definition; it is something, indeed, which is a matter of experience, and is known by consciousness, but, like the simple and elementary emotions and desires, and any other subjects of mental realization which are truly elementary, it cannot be described by words. And if it were otherwise, the definition of liberty above mentioned would be wholly inadmissible; for exemption from law is so far from constituting liberty, that it might be shown, upon grounds entirely satisfactory, that there can be no liberty, not even a possibility of it, where law has no place. So that we feel fully authorized in saying, although we are under the necessity of leaving the inquiry with these few words, that there is no evidence of contradiction in the case.

§ 131. Admission of inexplicableness or mystery. But if it be merely said that there is something inexplicable or incomprehensible, something mysterious in the relation of the two propositions which have been considered, it is not easy to deny that there is some degree of truth in the remark. We cannot imagine that there is any undue humiliation, anything discreditable in the acknowledgment that such is the fact. Nothing is more certain than that there are many things, into the full measure of whose length and breadth, and height and depth, the human mind, in the present state of existence and under the present economy of things, has never been able to penetrate. And it is undoubtedly the mark of true wisdom frank

ly to acknowledge our ignorance in those cases where it must infallibly exist, and not to indulge either in pretensions which are unfounded, or in complaints which are useless. Such advice, indeed, may not be entirely acceptable to men of a captious or flippant temper, or of an intellect imperfectly disciplined; but it is fully warranted by correct views of our own powers, and of the relations we sustain to other beings. "The most enlightened of men," says Robert Hall, "have always been the first to perceive and acknowledge the remaining obscurity which hung around them; just as, in the night, the further a light extends, the wider the surrounding sphere of darkness appears. Hence it has always been observed, that the most profound inquirers into nature have been the most modest and humble." These remarks of a writer so distinguished, not only for refinement of taste and fervour of piety, but for philosophical. acuteness, naturally reminds us of some sayings of Mr. Locke, which indicate at the same time his characteristic modesty and candour, and his views of the very difficulty which we are now examining. "I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that, though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free, yet I cannot make [meaning undoubtedly that he could not explain and clear up in all respects how it should be so freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to; and therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it.'

And I must myself be permitted to say, in harmony with these impressive remarks, that, in the midst of a universe under the government of God, where the minutest things are under his superintendence and

control, it seems to me not only a thing possible to be done, but that it is one of his greatest works, that He has created a being who is formed and sustained with law as the basis of his existence, and at the same time with the birthright and the glorious inheritance of liberty.

§ 132. Of the limited powers of the human mind.

In this connexion, and as tending to support the views of this chapter, we think it proper to make a few general suggestions in respect to the limited powers of the human mind. We may regard it as a wellestablished principle, that the mind of man, although it may be indefinitely progressive in some directions, is subject to the restriction of impassable barriers in others. How many objects of knowledge, in the sphere of material as well as mental nature, have altogether set at nought. the inquiries of men! Beyond the boundaries, whatever they may be, which God has assigned as the barriers of our faculties, is the land of darkness, the region of hieroglyphics, the habitation of mysteries. We use these expressions not in lightness of spirit, but merely to convey the fact as it exists, and with profound veneration; for if those dark and mysterious places are not reached, and occupied, and understood by the human mind, it is certain that they are within the reach and knowledge of another mind infinitely greater. The existence of mysteries, beyond its allotted sphere of action and inquiry, is necessarily an incident to every created mind; for the mere fact of being created necessarily implies inferiority, and that, too, in perception as well as in power. In one sense, indeed, it may be admitted, that man is great, and the honoured possessor of great and wonderful faculties. Certainly this is the case when we compare him with the lower animals, that have no moral nature, and seem destined soon to perish. But let him never forget, that, under other circumstances, the view presented is entirely the reverse, and that he is as blind in intellect as he is poor in power, in com