dinate indulgences, which inevitably tend to bring the mind more or less within the verge of insanity. Within the limitation implied in this remark, a very slight observation discovers to us that men are constantly in action; that the causes of action exist in themselves; and that, in all the numberless varieties of their conduct, they act freely. One is in pursuit of honour, another of pleasure, another of wealth; one acts from motives of interest, and another from sentiments of duty; one has solely in view the promotion of his own personal welfare, another that of mankind; but in each and all of these cases, and in all others, there is no declaration and no evidence of compulsion. And we feel the force of this statement the more when we further notice that men are frequently changing those pursuits to which their attention was directed in the first instance; transferring themselves from one neighbourhood to another, from one sphere of life to another, and from one climate to another, and adapting their feelings and conduct to situations never before experienced. Everywhere there is life, activity, movement, energy; plans never before started; new methods of executing them; the motives and conduct of one individual conflicting with those of another, and varying constantly to meet conflicting exigencies. And does all this bear the impress of fatality? Are we not to receive these facts`as decisive indications of liberty, even if it be true that we are unable to define what liberty is? Can we even conceive of a freedom which shall result in opening a wider sphere, or in securing a greater variety of action?

§ 126. Argued further from the view taken in the Scriptures. We conclude this enumeration of circumstances, which tend to illustrate and prove the existence of liberty of the will, with the single fact further, which no one can regard otherwise than as entitled to our serious consideration, that the Scriptures clearly recognise man as possessing such liberty. If the Scriptures everywhere assert the omniscience and superin

tendence of God, and announce his superintendence as extending to the minutest things and events, both material and immaterial, as seems to be abundantly evident and to be universally admitted, still it must be confessed, at the same time, that they are no less explicit in the announcement, both expressly and by implication, that man has power, freedom, and accountability. All those passages which call upon men to consider of their ways, obviously imply that there is no obstruction in the way of their considering, and that they are free either to do or not to do it. All those passages which exhort and require men to repent of their deeds, obviously imply that they are in the possession of liberty, and that there is no obstacle in the way of their repentance which is inconsistent with liberty. All those passages which enjoin upon men the performance of moral and religious duties, go upon the supposition that obedience and disobedience are alike within the sphere of their choice. "Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, oh house of Israel," is the beautiful and affecting language which God utters to his ancient covenant people, and to all his impenitent children of all nations.

§ 127. Practical importance of the doctrine of liberty.

If we have not stated the argument on the side of freedom so clearly and forcibly, and so much at length, as might have been done, the deficiency occasions the less solicitude when we consider that, in all ages of the world, the doctrine in question, with few exceptions, has been fully and universally admitted. Still there have been found some persons, from time to time, who have maintained and have apparently believed the opposite, and have strenuously endeavoured to give a currency to their opinions. And hence, in closing these remarks on the subject of the freedom of the will, it seems a suitable opportunity to say something on its practical importance. If we are destitute of freedom, we certainly cannot feel moral accounta

bility; and whatever course we may take in life, even if it be entirely injurious and sinful, we shall yet feel that we are not properly the subjects of blame. Before, therefore, we adopt the notion of man's destitution of liberty (if, indeed, it be possible, after a due consideration of what has been said on the subject), we should carefully and seriously consider the consequences.

For the purpose of showing that these intimations are not based upon unfounded or exaggerated fears, and in order more clearly to illustrate the pernicious consequences to which erroneous notions on this subject are apt to lead, we take the liberty to introduce here an extract from the writings of the celebrated M. Diderot."Examine it narrowly," says M. Diderot, "and you will see that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive of a being acting without a motive, than we can of one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit, which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What, then, is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill? The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed or punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. But, though neither the doer of good or of ill be free, man is nevertheless a being to be modified; it is for this reason the doer

of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c.; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust."

It seems to be unnecessary to spend time in commenting on this passage, which is as much at variance with sound philosophy as it is with good morals and the existence of society. Wherever such erroneous principles have gained a footing, it is not surprising that the intellect should be obscured; that the sensibilities should be blunted; that crimes, dreadfully revolting to human nature, should be multiplied; and that even whole kingdoms should be convulsed, and clothed in mourning and blood.

Let us, then, take that true position, which is clearly pointed out both by reason and the Scriptures, of humble dependence on God on the one hand, and of solemn responsibility for our conduct on the other. It is impossible for us to form too high notions of the power, wisdom, and superintendence of the Deity; nothing is more favourable to virtue than the conviction of his constant presence and oversight; but, at the same time, we ought ever to remember that he has seen fit to impart to us a moral nature, embracing the elements both of power and liberty; and, whether we account this gift as ten talents, or five, or only one, he holds us responsible for its use, and will punish the slothful servant who hides it in the earth. "For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.”

CHAPTER VI.

CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND FREEDOM.

§ 128. Objected that the views maintained are contradictory. WE are now so far advanced in our inquiries as to find ourselves in a position where we may be permitted to delay a little upon the objection, expressed with some variety of phraseology, but in all cases to this effect, that there is an utter inconsistency and contradiction between the two doctrines of the freedom of the will and the subjection of the will to laws. If the Will is free, it is said, it cannot be subject to laws; and if it is subject to laws, or must act in harmony with laws, it cannot be free; and, at any rate, there is something utterly incomprehensible in this state of things. The consideration of this objection, thus broadly and emphatically stated as it often is, will occupy our attention in this chapter, and, at the same time, will incidentally furnish an opportunity for some remarks, which may not be unimportant in their practical applications.

§ 129. Answered that they result necessarily from the evidence.

In remarking upon the objection which has just been stated, and which undoubtedly exists in the minds of some candid inquirers, we wish it to be noticed, in the first place, that each of these two propositions, viz., that the will has its laws, and that the will is free, rests upon its appropriate evidence. We take it for granted that they are propositions which have a meaning and which can be understood; and that, as such, they admit of the application of reasoning, and are susceptible either of affirmation or denial. In reasoning upon them, they have been made separate subjects of contemplation. The arguments by which they are respectively supported are entirely